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Summary
The first five chapters investigate the incentive effects 
of the reward for labour being inseparably linked to that for entre­
preneurship in the labour-managed firm. After an initial analysis 
of the standard model of such a firm in Chapter 1, Chapter 2 attempts 
to investigate many issues influencing productivity and efficiency by 
considering the work-leisure allocation of time as a choice variable. 
Chapter 3 argues that within the incentive structure there is a direct 
utility effect arising from the work environment. Chapter 4 considers 
the effect of different property rights structures on firm behaviour 
and Chapter 5 discusses the implications of price uncertainty. In 
these chapters we question the established pessimism concerning the 
"smallness" and perversity of labour-managed firms by demonstrating 
under reasonable assumptions (i) higher effort of workers for higher 
product prices (Chapter 2), (ii) the work-environment effect of 
reduced worker alienation (Chapter 3) and (iii) the risk-spreading 
behaviour caused by uncertainty (Chapter 5).
In Chapter 6 an incentive scheme to aid the mobility of 
labour in a labour-managed economy is described and extended to the 
consideration of individual labour supply. A contrast to the incen­
tive structure of labour-managed firms is considered in Chapter 7 
which analyses efficiency aspects of Soviet incentive bonuses of the 
Kosygin reforms of the mid 1960s with the conclusion that their early 
amendment was predictable. Chapter 8 investigates the incentive 
effects of limiting private plot size in a simple collective farm model. 
This question does not seem to have been considered, yet such restric­
tions were applied by Kruschev in the late 1950's. Chapters 9 and 
10 eschew assumptions of perfect knowledge of planners and consider 
the relative advantages of using prices, and thus profit incentives, 
over quotas in a second-best world. The basic model in this area 
(Weitzman (1974)) is extended in a number of directions.
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Introduction
In the first part of the thesis, we will consider a competi­
tive labour market as the standard of comparison in order to investi­
gate payments for labour in other systems, particularly one where 
workers fulfil a group entrepreneurship róle, taking group decisions 
concerning the hire of factors of production, output levels and so 
forth. This system has been the subject of considerable analysis based 
on the early work of Ward (1958) and Domar (1966) and developed by 
Vanek (1970) and Meade (1972). In its simplest form, the objective 
function of a firm in this system- a labour-managed firm - is taken 
to be the maximisation of the per worker excess of revenue over non­
labour cost. The payment received for a worker-member's labour is 
thus contingent upon the group entrepreneurial decisions, incentive 
effects influencing how hard workers work, and any stochastic factors 
such as uncertain demand conditions.
In Chapter 1, we investigate entrepreneurial decisions 
for such a firm. As workers take these decisions in order to maximise 
their individual income, it has been argued that their behaviour will 
be such as to equate the marginal and average net revenue products of 
labour by fixing membership size. This not only has the effect of 
making the firm smaller than its conventional profitable counterpart 
but also leads to some well-known perverse comparative-static results. 
We see in Chapter 1 that the picture becomes more complicated when 
entrepreneurial decisions concerning other factors of production are 
taken concurrently, and we attempt to offer a characterisation in 
terms of the changes in marginal products along a linear expansion
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path in input space emanating from the origin. The differences in the 
behaviour of the labour-managed firm from that of the conventional 
firm derive of course from the joint labour/entrepreneur role of a 
member of a labour-managed firm.
The fact that worker- members in labour-managed firms are 
working for themselves gives rise to incentive effects in terms of 
an individual's supply of labour. These effects have been investigated 
by Sen (1966) and a number of recent papers, for example Bonin (1977a) 
and Berman (1977). The size of the incentive effects is seen to 
depend on the interdependency of individuals' supply decisions. This 
can be expressed in a number of ways, which are compared in Chapter 2.
Two additional complications to the working of the incentive 
structure of labour-managed firms are the subjects of Chapters 3 and 
4, In Chapter 3, it is argued that as well as having an incentive 
effect via the reward for labour, the labour-managed firm may well 
present a more amenable and pleasanter working environment. Less 
disutility of work at the margin may imply a different individual 
labour supply decision. The interesting question arising from both 
the incentive and work environment effects on individual labour 
supply, is how far this will effect the optimal entrepreneurial 
decisions as to size of membership, hire of other factors of production, 
level of output, etc.
A second complication to the working of the incentive 
structure in labour-managed firms is the likely property rights 
structure in such firms. There is no unique structure of property
viil
rights observed in all instances of labour-managed firms, but the 
Yugoslav case, which has been documented by Furubotn and Pejovich 
(1973), is an example where, it is claimed, the property rights 
structure leads to disincentives to invest in labour-managed firms. 
Chapter 4 contains a short discussion of some property rights issues. 
The object of the chapter is to emphasise the existence of not only 
a property rights structure for the firm's capital assets, but also 
for firm membership.
The assumption of no uncertainty is relaxed in Chapter 5 
where uncertainty in both product price and fixed cost is analysed.
A parallel is drawn between the influence of uncertainty on a labour- 
managed firm's membership level decision and the perverse comparative 
static results noted in Chapter 1.
In addition to the effects of a contingent contract, rather 
than a wage, for labour within a single labour-managed firm, there 
are further problems relating to economic systems based on such firms 
One is the "Ward-Domar" problem concerning the lack of mobility of 
labour in such a system. Another is the absence of any short-term 
mechanism for full employment. Both these problems emanate from pro­
perty rights of firm membership and are touched on in Chapter 4. In 
Chapter 6 , however, an incentive fund scheme is outlined as a partial 
solution to these problems. The scheme is extended in a number of 
ways, one of which is the case of variable individual labour supply.
A technical problem in seeking the maximum net income per
worker is that the latter may not be a well-behaved function of
rights observed in all instances of labour-managed firms, but the 
Yugoslav case, which has been documented by Furubotn and Pejovich 
(1973), is an example where, it is claimed, the property rights 
structure leads to disincentives to invest in labour-managed firms. 
Chapter 4 contains a short discussion of some property rights issues. 
The object of the chapter is to emphasise the existence of not only 
a property rights structure for the firm's capital assets, but also 
for firm membership.
The assumption of no uncertainty is relaxed in Chapter 5 
where uncertainty in both product price and fixed cost is analysed.
A parallel is drawn between the influence of uncertainty on a labour- 
managed firm's membership level decision and the perverse comparative 
static results noted in Chapter 1.
In addition to the effects of a contingent contract, rather 
than a wage, for labour within a single labour-managed firm, there 
are further problems relating to economic systems based on such firms 
One is the "Ward-Domar" problem concerning the lack of mobility of 
labour in such a system. Another is the absence of any short-term 
mechanism for full employment. Both these problems emanate from pro­
perty rights of firm membership and are touched on in Chapter 4. In 
Chapter 6, however, an incentive fund scheme is outlined as a partial 
solution to these problems. The scheme is extended in a number of 
ways, one of which is the case of variable individual labour supply.
A technical problem in seeking the maximum net income per
worker is that the latter may not be a well-behaved function of
membership level. A similar point is picked up in Chapter 7 when 
also the efficiency implications of using bonus functions for decen­
tralising planned economiesare analysed. The particular bonus function 
considered is that pertaining to the 1965 reform in the Soviet Union.
The Soviet collective farm is the subject of Chapter 8 where 
the allocation of time between leisure, work on private plots and 
work on collective land is the behaviour that can be influenced by 
planners' controls. The effect of limiting the size of private plots, 
either by a fixed quota or by a quota which is related to time worked 
on collective land, is analysed.
The final two chapters of the thesis relate to the debate con­
cerning the relative efficiency of price and quantity planning controls 
in an economy with uncertainties in marginal benefit and marginal cost. 
Here the decentralised managers have more information concerning cost 
than the planners. However, if set a price and rewarded according to 
profits, they may well over-react, in a social welfare sense, in 
adjusting output level to that which equates marginal cost and price. 
This is because at, for instance, lower levels of output marginal 
expected benefit may be relatively high, if the marginal expected 
benefit schedule is downward sloping. On the other hand if the managers 
are simply set a quantity to produce, they will not react at all to 
additional information about costs. This problem was first solved 
by Weitzman (1974). However, it is shown in Chapter 9 that a simple 
price schedule is superior in expected welfare terms to either a 
pure price or quantity schedule. A further problem with both price 
and quantity (of output) controls is that neither ensures full
employment of resources. Planning controls using relative product 
price to resource price levels and which do ensure full employment of 
resources are compared with direct resource allocation in Chapter 10.
The common thread of all the topics outlined above is that 
of the effect on resource allocation to productive enterprises of 
various incentive systems. Although most emphasis has been placed 
on the incentive system defined by the concept of the labour-managed 
firm, variations to decentralised planning controls such as managerial 
bonus functions and quantity restrictions have been included. Within 
the latter context, the analysis in Chapters 9 and 10 of the welfare 
effects of different decentralised planning controls in second-best 
situations is an important topic.
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2.
An orthodox entrepreneurial profit maximising firm in 
competitive markets, with no uncertainty, and with access to rentier 
capital, maximises profit n defined by
n = pQ(K, N) - wN - rK (1.1)
where
P
Q(K, N)
N
w
K
r
product price
twice differentiable production function with positive
marginal products and negative definite hessian in
the locality of solutions
number of workers
wage per time period
quantity of capital
rental per unit of capital per time period.
An equivalent labour-managed firm (LM-firm) is assumed to 
maximise the income per worker-member in the firm, that is to 
maximise
y = (p Q(K, N) - rK) /N (1.2)
The income per worker y is simply revenue net of all non-labour 
costs shared equally among the worker-members. In this chapter, we 
will assume, unless otherwise stated, that both capital and labour 
are freely and costlessly adjustable to their optimal values. Also 
both inputs are homogeneous and of the same quality in the two types
of firm.
3.
We can compare the LM-firm with the profit-maximising firm 
(PM-firm) by comparing the equilibrium conditions for maximising (1.1) 
and (1.2). We can also assess differences in the responses of the 
two firms to parametric changes in the product price and the capital 
rental. This comparative analysis is well-known and develops from 
Ward (1958), Vanek (1970) and Meade (1972). We will, however, attempt 
characterisations ,of some of the comparisons, which do not appear to 
have been published, although we cannot claim originality with any 
conviction.
The equilibrium of the PM-firm is given by maximising (1.1) 
with respect to the variables K and N . First-order conditions 
are thus
pQK - r = o (1*3)
pQN - w = 0 (1,4)
while for the LM-firm, first-order conditions for maximising (1.2) 
with respect to K and N are
PQK - r = 0 (X.5)
pQN - y = 0 ( 1. 6 )
Second-order conditions for the two firms are the same, i.e. that
the matrix
4.
q kk q kn
q nk qnn
is negative definite.
Suppose the wage rate w for the PM-firm equilibrium is 
such that it is exactly equal to the maximum income per worker in 
the LM-firm, i.e. w = y . Then the equilibrium conditions (1.3) and 
(1.4) are identical to (1.5) and (1.6). Now consider the behaviour 
of the two systems of equilibrium conditions as the wage rate w varies. 
Obviously the LM-firm equilibrium is unchanged. Comparative statics 
on the PM-firm's equilibrium yields
'dK
= I h"1
0 '
dN p dw
'dK1 dw '-‘W
_dN P * 1H | - QJ
As H is negative definite, |h | > 0  and Q < 0 and
^  < 0 . Also the sign of ^  is given by the sign of -Q ^  . If
clKQ > 0 , and the inputs are complementary then < 0 and we also
have —  < 0 . Thus in the case of complementary inputs we have: dw
if y < w (arising from dw > 0 ) then capital, labour and output 
are greater in the LM-firm than in the PM-firm;
5.
if y > w (arising from dw < 0) then capital, labour and output are 
less in the IM-firm than in the PM-firm.
Even if Qy.., £ 0 , the same ranking of labour inputs can be
made. Also if = 0 , the capital levels are the same in the two
types of firm and the labour input and the output levels are ranked 
as above. Furthermore the same labour input and output ranking holds 
if capital is fixed and not variable, provided it is fixed at the 
same level in the two types of firm.
If w = y then II = 0 . Also ^  = -N < 0 . Thus if
1 dw
w < y , then n > 0 , and the condition y < w , y > w in the above
can be replaced by II < 0 , II > 0 respectively. This particular
technique of changing w to yield comparative static results was 
used to compare advertising behaviour in Ireland and Law (1977).
As capital and labour being complementary appears a reasonable 
assumption and as this is a sufficient condition for the LM-firm to 
employ lower (higher) levels of both inputs and produce less (more) output 
than the PM-firm when profit is positive (negative), it has been argued 
that the conclusions to be drawn from this analysis are that:
(i) In long run equilibrium (when profit is zero) the two 
firms will be identical.
(ii) The short-run is likely to be characterised by positive 
profits and thus smaller LM-firms than PM-firms.
6.
Also if capital is fixed (at the same level) then the 
above conclusions hold without the assumption of complementary inputs.
response to the common parameters r and p . It is well-known 
(see Intrilligator (1971)) that for the PM-firm, output will increase 
for an increase in product price. Thus at least one input must be 
superior (the demand for this input increases with product price).
An increase in an input price will reduce optimal output if the input 
is superior and increase it if the input is inferior.
Now consider the response of the LM-firm. Totally differen­
tiate (1.5) and (1.6) and we obtain
The LM- and PM-firms can also be compared in terms of their
PQrK dK + PQKN dN = dr - Qk dp ( 1 . 8)
(1.9)
Now from (1.5) and ^ - QN = ^  from (1.6).
We can thus solve for dK and dN as
dK - ( 1 . 10)
dN ( 1. 11)
Consider first the case where dp > 0 , dr " 0
dK
dp
-r (Qnn n + q nk k) ( 1 . 12 )
7.
dN
dp H N % k n Qkk k)
(1.13)
Both (1.12) and (1.13) are ambiguous in sign. Basically 
inspection of (1.9) if dK is constrained to be zero yields
JM n
1—  = rK/(p N Q„„) < 0 where dr = 0 . The introduction of capitaldp NN
variability will reinforce this if the inputs are substitutes
(Q < 0) and counteract it if they are complements. Also inspection
dK 2of (1.8) if dL is constrained to be zero yields = -r/(p Q^) > 0-
The introduction of labour variability reinforces this if the inputs 
are substitutes and counteracts it if they are complements. Before 
assessing the likely signs of (1.12) and (1.13) and also of ^  , 
it will be useful to consider the other case; that when dp * 0 and 
dr > 0 . We then obtain from (1.10) and (1.11):
dK
dr P I H | N % N  N + QNK K)
dN
dr
-1
P IH | N «KN
N + Qkk k)
(1.14)
(1.15)
Obviously and are both of opposite signs to
4 -^ and ~ respectively, and their signs depend on the same bracketed dp dp
terms. In fact this can also be seen by noting that K, N and 
indeed Q are homogeneous of degree zero in (p, r) . This is 
because maximum income per worker is homogeneous of degree 1 in 
(p, r) , so that the same input levels are optimal if for instance 
p and r both double. The implication of input demands being 
homogeneous of degree zero in (p, r) is that K(p, r) has the
8.
property
0
and similarly
3N 3Np + -5—  r 3p 3r 0 .
Expressions such as Q,_, N + Q„„ K occur in other fields r NN NK
of analysis. Most interestingly they appear in the analysis of the 
regulated firm. For instance Baumol and Klevorick (1970) focus 
attention on the sign of such an expression which needed to be negative 
for the capital-labour ratio to increase in a regulated firm when 
the "regulation" was tightened (maximum rate of return on capital 
reduced). They took the view that such negativity "is obviously 
not necessarily true, nor is it easily interpretable", (Baumol and 
Klevorick (1970) p. 179). However a simple interpretation is that 
if decreases for a one per cent increase in both capital and
labour then QNN N + K < 0 . To see this, describe
qn - qn(+n. <M0
and differentiate with respect to if , i.e. increase labour and 
capital inputs by the same proportion. Similarly if decreases
then Q „ N + Q K < 0 . We argue that marginal products reducing 
with scale increases provides a reasonable basis for assuming 
negativity of these expressions and thus our allocation of signs for 
(1.12) to (1.15) would be
9.
dN
dp < 0
Of course there exist production functions which would
invalidate this allocation. Note, however, that the example of 
Baumol and Klevorick (1970, p. 179) is inadmissable as revenue is 
negative for all non-trivial input levels, as it is a negative 
definite quadratic form in the input levels.
A genuine counter example to the above allocation of signs
would be
and St > 0 . Opposite signs to those allocated for
in the example. Note however that at least one pair of signs must
Q - K log (N + a) + b log (K + a)
a > 0 and r is such that locally bK > 1 (for second order
(K + a)
conditions). Then
can be obtained if capital and labour are interchanged
10.
be correct as we cannot have both of (Q.„. N + K) andNN NK
(Q N + Q K) positive as this would imply that Q(K, N) was not locally NK. KK
concave, contrary to assumption.
In order to examine how output changes with respect to a
change in product price or capital rental, consider first the cases
when one of capital or labour is fixed. Then if capital is fixed,
we have 4— < 0 and 4— = - — 4— > 0 , so that output will decreasedp dr r dp
with product price and increase with capital rental. On the other 
hand, if labour is fixed and capital is variable, we have ^  > 0
J
and -7— < 0 , and thus output will increase with product price and dr
decrease with capital rental. Thus the picture is of a "normal" 
response to the parameter changes if labour is fixed and a perverse 
response if capital is fixed. If neither is fixed, then we can des­
cribe the change in output as
dQ
dp
and
dQ
dr
„ dK _ dN
\  dr dr
Substituting in (1.12) to (1.15) and rearranging yields
dp H
f
K Qn v^
KK K + QKN N QNN N + QNK K\
and dr r dp
11.
Writing
Qk = Qk (4>N, 4>K)
Qn = Qn (*N, *K)
we then have
{
d log Qk d log Qn-
, dQ > .so that -j-1 = 0 asdp <
d log Qk > d log Qn
d 4> < diji
Thus if on a linear expansion path from the origin, increasing
capital and labour both by one per cent decreases the marginal product 
of capital less than it decreases the marginal product of labour then 
output will increase. The output response to a change in price (and thus 
also to a change in capital rental) is not necessarily perverse when 
both factors of production are variable. An interesting special case 
would be if the production function were locally homothetic, i.e.
hU) Q(K, N) = Q($K, 4>N) all <(> in (1 - t, 1 + e)e > 0
then differentiating with respect to K and N yields
h(») _ . 3Q(»K, +N)
$ 3*K
and h(») _ . 3Q(»K, +N)a wN<(> 3$N
12.
Thus the marginal products are homothetic and their ratio
d log(QK/QN)
is homogeneous of degree zero. Thus — d log" -^-- = an<*
0 .dQdp
dQ
dr
We have seen that the possibility of perverse output responses 
comes from (1.6), that is the condition for optimal labour input in 
the LM-firm. The intuition behind this is easily seen when capital 
is fixed. Then if product price goes up marginal revenue is reduced 
less (proportionately) than the income per worker. As the marginal 
revenue is the benefit to the LM-firm from the marginal worker, while 
the income per worker is the cost, optimal membership is reduced. 
Similarly, an increase in capital rental reduces the cost of the 
marginal worker (income per worker) while not affecting the benefit 
(the marginal revenue). Thus in this case optimal membership is 
increased.
All we have done here is to survey some basic analysis which 
we will wish to call upon later. We have assumed the existence of an 
interior equilibrium for the LM-firm. Due to the inherently unstable 
properties of ratios such as income per worker, this is in fact a 
considerable assumption even granted local concavity of the production 
function. We will have more to say on a related point in a later 
chapter (Chapter 7). Here we simply note that a production function which for 
example is homogeneous of degree v < 1 will permit no interior global 
maximum of income per worker when both labour and capital can be 
varied. To see this, simply note that
y(*)
¿ L a
<t>N r
K
N
As <(> ■+• 0 , y(<f>) “ , whereas at <)> = 0 , income per 
worker is not defined, and there will be no interior solution to 
the first-order conditions, (1.5) and (1.6).

15.
Although many writers on the theory of the labour-managed or 
co-operative firm have followed Ward (1958) in assuming that the labour input 
of the firm can be varied only by varying the number of workers, papers such 
as those of Sen (1966), Bradley (1971), Cameron (1973), Markusen (1975; 1976), 
Bonin (1977) and the analysis of Vanek (1970, Chapter 12), embody the 
assumption that the individual worker's (or individual household's ) supply 
of hours can be varied. The recent contributions of Berman (1977) and 
Berman and Berman (1978) follow the latter practice in assuming that in the 
short run membership of the firm is fixed but hours worked per member can be 
varied, whereas in a planning period longer than the short run it is assumed 
that membership can be varied with the proviso that there are no involuntary 
expulsions. This approach seems a sensible attempt to increase the relevance 
of the theory of the labour-managed firm by eschewing the assumption of short- 
run membership variability and recognising that "the ability of the firm to 
control and vary hours of work to adjust the labour input should be considered 
an integral part of the worker-managers' decision-making authority".
(Berman and Berman (1978)).
The present diapterhas three main objectives. First we will show 
that some of the results of Sen (1966), Berman (1977) and Berman and Berman 
(1978) can be related in a number of respects and a richer analysis produced. 
Secondly, with the aid of the augmented model thus derived, we will explore a 
number of comparative statics questions. In so doing we dispute Berman and 
Berman's (1978) claim that the short-run effect of a rise in output price in 
the labour-managed firm will be for workers to increase hours worked, given 
the usual assumptions on income and substitution effects. Like Bonin (1977) 
we find that the effect is ambiguous and, we argue, in some circumstances quite 
likely to be perverse. We also consider comparative statics responses to
16.
price changes in the medium term in which membership is also variable.
There has been considerable interest in such questions since Ward's (1958) 
demonstration that where labour is the only variable factor of production the 
optimal number of members in a co-operative will adjust pervesely to a change 
in output price. The general analysis of the responses of the co-operative 
to changes in product price is contained in Section II. In Section III, 
following Sen (1966), needs payments are introduced so that the income of 
a co-operative member consists of two parts, one related to work done by the 
member and one to the member's needs. The responses of the co-operative to 
change in fixed costs and in needs payments are analysed in this section.
Some of the analysis of the preceding sections is illustrated in Section IV 
for a specific simple utility function by means of diagrams. The importance 
of membership constraints is also discussed.
Our third objective is the examination of a number of efficiency 
questions and allied topics. Short-run, medium-term and long-run efficiency 
issues are discussed in Section V.
The conclusions of our analysis are briefly presented in a final 
section. Some of the more tedious mathematical derivations are relegated to
the Apnendi x .
I. The Model
Our model will follow that of Sen (1966) in assuming that the 
co-operative consists of N families (or individuals) with identical tastes. 
However, given our interest in comparative statics, the product price will not
17.
be set equal to unity and it is assumed initially that the only income of a 
co-operative member is work income. Each member, i, has a quasi-concave 
utility function U (yl,l ) where y^ is the member's income and the
hours worked by the member and the usual restrictions U1 > 0, uj < 0 (where 
uj^  is the marginal utility of an additional hour's work at a given income 
y1), U 1 < 0, U„„ <0, U i - 0, hold. U * - 0 is assumed as it is felt 
that the marginal utility of leisure would not decrease with income. Sen 
(1966, p.363) explains that "families are not necessarily indifferent to the 
happiness of other families (though they might also be that) and their notion 
of "social welfare" takes into account the utility of other families". Thus 
individual j attaches the weight a ^  to the utility of member i and the 
criterion function which member j seeks to maximise is
N
WJ = l a-.U1 
i-1 lJ
where a^j = 1 (all j) and 0 s * 1.
( 2 . 1 )
The ith member's income is obtained from the 
surplus, R, of revenue, PQ, over non-labou 
i's relative input t1/L.
distribution of the co-operative 
m k kr costs f Z F r , according to 
k=l
's
(PQ -
m
Z
k-1
li Iffkpk) t }L ( 2. 2)
The co-operative is a price-taker at output price P and output Q is deter­
mined by the well-behaved production function, Q “ Q(L, F1, F ,...Fm) where
N
L m z f.1. Q > 0  and Q.. <0. Much of our analysis will make the , , L LL _ k
assumption that the non—labour inputs are fixed. P is the price per unit 
k thof F , the k non-labour factor input.
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Berman (1977, p.313) shows that if workers collude to choose a 
common f. to maximise Ul(yl,ll) or more generally, where hours worked can
vary reflecting taste differences among members, if each member behaves so 
that the elasticity of total hours worked with respect to hours worked per 
member is unity then this will yield the result
Berman describes (2.3) as "the marginal conditions for the sbort-run Pareto- 
optimal allocation of labour in the productive process". The same result is 
derived in Berman and Berman (1978) by maximising the utility of a "typical 
worker" in the labour-managed firm. Cameron (1973, p.18) explains that (2.3) 
will result under identical tastes and certainty such that "each household is 
aware that its every move is accompanied by similar moves of all ... other 
households" and Bonin (1977, pp.81-82) offers some interpretations of the same 
equilibrium condition in the context of the Bradley (1971)-Cameron (1973) 
debate on models of the Soviet collective farm. Equation(2.3)is also a 
condition for social welfare maximisation in the Sen (1966) model and (with 
modification to allow for productivity differences among workers) is an 
efficiency condition in the Markusen (1975; 1976) papers.
We can easily show that the important result stated in (2.31 still 
holds if each worker considers choosing a common value of i  when the criterion 
function is WJ rather than UJ . The first-order condition for a maximum of 
W^ with respect to ” 1 (all j) is
(all i) (2.3)
Uy
0 (2.5)
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As we assume that all individuals have identical tastes (2.3)satisfies (2.4)
the only solution. Thus all individuals will desire the same value of the 
common labour input and this will satisfy (2.3) for all members irrespective 
of the weights a member attaches to the utilities of fellow workers.
Sen (1966) consider a Nash or Cournot equilibrium where each worker decides on 
his labour hours on the assumption that other members will not make any change 
in their labour input in response to that decision. Berman's worker chooses
The measures S and T respectively reflect sympathy felt for others and 
sympathy received from others and both lie in the closed interval Q./N, 
A Nash equilibrium will be defined by
Note that if S = 1, the case of perfect sympathy, then as Sen (1966, p.365) 
indicates, (2.5) will satisfy the key optimality condition which we have stated 
as (2.3) above. Setting S = 1/N in (2.5) yields a result which corresponds 
to maximising UJ as in Berman's (1977) analysis and it is easily seen that 
this fails to satisfy (2.3)except, trivially, if N = 1.
As an alternative to this collusion analysis both Berman (1977) and
to maximise 
N
whereas Sen's maximises .Vr  Sen restricts 
Nl'l
= S (all j) and (1/N) £ a.. = T1 = T (all i).
; = 1
+ Uj| = 0 (all j) (2.5)
It is perhaps not surprising that the same labour supply conditions
hold for the case of collusion of workers to choose a common 4 and for the 
case of perfect sympathy such that each member attaches the same weight to the
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the utility of every other member as he does to his own.
II. Comparative Statics : Product Price Change
We will consider three kinds of adjustment period in our model.
The number of labour hours supplied by each worker is assumed variable in the 
short run. The number of members of the co-operative is assumed variable in 
the medium terra and other factors of production, F*', F^,,..Fm, are assumed 
variable only in the long run. Also in the long run there is entry and exit 
to and from the industry of co-operative and/or entrepreneurial firms in pursuit 
of higher income per member or higher profits.
First let us consider the comparative statics of a change in product 
price in the short run. We will assume that the effect of a change in product 
price on the co-operative member's evaluation of money income and hours worked 
in terms of utility is negligible so that real income and money income do not 
diverge.
In the short run only the are variable and under the identical
tastes assumption all workers will have the same UJ , IJ-J for any product price 
P. Thus the comparative statics can be examined by considering equation (2.5) 
for just one individual. Recall that for the collusion case, as opposed to 
the Nash equilibrium, we can simply set S = 1 in which case (2.5) yields (2.3) 
above. Differentiation of (2.5) with respect to P yields
d r
dP <L-AL [uyj { s P Q ^  + O-SjJ } ♦ U , V  ♦ «j{l-s(l - ^ ) } ] ( 2 . 6 )
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where A < 0 is assumed. (see appendix)
Obviously dll^/dP can be positive or negative. However, some
progress can be made in the analysis of (2.6) if we consider dt^/dw where 
w is the wage rate and w£J , the income, of an identical worker employed 
for wage income such that w£^ = R/N. In this case when iP (wl^, is
maximised it can be shown that
dw (2.7)
where A < 0  from second-order conditions. It will be assumed that (2.7)
effect) outweighs the negative components (the income effect) in the numerator.
for the case where S = 1 contrary to Berman andBerman's (1978, p.704) claim 
that a rise in price causes workers to increase labour input "on the usual 
assumption of substitution effects outweighing income effects". When S = 1
of indeterminate sign. Bonin's (1977) results confirm this ambiguity.
His model corresponds to the collusion case but is complicated by the existence 
of a private, as well as a collective, output. However the ambiguous response 
of an individual's labour input on the collective crop to changes in the 
price of collective output, reported by Bonin (p.82) clearly persists if there 
is no private output. (In any case an increase in the price of the collective 
crop reduces an individual's labour hours on the private plot). Vanek (1970, 
pp.251-2) also discusses the possibility of a "backward bending supply of
w
Note that di.J/dw > 0  in (2.7) does not imply d£J/dF > 0  in (2.6)
sign dJ^/dP = sign ( U ^ P Q ^  + U^tJ + uJLQL/Q) and if < Q/L this is
effort" in the short run.
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There is one obvious case of a Nash equilibrium when a positive 
sign for (2.7) implies the same sign for (2.6). This is the case when S 
is small (S -v 1/N) and N is large, that is when the co-operative has a 
large membership and each member has small sympathy for fellow members. In 
these circumstances individual j's independent decision to work an extra 
hour will have little effect on average income per hour. Moreover, as j 
is only significantly concerned with his own income he ignores any effect 
of his extra hour's labour on the income of other members. Under these 
circumstances it is to be expected that his labour supply response is 
determined by the same criterion as that of the individual wage earner whose 
hours of work have no significant influence on the market wage rate.
In other cases dl^/dP is ambiguous but the picture is clearer, 
as we show below, if we assume that the co-operative is initially in a 
position of medium-term equilibrium with a membership level such that income 
per member is maximised. While this concept of equilibrium membership is 
familiar from 'individualistic' models of the labour-managed firm and is 
due to Ward (1958) its use in an analysis incorporating sympathy deserves 
further discussion. Specifically we are assuming that S does not vary with 
N during any adjustment as the firm moves from one medium-term equilibrium 
to another in response to (say) a price change. This might be rationalised 
by arguing that membership increases are evaluated only from the point of 
view of the initial membership (of course once at the new equilibrium a new 
value of S may obtain) and membership reductions are evaluated only from 
the point of view of remaining members. As we rule out involuntary 
expulsion no sympathy need attach to those who leave. More complex treat­
ments of the relationship between S and N are not pursued here. A 
related point which may be noted is that our concept of medium-term equilibrium
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implies that the size of membership is not an argument in the utility function, 
UX.of the worker or the welfare index of the firm (for an alternative view see 
Furubotn (1976) and the related discussion in Berman and Berman (1978)).
If N is treated as a continuous variable then, as is well known 
from the work of Ward (1958) and others, maximisation of R/N implies
PQl / j " £  " 0 ( a l l  j )  ( 2 . 8 )
Thus, from (2.6) in the neighbourhood of medium-term equilibrium sign 
di^/dP = sign [?yyyJ + Uy**J + uyJ{i's(1"LQL/Q)}] an expression which can 
easily be compared with the numerator in (2.7) which we assume to be positive. 
Now from (2.8) QL < Q/L and so there is a disparity between the two expressions 
which makes dJ.-1/dP ambiguous in sign. By solving from (2.8) to obtain
1-S(‘ Fkpk
(2.9)
it can be seen that when S ** 1, corresponding to the cases of collusion and 
perfect sympathy the coefficient on Uy (the only positive term) in the 
numerator of (2.6) is less than that in the expression in the numerator of 
(2.7) by a factor given by the share of revenue going to labour.
Note that we are still considering a short-term analysis as N is 
fixed, albeit at an initially optimal level. The disparity might be greater 
or less for a different N.
An example of a utility function for which diJ/dP is in general 
negative is U ■ y°(l-i)^. In this case from (2.7) dt^/dw “ 0, and making
the necessary substitutions in (2.6) and using (2.5) yields
dP “^ ( l - O 6 £ FkPk < 0 ( 2 . 10 )k=l
Oi and Clayton (1968, p.38) argue, in their producer co-operative model of the 
Soviet collective farm, that "a sufficient condition for a completely inelastic 
supply of labor by each worker is that the utility function (with leisure and 
money income as arguments) be of the Cobb-Douglas form". However it is 
evident from (2.10) that individual labour supply would be completely inelastic 
with respect to price only if S ¡fcl/N A  0. Thus in general, for 0 < S < 1, 
(i.e. for some sympathy or collusion) if all workers have the same Cobb-Douglas 
utility function individual labour hours contract as product price rises. Of 
-course with a different utility function such that(2.7)is Dositive less strong 
results would be possible. Nevertheless there appears ample reason to believe 
that perverse short-run responses of hours worked to an increase in product 
price are possible.
expanded. As all workers are still assumed to be identical and to know the
term equilibrium will be defined by (2.5) and (2.8) for an  prices.
We are assuming that N can be treated as a continuous variable and 
that adjustment to optimal N is feasible.
The comparative statics of both (2.5) and (2.8) have to be considered 
and in the neighbourhood of the equilibrium defined by these conditions we
Now let us consider the medium term in which membership, N, as
well as hours worked per member, JtJ, are variable. Individuals decide their 
own and also vote on whether vacancies should be replaced or membership
decisions of their colleagues, all votes will be unanimous and medium'
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derive
dP U ^yJyy y l v )
(2.11)
which is positive if and only if d£J/dw > 0 from (7.7), (A = A fory w
y = wf.) . The following can also be derived
dN
dP
1
*jp\ LL
m k k I F P
k=l
d r
dP (2 .12 )
which is negative given that (2.11) is positive. Then, in the medium term 
hours per member will increase but the number of members will decrease in 
response to a price increase.
The change in total hours supplied will be given by 
and so, from (2.11) and (2.12) we may write
dL = NdtJ + !JdN
dL 
dP pV
m
£
k=l
(2.13)
which is clearly negative. Thus total hours will respond perversely to a 
price change in the medium term even though individual hours responds non- 
perversely. Note that these medium-term comparative statics results are not 
influenced by the values of S (which is assumed to be independent of N as 
explained above) and so include the cases of perfect sympathy and collusion.
Of course, in the long run when other factors are variable, then 
depending on the degree of complementarity between these factors and labour, 
it is possible that total hours supplied, L, will eventually increase in 
response to an output price increase.
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III. Comparative Statics : Needs Payments and 
Fixed Costs Changes
Sen (1966) assumes that a proportion a, 0 & a 1 1 of the 
co-operative's surplus, R, is distributed according to needs, the remainder 
(1-a)R being distributed according to labour input. Here we choose to model 
needs payments as a fixed cost per member deducted from the co-operative's 
surplus .
write
Let the needs income for individual j be written then we may
y
j = ZJ (2.14)
Equation (2.14) reflects the idea that 'needs' may be exogenously determined by 
circumstances such as dependents per family. Admittedly payments made to cover 
needs may, over the long run, change in a fashion reflecting changes in the 
wealth of the co-operative.
If needs payments are modelled as we suggest, then for ZJ fixed, 
the short-run comparative statics analysis of the last section and the equil­
ibrium conditions of Section I remain substantially unaltered (on the assumption
m , . NK K 1of identical preferences and needs). The expression Z P F + E Z 
m k=l j'l
replaces Z P Fk and where we used dfc/dw as a yardstick we now have to 
k=l • •
define the full income of a wage-earner as wiJ + ZJ so that an unearned
component is now included and w again approximately equates the full income
of a wage earner with that of a co-operative member.
27.
The question of the comparative statics response to a change in 
needs payments now arises. When membership is fixed we may consider (2.5)
where < 0 from second-order conditions. Thus if S=l, the allocation 
of co-operative income between work income and needs income has no effect on
seen by comparing (2.6) with (2.16). The different responses evident from 
(2.15) and (2.16) are due to the first two terms in the square bracket in 
the latter which are zero in (2.15) where income effects are absent. Thus 
the effects of an increase in needs income is much the same as that of a 
compensated factor price change.
with R/L replaced by (R-NZ)/L and y^ defined as in (2.14). Then, using 
Ni.^  = L as J.J is common to all (identical) individuals, comparative statics
yield
(2.15)
labour supply. In this case of perfect sympathy or fixed by collusion
to be the same for all workers an increase in needs income has no disincentive 
effect on individual's labour supply. If S < 1, however, df^/dZ <0, a
conclusion also reached in Sen's (1966) model.
It is instructive to compare the effect on l^ of a change in Z
with the effect on of a change in one of the non-labour (fixed) input
If # 1
prices say P . Then, again from (2.5) and using NJtJ = L we have
If S * 1, then df-Vdpk >0. If S < 1, then ui.J/dP*^  could still be 
positive: certainly if dtJ/dP < 0, then this would be the case as can be
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In the medium term membership, N, is also variable. Treating 
N as a continuous variable and assuming that adjustment to optimal N is 
feas ible we may note that (given that all members choose jointly, or 
independently the same labour input) (2.14) is maximised with respect to N 
when (2.8) holds. If (2.8) is divided through by then it becomes an
equation in L alone, and does not involve Z. Thus, in the medium term 
total labour input L is independent of the level of needs payments.
If the short-run response to an increase in Z is to reduce man-hours, in 
the medium term N will increase to bring L = Nil to its initial level.
The fact that (2.8) still holds when there are needs payments implies that 
the medium-term response to a change in product price is essentially unaltered.
IV. Comparative Statics : A Simple Example where Income 
Effects are Absent
For the case of the separable utility function U = y - B(*0, where 
B'(t) > 0 , 8 "(il) > 0 it is possible to illustrate much of the analysis of 
Sections II and III in simple diagrams. Some elements in the diagrams draw 
on the work of Domar (1966), Oi and Clayton (1968) and Stern (1980, Ch.3). For 
this particular utility function our condition for a Nash equilibrium if there 
are no needs payments may be written
SPQl + (1“S)£ = B'U) (2.5)'
When S«1 we have the cases of collusion and perfect sympathy; when S is 
very small and N large such that S % 1/N % 0 we have the case of a Nash 
equilibrium for a firm with a "competitive" internal labour market.
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(a) Change in Product Price
In Figure I the co-operative is in an initial position of medium- 
term equilibrium described by point A. Condition (2.5)' which is a short- 
run equilibrium condition (holding for a given N) is satisfied, but the 
firm also has attained optimal membership such that (2.8) holds implying that 
the value of the marginal product of an hour's labour is equated with income 
per hour so that the efficiency condition
PQl = B’U) (2.3)'
is satisfied. Price is initially PQ and then increases to P1. The change 
in price shifts the value marginal product schedule up to the right. The
Figure I
Effects of a Price Change
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R/L schedule is raised and, as there are fixed costs, the maximum of the 
new schedule lies to the left of that of the initial schedule. The short- 
run and medium-term effects of the price increase can now easily be disting­
uished .
If there is collusion or perfect sympathy the new short-run equilibrium
will be at B where (2.3)' is satisfied and all members have increased their
labour input. On the other hand, if S £ 0 the new short-run equilibrium
will be at C and for 0 < S < 1 the new equilibrium will be somewhere on
B' (L/fJp)between B and C yielding a total labour input between L^  and L^ ,.
The diagram clearly shows that workers will gain by colluding at B. No
matter where the new short-run equilibrium may lie between B and C it is
clear that P Q < (R/L)., so that income per member may be raised if the ] L 1
firm can contract membership by failing to replace any who leave. Any 
reduction in N shifts the B'( t )  schedule to the left. The new optimal 
membership would be N^, and point D depicts the new medium-term equilibrium. 
Note that membership has fallen and so has total hours which are now Lp.
Since B'(4) is an increasing function of i  we may also conclude that hours 
supplied per worker are greater at D than they were at A. Of course with 
this particular utility function dfc/dP is always positive in the short run 
as well.
(b) Change in Fixed Costs
Figure II illustrates the effects of a change in fixed costs when 
the firm is in an initial medium-term equilibrium at A. A fall in fixed 
costs raises the (R/L) schedule such that the new maximum corresponds to 
a smaller L. In the short run if S-l, i  does not adjust since (2.3)'
/ B*(L/Nr)
/
______ __ F
__ / B'(L/N )
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Figure II
Effects of a Change in Fixed Costs
still holds. For 0 < S < 1 when fixed costs fall a new equilibrium will
be established in the short run on g'CL/N^) somewhere between A and E
(at E if S % 0), so i. increases. In the medium term it will be
optimal to attain a reduced membership (since at all points on AE, PQ^ <
(^/L)^) and establish a new medium-term equilibrium at F where total hours
have fallen to L_ but hours per worker are clearly higher than at A. r
(c) Change in Needs Payments
When there are needs payments, equation (2.5) must be rewritten
spql + (l-s) = B'U) (2.5)"
and the additional medium-term equilbrium condition is (2.8) as before.
Figure III depicts a co-operative with 0 < S < 1 in medium-term equilibrium 
at point G. If S»l, B'(L/Nq ) would pass through H and, if S & 0 ,
through J. For all S, is the initial medium-term equilibrium labour hour:
input . An increase in needs payments from to Zj, shifts the (R-NqZq )/L
P'(l./N())
LK l g
P'iL/Nj)
Key:
PQ,
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J = R/l
2 = (R-N 7 )/!. 
( K - N ° 0 /L3 =
4 = (R-n"z |)/l
ll'-K H-G
11'-J’ 11-J
H-M 
“ H-J"
Figure III
Effects of a Change in Needs Payments
schedule to (R-Nq Z^)/L and from (2.5)'' we see that in the new short-run 
equilibrium 6 * (*■) and thus t must be lower (unless S=1 in which case 
there is no change). The new short-run equilibrium is shown by K but at 
L„, PQ > E/L so it is optimal to recruit. This moves (R-NZ)/L down 
still further and also shifts the 6 '(£) schedule to the right until a new 
equilibrium is established at M. Thus the short-run reaction to an increase 
in needs payments is to reduce hours per worker but in the
medium term the firm exactly compensates for this by increasing membership.
We may note briefly here that the analysis would be significantly 
different if there were discrimination between new recruits and existing membei ■ 
in the sense that new recruits were available who either had no needs or did 
not qualify for needs payments. In Figure TV(a) and (b) below the shaded areas 
indicate the net gain that NQ original members may make by taking on new 
recruits who only receive (R-N^ZJ/L per hour). Note that in (a) the 
initial equilibrium is collusive and original workers cut their total hours 
from the initial level of to when they recruit, (LC-LB) hours being
supplied by new recruits. In case (b), on the other hand there is an initial
Nash equilibrium with a competitive internal labour market (Nq  being large and
S RiO) and here original workei a increase their total hours 33.
R'a/N0) ,n'(L/Nn)
LB
(a)
L L
Figure IV
Equilibrium when New Recruits receive No Needs Payments
from L_ to L_ and (L_-L„)hours are supplied by new recruits. Suchu L r L
behaviour has some similarity with outside hiring as discussed by Domar 
(1966) and Wiles (1977, ch. A).
(d) Membership Constraints
Throughout the paper it has been assumed that it is possible to 
adjust membership to the optimal level at which income per hour is equated 
with the value marginal product of an hour's labour. We must recognise that 
there may be circumstances in which this is not feasible because the co-oper­
ative is unable to offer potential members sufficiently high levels of utility 
to induce them to join.
For simplicity we will restrict the argument to the case of collusion or 
perfect sympathy in which case maximising U is equivalent to maximising W
Let U “ $(N) be the membership constraint. It will reflect 
present levels of utility of potential members and will be assumed continuous.
and the co-operative is assumed to maximise U = y - 6(4) subject to 
U - <f>(N) . The appropriate Lagrangean function is
9 = y - 0(4) + A£y - 6(4) - *(N)J (2.17)
and maximisation with respect to 4 and N yields the condition for an 
interior optimum
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[PQL - 6'(4)] (1 + X) = 0  (2.18)
PQl4 - S/N = A<p' (N) / (1 + X) (2.19)
where the multiplier X is positive or zero according to whether the 
constraint is binding and <J>' (N) > 0.
In Figure 5(a) the membership constraint is binding and N^ is the 
maximum possible membership. The hatching represents the infeasible region. 
Note however that the optimal labour input (from (18)) is defined by L^ , and 
not by Ly the latter being the labour input which maximises income per 
worker (and not utility) subject to the constraint (compare Domar (1966)).
In Figure V(b) the constraint is not binding and the unconstrained optimum 
membership N* is attainable. Of course if N*< i N^ ,, where N^ is the
initial membership,adjustment to N* will depend on labour turnover and deaths 
of members on the assumption that involuntary expulsions do not occur. (Of 
course if membership is immutable labour input would simply remain at Lq ).
Note that adjustment problems are exacerbated by the fact that when product 
price falls and the individual utility level offered by the co-operative 
also falls the co-operative will wish to expand membership and it will wish 
to contract membership when price and thus utility level rise.
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Figure V
Effects of the Membership Constraint
V, Efficiency Considerations
We will state three conditions for efficiency in the allocation of 
labour corresponding to the short-run, medium-term and long-run adjustment 
periods distinguished in Section II.
(i) In the short-run all individuals within the co-operative should 
have the same marginal rate of substitution (MRS) between income and hours 
worked which should be equal to the value marginal product of labour. This
is stated as (2.3) above.
(ii) Medium-term efficiency implies that a reallocation of labour 
among co—operatives has taken place such that the MRS between income and work 
in all co-operative6 is the same and equal to the (connon) value of the 
marginal product of labour.
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(iii) In the long run all inputs are variable and new entry can 
take place. Thus long-run efficiency requires that, at optimal levels of 
non-labour inputs, the value of the marginal product of labour is the same 
in all co-operatives.
If (i) does not hold members of the same co-operative could trade 
labour for income and reach a Pareto-preferred position. If, within a 
co-operative, the MRS and the value marginal product of labour are unequal 
workers can gain by (jointly) adjusting labour hours until the equality holds 
so that, at the margin, the gain from an extra hour's work is equated with its 
opportunity cost. If (ii) does not hold members of one co-operative could, 
in principle at least, trade labour for income with members of other co-operat­
ives and reach a Pareto-preferred position. Finally (iii) is the familiar 
condition for long-run efficiency and requires that all inputs be adjusted to 
optimal levels. In relating these efficiency conditions to our earlier 
analysis we will continue to assume that all tastes are identical.
Although the MRS is constant for all workers in the co-operative 
in all cases above (see (2.3),(2 .4) and (2 .5)),it will only be equal to the 
value marginal product of an hour's labour in specific circumstances. Two 
cases are when S=l, perfect sympathy, or when workers collude to fix a 
common l .  These cases of short-run efficiency have been analysed respectively 
by Sen (1966) and Berman (1977). Note that for 0 < S < 1 if N happened 
to be optimal so that (2.8) holds then (2.3) will also hold if there are no 
needs payments. (We continue to abstract from needs payments until later 
in this section).
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Even if S = 1 , this is not necessarily going to imply (ii) 
as there is no immediate reason why the value of the marginal product 
in one co-operative should be equal to that in another. In fact both 
Ward (1958) and Domar (1966) have demonstrated that the labour market 
may tend to be rigid in an economy of co-operative firms. Thus poten­
tial members might be attracted to a co-operative where both income 
per worker and the value of the marginal product are high from co­
operatives where both are low. The rich co-operative may however refrain 
from any expansion of membership if increasing membership would reduce 
income per worker. In the long run, of course, this misallocation can 
be corrected by new entry (which equates both income per man hour and 
the value of the marginal product of an hour's labour across all co­
operatives) but a number of solutions have been proposed which might 
operate during an adjustment period too short for significant new 
entry to take place. These include Dubravcic's (1970) suggestion that 
co-operatives might hire labour at a fixed wage in the short term, Meade's 
(1974) outside employment authority and (1972) inegalitarian co­
operative, the proposal of Vanek et al for firm-specific lump sum taxes 
and the enterprise incentive fund scheme of Ireland and Law (1978).
The assumption of identical preferences has been retained 
throughout the paper but we should note that substantial differences 
in preferences may have efficiency implications. Furubotn (1978) 
suggests efficiency problems may arise where a politically dominant 
group of workers within the firm has preferences which differ signifi­
cantly from those of other workers whereas Berman and Berman (1978) 
assume the utility of a 'typical worker' is maximised. The papers by 
Markusen (1975, 1976) discuss some efficiency aspects of differences 
in preferences. Preference differences would also complicate the
comparative statics analysis of Section II, particularly where there 
are needs payments. Of course in the special case where differing 
needs exist among individuals but where these are exactly compensated 
for by the payments ZJ , in that UJ (yJ-ZJ , i,J ) = UJ(R/N,i.J) all
j, the analysis would be unchanged. This assumes that needs payments 
are treated by individuals as transfers to offset particular liabilities 
and, once these are met, individuals are identical in all respects.
Finally we should recognise that there are other aspects 
of efficiency in labour-mananged firms which have not been captured 
in our model. (See Vanek (1970, Chapter 12) and Chapter 3 for some 
relevant discussion).
VI. Concluding Comnents
In Section I, we demonstrated that the "sympathy" approach 
of Sen (1966) and the equilibrium in workers' supply of hours worked 
discussed by Berman (1977) and Bonin (1977) may be viewed as essentially 
dual approaches to the problem of labour supply in a co-operative, and 
can be summarised by equation (2.5). In terms of our second objective 
of considering the comparative statics of the equilibrium we distinguished 
short-run, medium-run and long-run results. In the short-run, we 
find that there are circumstances where individual labour supply may 
well decrease when output price rises. In particular this is always 
so for a utility function of Cobb-Douglas form when S i1 0 , contrary 
to Oi and Clayton (1968), and in any case the possibility of perverse 
responses will not necessarily be eliminated by stating that normal 
assumptions on income and substitution effects hold. (Berman and 
Berman (1978)). However if membership is also variable so that the
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firm attains an equilibrium at which income per man hour is maximised 
by membership size, such perversity will not occur.
In the medium term, we consider that membership can always 
be adjusted to income maximising levels, and show the conventional 
result that membership contracts in response to an increase in product 
price. Also total hours will decrease (Equation 2.13) whatever 
happens to hours per member. This result may of course be modified 
in the long run when other factors of production are variable.
The existence of needs payments reduces the hours worked by 
the individual worker (unless S = 1 , see Equation (2.15)), but in 
the medium-term, the membership level will adjust (for any S ) so 
that the total hours of labour supplied to (and thus also the output 
from) the firm is independent of the level or existence of needs 
payments. We also show that the short-term effect of an increase in 
needs payments is analogous to that of a compensated change in the 
price of a fixed factor.
Many of these points are shown for the simple utility function 
U = y — 8(!0 in Section IV by the construction of a diagram combining 
the effects of parameter changes and membership changes on hours 
worked.
In Section V, we specified precise conditions for what we 
term short-run and medium-term efficiency. We find that short-run 
efficiency is attained when there is perfect sympathy or collusion 
in hours worked (S « 1) (results familiar from Sen (1966) and Berman 
(1977)), and, in addition, in the absence of needs payments, if
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membership level is such that income per hour is maximised (i.e. (2.8) 
holds). Medium-term efficiency can be attained by a variety of alterna­
tive policies, one of which is a generalisation of an enterprise 
incentive fund scheme (Ireland and Law (1978), see Chapter 5).
Of course, our analysis assumes that adjustment to equili­
brium is feasible and to some extent neglects the difficulties and 
costs of such adjustment. Also we have neglected consideration of 
non-identical preferences and our concern for efficiency has been 
limited to questions concerning allocative efficiency, whereas there 
are clearly other possible dimensions of enquiry. But we have attempted 
here to illuminate some of the results from earlier studies and derive 
additional results in models of the labour-managed or co-operative 
firm in which the individual worker's supply of hours can be varied 
and income and hours worked both affect the individual's utility.
membership level is such that income per hour is maximised (i.e. (2.8) 
holds). Medium-term efficiency can be attained by a variety of alterna­
tive policies, one of which is a generalisation of an enterprise 
incentive fund scheme (Ireland and Law (1978), see Chapter 5).
Of course, our analysis assumes that adjustment to equili­
brium is feasible and to some extent neglects the difficulties and 
costs of such adjustment. Also we have neglected consideration of 
non-identical preferences and our concern for efficiency has been 
limited to questions concerning allocative efficiency, whereas there 
are clearly other possible dimensions of enquiry. But we have attempted 
here to illuminate some of the results from earlier studies and derive 
additional results in models of the labour-managed or co-operative 
firm in which the individual worker's supply of hours can be varied 
and income and hours worked both affect the individual's utility.
Al.
Mathematical appendix to Chapter 2
Derivation of (2.6)
From (2.1) and (2.2) we have
• N . m . ,
WJ = E a.. U1((pQ - E F p )t1/L, t1) 
i=l 1J k=l
Differentiating with respect to i,1 = i. all i we obtain 
(as £.1/L = N and is fixed)equation (2.A)
N
£ a..(Uly PQ + uj) = 0
i-1 XJ L 1
Alternatively a Nash equilibrium is obtained by A2.1 with 
respect to holding H1 (i t  j) constant. We then obtain the
first order conditions for all identical members:
As
and
E a. 
i-1
U x(p Q. f- - R.-^ -) + a..(UJ  ^ + u h  = 0 all j
i.J all i, j
y l  = yJ all i, j
We can simplify this to
1
N
N
E
i-1
a..(U  ^(pij y + uy
j h
i
+ 0
(A2.1)
(A2.2)
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i.e. Uyj [s p Ql + (1 - S) + u j  = 0 all j (2.5)
Differentiating (2.5) totally with respect to p and ,
j = 1, 2 . . . N for fixed N is simplified by noting that all i^ 
will react in the same way as all individuals have their equilibrium 
defined by an equation identical to (2.5).
We obtain
{UyyJ P QL [S P QL + (1 - S) R/L]
p Q N.L - NR
+ UyJ [S p Qll N + (1 - S) (-----~2----- )]
+ p ql  - a -  s) r /l ] + ♦ u jy p  q l } d»j
= -  ju  j 2  [s p Q + (1 -  s) r /n] + u j (s qt + ( i  -  s ) 
i  yy l  1 i  y L
+ uiy Q r ]  dP
111118 t r  “  ^  CUyyj{S P Q L l i  + ( 1 '  S) R/N} + V (1 "  S(1 ’  “ S r”
+ UJ‘ t-h
i y  ■>
Now the terms in A are all negative apart from 
1 (P Q, L - R)
U J(1 - S)N -----s---- which is ambiguous. Note that if pQ. “ R/L
y L2
or S - 1 this term is negligible. We will assume that the other 
terms (which form the second-order condition for (2.4)) dominate this
term.
6-1 ¡j
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Derivation of (2.7)
Maximise U(wi.J , iJ)
with respect to
First order condition, omitting superscripts, is
U w + U„ = 0y *■
Totally differentiating with respect to w and l  we obtain
(Uyy «2 + 2V  w + Uu )<U = (Uyy y + V  4 + V  dW
^  (Uyy y + V  * + Uy> 
where = Uyy w2 + 2Uyjl w + U ^  < 0
Derivation of (2.11) and (2.12)
Use (2.5) in (2.8) to obtain
U R/L + U. - 0y 1
Totally differentiate to obtain
(A2.3)
Ay du + (O)dN + [Uy Q/L + Uyy (R/L) (Q/N) + Uly Q/N]dp - 0
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Derivation of (2.7)
Maximise UfaS."1 , i.^)
with respect to i,J
First order condition, omitting superscripts, is
U w + U„ = 0y *■
Totally differentiating with respect to w and l  we obtain
(U
yy
W2 ♦ 2U „ 
y l
w ♦  Uu )dl = (U y + U . 1 + U ) dw
yy 3 y i  y
Thus M 1 (u V + U . 1 + u )dw yy ’ y l y
where Aw *
n w2 +
2Uy* W + V l l
< 0
Derivation of (2.11) and (2.12)
Use (2.5) in (2.8) to obtain
U R/L + U_ - 0
y *■
Totally differentiate to obtain
(A2.3)
Ay d* + (O)dN + [Uy Q/L + Uyy(R/L) (Q/N) + UJy Q/N]dp - 0
as R/L is maximised with respect to N from (2.8).
We then have
di.
dp
where Ay
|U y + U . I + U
' y y  3 y i  y
!!i_ u _ 2u* V  + uu 2 yy U UU  
y
(2.11)
Now totally differentiate (2.8) and obtain
i p Qu  N dl + l2 p Qll dN = (Z FK pK)/(pN)dp . Use
(2.11) to obtain (2.12).
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I. The theory of the labour-managed firm (LM-firm) is now well-
known for predicting perverse behaviour and grave problems. The 
response to an output price change of a firm maximising income per 
worker with respect to work force size alone is an example of the 
former. When product price goes up, such a firm will wish to employ 
less labour and thus produce less output (see for example Meade 
(1972) and also see Chapter 1). The property rights aspects of the 
use of capital (see Furubotn and Pejovich (1973)) and labour market 
inefficiencies (see for example Ireland and Law (1978) and Chapter 
6) constitute further examples of grounds for doubting the wisdom 
of organising production in terms of LM-firms.
However, most empirical work has been concerned with 
demonstrating the higher productivity achieved by LM-firms and labour- 
participating firms. Some of this work is summarised by Blumberg (1975). 
It is argued in the empirical literature that a result of moving 
towards labour management or participation in management is a 
reduction in the alienation of the labour force from the firm. A 
Marxist explanation has been that LM-firms may benefit from two factors: 
that their workers do not feel exploited by capitalists and also 
that their labour is not simply exchanged for a wage in the labour 
market as just one of many economic relations and with a corresponding 
lack of dignity (see Selucky (1975)).
In this chapter we will take the view that the LM-firm's 
advantage is not simply that incentives are such that workers are 
prepared to worker harder in LM-firms, a proposition well-known in 
the literature and well-discussed in Vanek (1970, Chapter 12), but
rather that workers gain utility both from the mutual cooperation and 
spirit of teamwork encouraged by such incentives and from the lack of 
confrontation with employers in IM-firms. They then gain utility 
directly from an LM-firm environment as compared with a conventional 
firm's environment. We will take the conventional firm to be an 
entrepreneurial firm which we will specify more fully in Section II 
and denote EP-firm. We will model the shift in the utility function 
for identical workers in one type of firm as compared with another, 
and we will see that in our model it is the reduced marginal disutility 
from extra work effort that is important for predicting firm behaviour.
We will also argue that there may exist relative economies in super­
vision costs in the LM-firm. As Vanek (1970, p. 238) says "if the 
private employer wants to produce anything, while paying a fixed 
contractual wage, the contract must explicitly or at least implicitly 
contain a provision regarding a minimum acceptable performance standard". 
Such a standard has to be enforced and the costs of such enforcement 
may be less (although of course not eliminated) in an LM-firm than 
in an EP-firm. The mechanism by which these assumed efficiency advantages 
feed through to influence productivity and other aspects of firm 
performance will be the primary target of our analysis, although we 
will also consider the distribution of gains from increasing worker 
participation within the context of an EP-firm.
One of the major reasons why a discussion of the direct 
environment effects on individuals' utilities appears desirable is 
the common practice of largely ignoring the alienation of labour and 
related questions in theoretical comparisons of LM-firms with con­
ventional firms. Domar (1966), after comparing LM- and other firms
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assuming a common relationship between inputs and outputs ends with 
a final caveat (p. 49): "Judged by strictly economic criteria the coop 
has not come out well. But even on these grounds, it is quite possible 
that a coop may be more efficient than a capitalist or state-owned 
firm in societies where membership in the coop, as contrasted with 
hiring out for a job, has a strong positive effect on workers' incen­
tives . . . ". Although Domar is almost certainly referring here to 
the incentive effects of an income schedule (rather than a given wage) 
on the level of effort, our point is that in addition to this there 
is a direct environmental effect from membership in the coop or LM- 
firm. When some specific attention has been paid to the alienation 
- firm type - productivity question it has usually been conceived of 
as an upward shift in the production function for the LM-firm, which 
blurs the direct environmental and incentive effects. For example, 
Carsen (1973) considers a reduction in X-inefficiency as an advantage 
of the LM-firm. Neither the basis for assuming such a result from 
alienation reduction nor the implications for firm behaviour are 
fully pursued. One of our aims is to consider the extent to which 
this approach can be justified within the context of a logical if 
simple model, where a given supply of labour services, supply of mana­
gerial services (by the entrepreneur in the EP—firm and the worker- 
managers in the LM-firm), and supply of risk-bearing services, all 
create disutilities which are not independent of firm type.
One interesting observation that can be made here very 
quickly, however, is that if the result of switching from a conventional 
firm to an LM-firm organisation is purely an upward shift in production 
by a multiple 9 > 1 for all input levels, then the effect on the
49.
LM-firm's behaviour would be the same as that of an increase in 
product prices, referred to above, except that output may increase 
or decrease dependent on the amount membership is reduced and the 
value of 0 .
It may be argued that labour-augmenting technical progress 
would be a more satisfactory way of viewing the effects of alienation 
reduction. Batra (1974) considers such technical progress in the 
context of collective farms but only as an exogenous rather than 
endogenous change. We present a specific model in Section II which 
links directly the productivity gain to the assumed utility function 
change as a result of an improved working environment. In Section III 
we extend the partial equilibrium analysis of Section II by considering 
general equilibrium aspects of the production sector. Section IV 
contains a summary of results and some discussion concerning gains 
from worker-participation within conventional entrepreneurial firms. 
Although this latter subject has been treated to some extent by 
Steinherr (1977), his work relates mostly to the optimal level of 
worker participation in worker-manager contracts.
In all the above analysis we take the role of the entrepreneur 
to be that of a manager supplying managerial services. If however the 
firm exists in a risky environment, then the entrepreneur (in the EP- 
firm) on joint entrepreneurs (in the LM-firm) supply the service of 
risk-bearing. We will delay a consideration of this until Chapter 5.
Mathematical derivations of equation(3.13)onwards are 
treated in more detail in the Appendix.
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XI
In this section we will assume the same given capital stock for both 
LM-firms and EP-firms. Also product prices and fixed costs are independent of 
firm type, and all parameters are known with certainty. A firm's net 
revenue R is defined as the given product price (p) times output (Q) minus fixed 
costs, and is a strictly concave function R(L) of the total supply of labour in 
efficiency units (L). The functional form of the net revenue function 
is again independent of firm type. What is not independent of firm type 
is firstly the firm's objective and secondly the utility function of 
individuals associated with the firm. We will assume for simplicity 
that all individuals are identical, and each individual seeks to maximise 
his utility which is dependent on his income (y) and on his own supply 
of both entrepreneurial and work effort. A particularly simple form of 
utility function will be used partly to avoid problems of income effects 
in labour supply and partly to ensure an equal ranking of the two types 
of firm in a utilitarian assessment in the absence of direct environmental 
advantages.
Thus the utility function of an individual who is employed as a 
worker in an EP-firm but undertakes no entrepreneurial activities, will 
be written.
U - w - B(i.) : e'(t) > 0 , B”(l) > 0 (3.1)
w
where w is the wage income and BU) is the disutility incurred by the 
individual from supplying to the firm *■ efficiency units of labour.
In general l  measures "effort" , while a more limited interpretation
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would be ’’hours worked".
Individuals in an economy of EP-firms (an EP-economy) can also become 
entrepreneurs, in which case they gain additional income, profits (II), 
but incur additional costs in terms of the disutility of hiring, organi­
sing and supervising labour. We assume this disutility to be of the form 
o(t).N , where N is the number of workers and *• the common number of 
efficiency units they each supply. Total effort supplied (L) is simply l.N.
The worker-entrepreneur's utility is thus:
U = w - B(i) + n - a(f).N : a ’(il) > 0 a"(t) > 0 (3.2)e —
Note that because of the absence of income effects entrepreneurs will 
also wish to work providing Uw > 0 and workers will wish to become 
worker-entrepreneurs provided . Also, B(®^ is the disutility
of his work effort born by the worker and a(t) that born by the 
entrepreneur. The entrepreneur seeks to maximise (3.2) by choosing w , 
i  and N, but we will assume that he is faced with a competitive labour 
market which implies that workers will only accept employment provided 
U > u , the competitive reservation utility, that is money wage minus disutility 
of work effort. Substituting u = Uw for w from (3.1)(as the 
entrepreneur will only wish to offer the minimum worker's utility) we can 
reformulate the entrepreneur's problem as
maximise with respect to f, N
U - u + R - (u + 3(*) + o(*))N (3.3)e
Thus the entrepreneur maximises net revenue minus the full labour costs»
incorporating a breakdown of the wage rate (into a base "wage" (u) and 
a compensation payment 0(£)) and also the entrepreneurial costs of 
employment.
52.
In the alternative LM-firm, the entrepreneurial role is assumed
to be divided equally among the worker-members. Thus each worker has 
1a share '¡J of profit but also bears his own entrepreneurial cost a(*-) .
Then, in the absence of direct benefits from the LM-firm environment, an 
LM-firm's worker has utility
U - R/N - B( l) - a( *) • (3.4)m
The particular utility functions we have used allow us to 
write from inspection of (3.1), (3.3) and (3.A) that for given 1 and N , we 
have
(N - 1)U + U - N Uw e  m (3.5)
so that for given l ,  N aggregate utility would be the same in the two
systems, although neither the distribution of income nor utility need 
be. Established theory of the differences between LM-firms and profit- 
maximising firms lead us to suppose, however, that the choice of *•» N 
will not be the same in the two types of firm except in long-run competi­
tive equilibrium where profits are zero. For our model of the F.P-firm 
this long-run competitive equilibrium is interpreted as Ug* = u ,
where U * is the maximum value of (3.3). Then no individual would be e
better off in terms of utility by becoming or ceasing to be an entrepreneur. 
Results can be found relating the behaviour of EP- and LM-firms which are
analogous to the established comparisons of LM- and profit-maximising 
firms, and some will be noted below. However, here we will proceed to 
the case where less alienation of labour occurs in the LM-firm which 
reduces either or both of a(!) and 8(i.) for any given l  . In fact 
we will see that we will need to be rather more specific and assume that 
it is the disutility of marginal work effort that is reduced. Writing 
g(!) = a(!) + 6(!) for the entrepreneurial firm, we will state that
a corresponding expression for the LM-firm is gm C ) , such that the marginal 
disutility of work effort is less everywhere, i.e.
g' (!) < g'(!) all 1 (3.6)m
Now let us consider the conditions for optimal choice of ! and 
N in the two types of firm . For the EP-firm, first order necessary 
conditions for maximising (3.3) are :
R' (L) - g'(!) = 0 (3-7)
R'(L).Jl = u+  g(!) (3.8)
Equation (3.7) states that the level of effort (!) should be 
chosen so as to equate the marginal net revenue product of an efficiency 
unit of labour with its marginal disutility. Equation (3.8) states that 
the marginal net revenue product of an additional worker should be equal 
to his full cost.
In the LM-firm, workers choose !,N to maximise their utility
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(3.4)and necessary conditions are:
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R'(L) - g'U) m (3.9)
R'(L) R(L)L (3.10)
If U* is the maximum value of (3.4), then if u « U* and m m
g(l) H g^ft) all l  , (3.9) and (3.10) are identical to (3.7) and 
(3.8). It follows then by taking comparative statics of (3.7) and
(3.8) for a change in u that —  > 0 and dL , M < 0
firm while the LM-firm is
du
unaffected . Thus
du
for -du>u = U *< m
implies u = U * we have < e 1 = 1 . < m ’ N « N> m and L l  L ,> m
m subscript distinguishes IM-firm optimal values. These results conform 
to the standard analysis of the LM-firm whenhours worked are variable, 
see for instance Berman (1977) and Bonin (1977).
Now suppose that (3.6) holds and g(A), gm (®.) are different 
functions. Write 1 as L/N , and we can see that (3.9) and (3.10) are 
functions of L and N alone. Also if Ug* = u and the EP-firm is 
in long-run competitive equilibrium then from (3.3), (3.8) can be 
rewritten
R'(L) - O.Sa)
For a fixed N , denoted NQ , the functions R'(L) ,
R(L)/L , g'(L/NQ) and g^(L/N0) can be drawn as functions of L , to 
form Figure 1. Note that R(L)/L will always be intersected at 
its maximum by R'(L) . Also g'(L/N) will shift upwards with a 
reduction in N . Now the EP-firm is in long-run equilibrium at an 
input of Lq total labour efficiency units and a workforce of 
Nq , as at these values (3.7) and (3.8a) are satisfied. The 
LM-firm is not in equilibrium at LQ , Nq as
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(3.9) does not hold. The adjustment of the LM-firm to its equilibrium 
can be considered in two stages. In the short run, the number of worker- 
members is fixed and workers find it to their advantage to supply more 
efficiency units of labour: in total and L^/N^ Per worker. At
L^ ,(3.9)holds but (3.10) does not.There would then be a tendency in the 
medium term for members who leave the LM-firm not to be replaced and the 
number of worker members would shrink. As this happens, g'm(L/N) would 
shift upwards until the number of workers reached such that (3.10)
held. During this adjustment period the short-run condition (3.9) would 
continue to hold, and workers will supply more and more effort as the 
labour force contracts. Note that g'm (L/N^) is not necessarily identical 
to g'(L/Ng) . However they both intersect with the R(L)/L function at 
. Thus after membership adjustment, the LM-firm will supply the same 
total work effort, earn the same net revenue and produce the same output 
as the entrepreneurial firm, but with less workers. A simple result 
which comes directly from the fact that (3.10) is independent of both the 
g(Jl) and g (i) functions and all variables other than L .
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Although the analysis in the last section was of a partial 
equilibrium nature, some aspects carry through to a general equilibrium 
approach. Consider an economy where production takes place in either 
type of firm, but where the EP-firm sector is in long-run equilibrium 
(u = Ug*) , all LM-firms are in equilibrium as defined by (3.9) and (3.10) 
and where all prices are given constants, perhaps determined by a 
dominant foreign sector. Take two extreme situations: one where iden­
tical EP-firms constitute the entire economy (the EP-economy), and the 
other where there are no EP-firms, only identical LM-firms (the LM-- 
economy). In both economies we also assume that full employment is 
achieved. In the absence of productivity differences arising from 
different disutilities of work the two extreme situations would give 
rise to exactly the same outputs supplied and inputs demanded by firms.
Now suppose disutility of work is less in the LM-firms as described by 
(3.6).The results of Section II tell us that each LM-firm will employ 
less members but produce the same as an EP-firm in the EP-economy.
However this would mean that more LM-firms would exist in order to satisfy 
full-employment. Each firm would still demand the same level of fixed 
inputs such as capital unless the prices of their inputs changed. Thus 
it is in the aggregate demand by the economy for, say, capital that 
general equilibrium considerations need to be taken into account, and 
it is this topic that will concern us here. Of course wc could have 
focussed interest on the consumption side by not taking product prices 
as exogenous to the economy, but it seems reasonable to fully consider 
the production sector before making such extensions.
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In a situation where firms buy capital with their own or their 
members' finance, lack of ownership rights in some versions of the LM-firm 
(such as the Yugoslav firm, see Furubotn and Pejovich (1973)) suggest reduced 
demand for capital by these firms. With such internal finance, comparison 
of the demand for capital goods between the LM-economy and the EP-economy 
is bound to be ambiguous. We will proceed, however, by assuming that in 
each economy there is an identical rentier institution which owns all the 
capital and rents this out to firms at a rental which equates supply and 
demand of capital. If there is a perfectly elastic supply of capital, then, 
as the same L holds for both types of firm and thus the marginal 
revenue product of capital is equated to the given rental at the same 
level of capital, the analysis of Section II holds. Alternatively,
we might assume that the rentiers have the same fixed supply of capital 
in each economy and fix the rentals to clear the respective markets.
Of course, the rentiermay distribute the proceeds to individuals, but, 
providing this is done in a non-distortive way, this will not complicate 
the analysis. The rental on capital will be such as to distribute the 
available capital equally between the identical firms. Thus firms in 
the LM-economy will have less capital each than those in the EP-economy.
This will affect both the marginal net revenue product and the average 
net revenue product of an efficiency unit of labour, and will feedback 
into the LM--firm’s decisions as regards membership size and work effort.
It is not a priori obvious that work effort per worker would still be 
higher in the LM-economy as a result of lower disutility of work, nor 
that aggregate output would be higher. If we can establish these points 
with fixed aggregate capital, however, it would seem reasonable a fortiori 
that they would also hold if aggregate capital could respond positively 
to the higher demand.
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The general equilibrium is defined by the following condi­
tions holding for each identical LM-firm, where pQ(L, K) is the 
strictly concave revenue function and r the capital rental, so that
income per member is then (pQ - rK)/N .
PQl = g'm (L/N) (3.9a)
pQL = (pQ - rK)/L (3.10a)
pQr = r (3.11)
K = hN (3.12)
where (3.9a) and (3.10a) are just restatements of (3.9) and (3.10), 
(3.11) is the condition for optimal capital and (3.12) is the fixed 
total capital condition expressed as a fixed capital to labour ratio 
h . By substituting (3.12) and (3.11) into (3.9a) and (3.10a) the 
following comparative static results are derived in the neighbourhood
of equilibrium for a small change in the parameter <j> when
g’m (L/N) = <(. g’(L/N) (3.13)
» hg-(L/N)[Q K K K + QKLL]/(A) (3.14)
3T * -hg'(L/N)[QL L L + QL K K]/(A) (3.15)
where
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A = p h2N(QLL Qrk - Qkl2)
- <#. g"(L/N) [Qr k K?‘ + 2Qlk LK + Qll L2]/N2 > 0LK LL (3.16)
We also obtain from i  = L/N and (3.12) that
ai ■ 8'(l/n>[Qkk r2 + 2Qrl ^  + Qll l2]'<l-a> (3.17)
which is negative again from (3.16) and concavity.
Note that the sign of (3.14) and (3.15) again depends on 
the question as to whether marginal products decrease or increase for 
a change in scale. If they both decrease then < 0 and ^  > 0 .d<p dtp
Thus also, from (3.12) > 0 . ^  is then ambiguous as efficiency
units of labour responds in the opposite direction to capital. However 
we can repeat the characterisation of ^  in terms of an increase in 
scale affecting the marginal products used in Chapter 1. Designate 
the increase in scale as an increase in X at (XK, XL). Then
É2.
d<|>
h g'(L/N)QK Ql fd In Qr
L. A dX
d In Ql 
dX
l .e. d£d<|> 0 as
d In Qr > d In Ql
dX dX
That is, output will increase or decrease with an increase
in $ according to whether the marginal product of capital increases
proportionately more or less than the marginal product of labour for
a one per cent increase in K and L . As <(> decreases from unity,
d In Ql d In QR
the firm's output will increase if --—---  >dX dX
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Finally aggregate output over all firms changes in proportion 
to average productivity, and
d(Q/N)
d<|> [Q dLL d<J> N + « K  K “ Q)
Using (3.10a) and (3.11) this simplifies to
d(Q/N) 3Q .
di(> 3L ’ d<f>
which is clearly negative.
Also we can show that ^  < 0 independent of whether
factors are substitutes or complements. Using (3.14) and (3.15), we 
have
dr
d<|>
d_
d<f>
3Q -g’(L/N)phL/ 
''3K' Â ^ LL VKK 0
The final comparative static result concerns the utility of 
a member. We have
dUm „ -d g(f, <») _ h dr 
d<f> d<J> d<J>
where is the change in the total disutility of supplyingd<p
factor services when the marginal disutility shifts according to (3.13).
There is obviously no assurance that is negative, unless
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the extra rental is distributed back to the members of the firms by 
the rentier. If the extra rental is used to buy more capital goods 
for the next period's production then the members may eventually bene­
fit from what is in effect forced savings. However if the rentier 
distributes his profit abroad or consumes it himself, then his monopoly 
position may be such as to allow him to appropriate all the efficiency 
gain and more beside.
Thus as d> decreases from unity, moving the LM-economy away 
from the long-run EP-economy equilibrium, effort per worker and average 
productivity per worker increases. Also if aggregate capital is 
fixed, and marginal products decline alone linear paths from the origin, 
then total efficiency units of labour per firm increase but capital 
and number of workers per firm falls. Also the worker-members will 
only be definitely better-off if all the extra rental generated by the 
increased demand for capital (and demand for capital will always be 
increased) is distributed to the worker-members.
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IV
We have been concerned so far in a consideration of the 
effects of an improved work environment as a result of reorganising 
firms under collective rather than individual entrepreneurship. The 
results of this analysis are summarised in the first row of the 
Table. In the first set of columns, results from Section II are 
reported. These relate to responses of a single firm to such reorgani­
sation from an initial situation of an EP-firm in long-run equilibrium. 
They also relate to an economy-wide reorganisation provided the supply 
of capital is perfectly elastic. This is of course because, in the 
absence of a change in capital rental, the labour input (in efficiency 
units) per firm is unchanged and so the same capital level solves (3.11). 
The right-hand set of columns constitute the results of Section III 
where capital in the economy is assumed fixed, so that reorganisation 
of the firms in the economy under collective entrepreneurship, which 
implies more firms with less members each, leads to an increase in 
the equilibrium capital rental.
An alternative way of improving work environment may be by 
maintaining individual entrepreneurship but involving some worker parti­
cipation and self-supervision, counterbalancing this with incentives 
in terms of profit shares, etc., but retaining the overall objective 
of maximising the entrepreneur's utility. We will call such a firm a 
WS-firm (standing for worker participating profit sharing firm). Such 
systems may involve problems of the agent-principal kind (see Ross 
(1974)). In such an environment reduced disutility of work may occur, 
and this could be due to a reduction of either or both constituent 
parts of g(l) . A partial equilibrium analysis in such a case is
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An alternative way of improving work environment may be by 
maintaining individual entrepreneurship but involving some worker parti­
cipation and self-supervision, counterbalancing this with incentives 
in terms of profit shares, etc., but retaining the overall objective 
of maximising the entrepreneur's utility. We will call such a firm a 
WS-firm (standing for worker participating profit sharing firm). Such 
systems may involve problems of the agent-principal kind (see Ross 
(1974)). In such an environment reduced disutility of work may occur, 
and this could be due to a reduction of either or both constituent 
parts of g(i) . A partial equilibrium analysis in such a case is
both simple and instructive, if we continue to assume a competitive 
labour market with equilibrium worker's utility of u . The entre­
preneur again chooses the number of workers (N) and the effort level 
required from each (!) , in order to maximise his utility subject to
u = y - 6*00
where y is worker's generalised income which may include a profit
share, etc., and B*(!) is the worker's disutility of supplying i
efficiency units in this improved participatory environment. Obviously,
the competitive labour market, if sustained, means that workers cannot
improve their utility above u : all gains from reduced workers' and
entrepreneur's disutility of effort are available to the entrepreneur.
Thus workers in an EP-firm would not be keen to initiate or agree to
such a change in organisation unless it was accompanied by a measure
of worker-control, which would approximate the firm to an LM-firm,
or was part of a general economy-wide movement. Even in the latter
case, workers will only unambiguously gain in the long run where
U - u . This is because the response of each firm to the improved e
disutility is ambiguous in respect to the demand for number of workers 
employed. If aggregate demand for labour were to fall u would be 
forced downwards and workers would be worse off in the short run, 
when the number of entrepreneurs, and thus firms, is fixed at the 
initial level. Furthermore, the presence of barriers to becoming 
entrepreneurs may make the long run heavily discounted by workers. 
Consider the following simple example of a single WS-firm operating 
in a competitive labour market.
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Suppose y = w + s R(L)/N and capital is fixed, such 
that w is the basic wage and s the proportion of net revenue paid 
as an incentive bonus to the workers. If s acted on profit rather 
than R(L)/N, w would simply be redefined net of y . Define the 
supervision or alienation cost in the WS-firm as
<f>ot(X.) with 0 S if S 1 .
with 6(4) unchanged from the entrepreneurial firm. The workers 
maximise their utilities by colluding (see Berman (1977) and Bonin 
(1977)) to decide their supply function of efficiency units of labour:
4 = 4(s, N)s
where 4 solves s
sR'(L) - B'(4) - 0
34g
and thus > 0
The entrepreneur now maximises Ug , given u , with respect 
to N and s . Write
U - R(L) - (u + 6(4) + <f>a(4))N + u (3a)e
then differentiating yields first-order conditions
3u 3“
5Ü- - R'(L)4 - <u ♦ 6(4) ♦ <*»(4)) ♦ JJ- Jjf m 0
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3s
e
For the first-order conditions to hold we require e = 0 (as
-r—  > 0 ) . This implies that
31s
(1 - s)R'(L) - <|> a'U) = 0
(3.18)
Equation (3.18) states that the optimal proportion of revenue should 
be one minus the marginal supervision cost of an extra efficiency 
unit of labour divided by its marginal product. Another way of 
putting this is that the share of revenue going to the entrepreneur 
should be the proportion of the marginal product of an efficiency unit 
of labour which is used to compensate the entrepreneur for the dis­
utility it involved.
no incentive himself to fulfil his function well. In this case of 
course w would be negative - a "license" to work, and it is true 
that if the operation was to be repeated, there would be an incentive 
for the entrepreneur to act efficiently so as to increase the price 
of a license.
If o'(t) = 0 then s » 1 and the entrepreneur has
Models of the "sharecropping" process which visualise s < 1
argue that the supply of worker effort is inefficiently small (see, 
for instance, Markusen (1976)). By suggesting that there are always 
some extra entrepreneurial supervision and organisation costs
66.
(<f> o'(4) > 0) , albeit lower in a WS-firm, this problem is avoided
and a deterministic and optimal solution forthcoming with s < 1 , 
(with R'(L) = <f> a'(4) + 3'(4)). Furthermore efficiency has been 
improved ($ < 1) compared with the EP-firm (<|> = 1), yielding the 
possibility of a Pareto-preferred state.
The source of the short-run ambiguity of the change in 
u to an improved work environment can be seen by using a parametric 
shift in the <f> a(4) + 3(4) ■ g(4) function. As we have seen from
the above example, it is unnecessary to spell out the exact form and 
operation of the contingent income function y . Let the g(4) 
function shift to if g(4) , if < 1 with the improved work environment. 
Following from (3.7) and (3.8) we have the WS-firm's equilibrium 
defined by :
PQl - <f g’(L/N) (3.7a)
pQL L/N - u + if g(L/N) (3.8a)
If capital is also a variable we also have (3.11) and either the rental 
on capital is a fixed price (under the assumption of perfectly elastic 
supply of capital) or (3.12) holds under the assumption of a fixed 
aggregate stock of capital in the economy. Also in the short run 
when the number of entrepreneurs is fixed but full-employment is 
still required, entrepreneurs will not change their employment of 
workers ex post, although their demand schedules may have shifted.
Thus the equilibrium system is completed by the requirement that in 
each firm N is constant in the short run !
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N N (3.19)
while in the long run (3.19) is replaced by Ue* = . As we have
argued, long-run equilibria are indistinguishable from those of the 
comparable (same $ ) LM-economy. We shall therefore confine ourselves 
to comparative statics of the short run case, defined by (3.7a),
(3.8a), (3.11), (3.19) and either r as an exogenous constant or 
(3.12). Consider the fixed capital stock assumption (3.12) first.
From (3.12) and (3.19), both K and N are constant. (3.7a), (3.8a) 
and (3.11) can then be totally differentiated to find the response 
of L, u and r to a change in <f> . We obtain
= g'(L/N)/(pQLL - <t> g"(L/N)/N) < 0 
(and thus —  < 0 )
(3.20)
dr dL
dif> P4KL d <t> (3.21)
which is negative if QRL > 0 , i.e. inputs are complements,
and - pQLL g'(L/N).L/(pQLL N - * g"a/N)) - g(L/N) (3.22)
Note that (3.22) is ambiguous in sign. One factor tending to depress 
u is the diminishing returns to labour, for as workers supply more 
effort, this diminishes the product of the marginal worker and thus 
the demand for workers. However, against this is the fact that, the 
bigger is g(Jl) , the bigger is the reduction in the cost of employing 
that marginal worker, caused by the reduction in $.
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The case where capital is in perfectly elastic supply can be 
considered by taking r and N as fixed and solving (3.7a), (3.8a) 
and (3.11) for changes in K, L and u in response to the change in 
♦ . This yields :
a *  = PQr K 8 , ( l/ n ) / D (3. 23)
= -P Q LK 8’ a / N )/ D  (3. 24)
^  = -g(L/N) + L g'(L/N)(QLL Qk k - QKL2)p2/N.D • (3. 25)
and D = (pQLL - <f> g"(L/N)/N)pQKK - p2 Q^ 2
As D > 0 , (3.23) is again negative, as is (3.24) assuming input 
complementarity and (3.25) is ambiguous once more. The comparative 
static results (3.20) -+■ (3.25) and associated results are summarised 
in the middle row of the Table. While these results relate to an 
economy-wide change in $ and thus change u , the case of a single 
firm adopting a better work environment is reported in the bottom 
row of the Table. Here u is exogenous and fixed, as is r , and 
(3.7a), (3.8a) and (3.11) are used to solve for ^  and .
In the analysis of the WS-firm as opposed to the LM-firm, 
the shift in g(l) rather than g'(i) has had to be considered. This 
is because g(t) appears in (3.8a) and Ue* i* Uw after the change in 
$ . The parametric shift we have considered means that both g(A) 
and g'(l) change in the same proportion. This may be significant as 
the change in g'(£) effects the change in l and thus, through the
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diminishing marginal revenue product of labour, the reduction in the
marginal revenue product of a worker, while g ( l )  effects the amount
the marginal cost of a worker is reduced, due to reduced disutility
of work and hence less required compensation. It is the interplay
of these two effects which determine the sign of ^  in the generaldtp
. . .  dN . . . . .equilibrium analysis and -tt- in the partial equilibrium analysis ofd<p
the EP-firm case.
V
Although the results reported in this paper and summarised 
in the Table come from a rigidly structured model, incorporating many 
assumptions, they appear intuitively reasonable. The pricture of 
firms in the LM-economy employing smaller numbers of workers but with 
higher productivity per worker is clearly seen. Also an explanation 
is given for the often perceived hesitancy of labour unions to invoke 
worker-participation short of worker control, and the impact of 
different production systems on the market for capital is shown. 
Furthermore, the model considers the distribution of utility in addi­
tion to that of income, as well as concepts of equilibrium in an 
economy with two sources of disutility: that of the supply of labour 
services and that of the supply of entrepreneurial services. It 
has been our argument that only such a model is capable of yielding 
an analysis of the implications of the lower alienation of labour 
which has been claimed for LM-firms.
Finally, we must consider the extent to which the assumptions 
on which the analysis has been based are likely to have been either 
erroneous or misleading. The most obvious candidates among our
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assumptions are the form of the utility function and in particular 
the absence of income effects in the supply of effort, the specifica­
tion of the division of disutility of effort between entrepreneurial 
and worker cost, the assumption of given prices, the existence of a 
market for rented capital, the absence of risk, and the assumption of 
full employment in both EP- and LM-economies. The first two of these 
are technical assumptions, basic to the analysis, and it is difficult 
to see how the analysis could proceed without either them or equally 
stringent alternatives.
Relaxation of the other assumptions, however, offers scope 
for further analysis in extending the current simple model to cover 
questions of monopoly, property rights in capital, risk aversion, 
and inefficient labour market adjustments. Such extensions, however, 
would all require specification of the exact forms such features were 
to take. We will consider the question of risk and risk aversion
in Chapter 5.
Appendix to Chapter 3
Derivation of (3.14) - (3.16)
Substitute (3.12) and (3.11) into (3.9a) and (3.10a) and 
obtain, using (3.13) :
p Ql (L, K) = <f> g’(hL/K)
Ql (L, K) = (Q(L, K) - Qk (L, K).K)/L
Totally differentiate with respect to L, K, p and d> :
pQLL -  ♦ g".h/K  PQlk  + * g " hL/K2 dL
(Q -  Q K) L -(Q  -  Q K)
QLL "  C l 2  ^ QLK + QKK K/L dK
» m L
g'd <J> - Q
which simplifies to
pQLL -  ♦ g"h/K pQLK + ♦ g " hL/K2" dL g 'd  ♦ ~ Ql  dp
^LL + QKL K/L QLK + QKK K/L
dK
a
0
•
and so
" ' 
dL qlk  + qkk k /l - [ pQlk  + ♦ g’W K 2] '
g ' d$ -  Ql  dp
1
"  A
dK 
• .
-| \ l + qklk / l3
>
pQLL -  ♦ 8 "  h/K 0
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where A is (pQLL - <t> g"h/K) (QLR + K/L) - (QLL + QRL K/L) (pQLR
(3.12), i.e. capital stock is fixed. Then from (3.12) and (3.19), 
both K and N are constants. Differentiate (3.7a), (3.8a) and 
(3.11) with respect to the endogenous variables L, u and r and 
the exogenous variable $ . This can be done in two separate exercises 
as (3.11) alone involves r .
+ d> g"h L/K2)
which can be simplified to
A = p(K/L)(Q ■LK.2) - * 8"h (QRK ^  + QLL L' +
2Qkl LK)/(LK2)
so that if dp = 0 , dd> / 0 :
dL
d 4>
h «LK L + QKK K>8’
PhK<QLL QKK " \ K 2) - * 8"h2((W  ^  + ^LL ^  + 2QKL LK)/K2h
pNh2(Qll Qkk - QLK2> " * 8"(QKK ^  + QLL ^  + 2^KL LK)/n2
Similarly
-h«LL L + QKL K)8' (3.15/3.16)
pNh2(Q 'lk2) - ♦ «"«kk r2 + Qll l2 + 2Qkl lk)/n2
Derivation of (3.20) - (3.25).
Consider equations (3.7a), (3.8a), (3.11), (3.19) and
74
Thus from (3.7a) and (3.8a) :
PQll - 4 g"/N 0 dL g' d<fi
pqll l /n -i du g d<p
Then it = 8 'd* pQLL - <f> g"/N
du
d<|>
, pQll l g' 
8 PQll n -
Then from (3.11)
(3
(3
dr _ o —  pQKL e' .
d$ = pgKL d<() “ pQLL - 4» g"/N 1
When capital is in perfectly elastic supply, r and N 
are fixed and K , L and u are solved from (3.7a), (3.8a) and 
(3.11) for given <f> , i.e. we have to consider the comparative statics 
of
PQl  "  4» g ' “ 0 (3.
pQL L/N - u + ♦ g (3 .
PQk “ r (3.
.20)
.22)
21)
7a)
8a)
ID
We then have from (3.7a) and (3.11) !
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r -
pQLL - ♦ g”/N pQl k dL g' d*
pQkl pQk k dK 0
• » •
so that
dL
d 4>
dK 
d d>
where D = (pQLL
and finally from
du
dij>
D pQKK 8'
“D p(^ LK 8'
- ♦ g"/N)PQKK - P2Qkl2 
(3.8a) :
(PQll L/N + PQl/N - * g'/N)^.
+ (pQLK L/N) * 8
(3.23)
(3.24)
A Qkk ' Qlk2)/(n‘d) - 8 (3.25)
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An individual in an economy may be able to decide whether 
to be a worker, selling the use of his labour, or an entrepreneur who 
buys other individuals' labour and organises it within a firm. He 
may be able to join with other individuals, to share the entrepreneurial 
burden, the labour and the rewards from both entrepreneurial and 
labouring activities. Another possibility is that the individual 
may be able to sell his labour for a claim on the income of the 
entrepreneur, and may in turn perform some entrepreneurial duties.
These three variants on the worker-entrepreneur relationship are 
neither necessarily mutually exclusive nor exhaustive. They depict 
a conventional entrepreneurial firm, a labour-managed firm and a 
worker-participating, profit-sharing firm, and they can be considered 
as different allocations of the property rights of entrepreneurship. 
Property rights concerning capital employed in firms provide still 
further scope for discriminating between types of firm and have been 
prominently considered in the literature, (see Furubotn and Pejovich 
(1973), Pejovich (1969) and Vanek (1975)).
Property rights of firm membership are normally taken to 
be such that:
(i) The current members cannot be forced to leave against their 
will (except as a punishment for breaking rules).
(ii) Membership will only be expanded up to the point where 
further recruitment would not be in the interests of the 
current membership.
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(iii) There is no market for firm membership. Thus membership 
is not transferable.
(iv) Income is shared between members according to set rules 
relating to skill, etc., and does not distinguish between 
income for labour and income for entrepreneurship.
These points imply that membership adjustment may be very 
sticky in a downward direction. However, for a poor LM-firm (low 
income per member) it may also be difficult to attract members. In 
this situation of output constrained by membership supply Domar (1966) 
argues that non-perverse output responses to price will occur. In 
general, however, the difficulties of labour mobility within an 
LM-economy are great and will be discussed in Chapter 6 . It is 
however, crucial to the incentive effects within a LM-firm that some 
such property rights structure exists. For instance if membership 
could be sold, then this would be tantamount to a market for equity 
and speculative purchase of memberships could take place. The right 
to grant membership is only vested within the worker-members as a 
whole.
The rights of members of LM-firms are introduced here in 
order to investigate the crucial and interesting question of property 
rights in capital, when capital is purchased by the firm rather than 
rented from a rentier. There is no definitive allocation of property 
rights of membership or capital for all types and examples of LM-firm. 
We can however contrast two such types with a conventional entrepreneu­
rial firm, using the notation of the last chapter, but revising the
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assumption of the existence of rentier capital. We will take a two- 
period model, which will be sufficient to discuss the argument.
The two types of LM-firms ve will consider reflect opposite 
approaches to the question of property rights of capital. One type 
is exemplified by the Yugoslav LM-firm in the late 1960's (see Vanek 
(1975, ch. 28). Here the LM-firm is given (although at a fairly 
high rate of interest) sufficient initial capital to make a project 
viable. The firm must maintain this stock of capital at book value 
by investing sufficiently to offset depreciation. Increases in 
capital stock can be financed by ploughing back profits, implying 
current sacrifice by the members, or borrowing at fairly short term 
from the National Bank. Any increase in the book value of assets 
occuring as a result has to be maintained. Thus at no time can the 
members dispose of the capital assets of the firm, even by just 
allowing them to depreciate. The members have only the right of use 
not the right of ownership of the capital of the firm.
A very different approach to property rights in capital is 
shown by the Mondragon cooperative in Spain (see Oakeshott (1973)). 
Here members make capital contributions (a minimum of £650 in 1972). 
They obtain a return of 6Z (in 1972) on their capital plus a wage 
or salary. Virtually all profit after these payments is reinvested. 
The most important difference between the Yugoslav firm and the 
Mondragon cooperative is that in the latter, members who leave receive 
their capital back (minus 12J% (1972)) but plus an element for capital 
growth.
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Suppose that as well as efficiency units of labour and 
entrepreneurship, capital also enters into the production process.
We will define the production function as Q(K, L) and assume it 
to be strictly concave and twice differentiable. We will consider 
a two-period model where capital is obtained at the beginning of the 
first period, used during that period, and disposed of at the beginning of 
the second period. We will ignore depreciation of capital. In the EP-economy 
finance is either internal or external. If the rate of interest on savings 
is eaual to that for borrowing then this makes no difference. We will de­
note the saving and borrowing interest rate as i . Then if output is sold 
and workers paid at the end of the period, we have in present value terms
p Q(K, L) - (u + 8(f) + a(i.))N K
U - u ----------------------------------- K + ----  (4.1)
e 1 + i 1+i
where the last two terms indicate the payment for capital in the 
first period (-K) and the present value of revenue from its sale at 
the beginning of the second period. If finance was provided externally 
then a flow +D is received at the beginning of the first period 
and a repayment of D(1 + i) discounted to the present is made at 
the beginning of the second period. The net effect is 
D - D(1 + i)/(1 i) » 0 . Then (4.1) can be written:
Ug - u - (p Q(K, L) - (u + 6(f) + <*U))N - iK)/l + i (4.2)
If the membership of the LM-firm all believe that they will 
8till be members of the firm in the second period and can then sell 
the capital, then the same approach yields (taking ♦ “ 1)
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Um
_ (p Q(K, L) - g(QN - iK) 
N(1 + i) (4.3)
With both firms the condition
(4.4)
is optimal, and can be added to appropriate optimality conditions 
with respect to l  and N as well as any relevant long-run equili­
brium condition on the number of firms. If investment is self-financed, 
that is the end of the story as savings is equal to investment by 
definition. If external finance is used then i must be the equili­
brium market^clearingrate of interest and must reflect savings 
behaviour.
(1973) claimed that internal investment is penalised because members 
cannot dispose of the capital assets of the firm. The members have 
the right of use of the capital but not of ownership. They can sell 
capital assets only if they replace them sufficiently to maintain 
the book value of capital. The fact that the length of membership 
is finite and may in some cases be quite short means that if either 
form of finance is available the LM-firm's maximand may differ from 
(4.3). The utility of members who leave at the end of the first 
period is, for internal finance alone,
In the post 1965 Yugoslav LM-firm, Furubotn and Pejovich
U (p Q(K, L) - g(t).N) _ KN (1 + i) Nm (4.5)
8 2.
and this is maximised when - (1 + i) » 0 , while for external
finance alone, we have
Um (4.6)
30which is maximised for D » K when -r^  = 0 . The former case is
the hypothesis of Furubotn and Pejovich (1973) who contrast this with 
the case illustrated by (4.3) which would also relate to the Mondragon
also avoided by leaving the LM-firm is made in Stephen (1978) . The 
latter paper also makes the point that if repayment of debt is made 
earlier than when the member leaves the firm then external finance 
produces (4.5) rather than (4.6), as this is in effect just internal 
finance with some temporal rearrangement. Some differences do arise 
if the lending and borrowing rates of interest are different.
key factor in this. If capital could be liquidated within the member­
ship period then the maximand would be (4.3). This is true even if 
with internal finance each member believes that the probability of 
his leaving the firm at the end of the first period is positive.
type of IM-firm. The point that paying back of at least some debt is
Note that it is the property rights of capital that is the
Suppose Nj i N leave at this time. Then those that leave obtain
(4.5) and those who remain obtain :
Um
. p Q(K, L) - g(ft)N _ K 
N(1 + i) N (4.7)
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If leaving is random, then the expected value of U is (4.3).m
(See Appendix ) Under external finance, in our example, it becomes 
preferable to leave the firm at the end of the first period, as the 
capital is only collateral for the principal of the debt and not the 
interest.
Our example of a capital project here has been simplified, 
perhaps too far, in order to make a complex set of arguments clear.
We will now turn to consider some of the implications. In a situation 
where bank finance (i.e. a rentier) is available, it has other 
advantages over internal finance than those portrayed above. Risk 
spreading is an obvious and important role of external finance.
Another factor is the added liquidity that external finance brings: 
individuals are borrowing "long" through the LM-firm and lending 
"short" in their private savings accounts in banks. It has been 
argued (Furubotn and Pejovich (1973)) that the 1965 Yugoslavian reforms 
brought about the use of more external finance and that this was an 
important cause of inflation. However a tighter monetary policy, 
raising interest rates and limiting credit expansion would presumably 
have prevented this.
The problem of default on debt is also significant, although 
perhaps not in the Yugoslavian context. It is likely that debt would 
be limited to much less than the value of the capital, and so some 
internal investment would be necessary. This reflects the fact that 
although moving to an LM-economy may reduce the alienation of labour, 
it may also open up an alienation of the providers of capital from 
the objectives of the LM-firm. One possible way out of this puzzle
8 4.
is the risk-sharing bond (see McCain (1977)) where the provision of 
capital earns the provider a share in the IM-firm's income. Another 
is the short-term pay-back period which reduces risks of default, 
and implies a higher cost of finance for members who expect to leave the 
firm before the full value of the capital is realised.
Finally, we will undertake some comparative-statics to see 
how the LM-firm reacts to changes in the effective user cost of 
capital which we will call q . q is i in (4.3), (1 + i) in
(4.5) and 0 in (4.6). When q = i = r , the equilibrium of the 
LM firm is the same as that of a counterpart PM-firm where Ug ■ u . 
This is a partial equilibrium model, as otherwise q would be deter­
mined endogenously. We define the LM-firm's equilibrium as
n 3Q _
P 3K q = o (4.8)
„ 3Q _
P 3L g'U) - o (4.9)
„ 3Q _
P 3L
pQ - qK _ 0 
L (4.10)
Differentiating (4.8) and (4.10) yields (see Appendix) the 
by now familiar results (see Chapter 1, p. 7):
dL
dq
1
"a -l qkl L)
dK 1 (r\ K -f o L)dq A-L l‘LL
(4.11)
(4.12)
Thus if both marginal products decreased with scale, labour 
efficiency units would increase and capital would decrease as q 
increased. Also from (4.9), (4.11) and (4.12) - L e»(t) < 0 •
Whether output will increase or decrease as the property rights situa­
tion (summarised by q ) changes depends again (see Chapter 1) on the 
relative elasticity of marginal products with respect to scale.
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Appendix to Chapter 4
The expected value of (A.3) when membership termination is
random is found as follows. The value of U for those who remainm
is (4.7) , i.e.
m
pQ(K, L) - gOQ.N K K
N(1 + i) N (N - Nx)(l + i) (4.7)
Those members who leave at the end of the first period 
obtain (4.5), i.e. :
„ 2 pQ(K, L) - sU)N _ K 
m N(1 + i) N
1 . N " N1 . . .The probability of obtaining U is — ^--- and that of obtaining
2 Ni “ . . .U is —it . If U is a Von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function m N m
then expected utility is
E(U ) m u 1(N - N)/N + u 2 N /N m 1 m l
pQ(K, L) - g(f)N - iK 
N(1 + i)
To obtain the comparative static results (4.11) and (4.12), totally 
differentiate (4.8) and (4.10) with respect to the endogenous variables 
L and K and the exogenous variable q :
•
PQKL PQKK dL dq
P^LL PQLK dK - r dq
» *
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Then £  - -<l/(A.L))p(QLK l ♦ Qkk K) 
f  - (l/AL)p(QKL k  ♦ qll L)
Now from (4.9)
g"(4) di.dq P « L L  g  + QLK
p 2 (-QLl q kk k + qlk2 k)/(a-l)
(4.11)
(4.12)
and therefore
di
dq -p -k (\ k qll
- QLK2)/(A.L.gM(i))
As A “ p2(QKK
di -K
dq ■ l 1 "TO
. dLwe have ^  ambiguous but
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Recent papers by Muzondo (1979), Hey and Suckling (1979), 
Ramachandran, Russell and Seo (1979), and Bonin (1979), have attempted 
to provide an analysis for the LM-firm under uncertainty which 
paralleled the analysis of Sandmo (1971) and Ishii (1977) concerning 
the profit-maximising competitive firm. Hey and Suckling in particular 
(i) compare the behaviour of the LM-firm under price uncertainty with 
that under certainty and (ii) examine the effect on the firm of 
an increase in uncertainty, in the form of a Sandmo-type mean-preserving 
spread of the distribution of the product price.
Muzondo (1979) shows that the LM-firm under uncertainty 
will, if its members are risk averse, produce more under uncertainty 
if the number of members is the only variable factor. He also pro­
duces various comparative static results, which Bonin (1979) shows 
are due to an algebraic error, and in fact comparative static results 
are, as one would expect, much the same as in the certainty case. 
Ramachandran, Russell and Seo (1979) discuss the institutional setting 
of the Yugoslav firm in the uncertainty case.
Hey and Suckling (1979) also derive the result concerning 
production by the LM-firm being greater under uncertainty in this 
situation. Hey and Suckling (1979) alone, however, show that member­
ship and thus production increases for a (Sandmo-type) mean-preserving 
spread of the product price distribution. However they do so using 
a rather odd and confusing transformation of variables. We will give 
a parallel proof without such a transformation below, before conside­
ring some important problems in commenting on the behaviour of 
comparative systems under uncertainty. We will then produce a very
89.
simple model embodying both decisions concerning the supply of 
effort and concepts of long-run equilibrium discussed in Chapter 3.
The behaviour of a parallel competitive firm under uncertainty is 
described following Ishii (1977) in the Appendix.
X. Fixed effort and capital
In this section we will hold capital and effort per worker 
fixed and allow only membership to be decided by the firm. The IM-firm 
seeks to maximise the utility gained by the individual member from 
his contract of membership in the firm. In previous analysis in the 
thesis, if the individual's effort level (*•) were fixed, this was equi­
valent to just maximising income per member. Under uncertainty, 
however, the exact outcome of decisions is not known, although we 
will assume that subjective probabilities can be attached to all 
possible outcomes. The maximand is then the expected value of the 
appropriate Von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function; i.e. maximise 
with respect to N
E (Ui(yi)} (5.D
We will again assume that y^ is the same for all members 
and assume that all members have the same utility function. This is 
sensible as the rule of equal division of entrepreneurial risk (same 
yA all members) implies that there are no advantages to diversifying 
the membership according to risk attitudes. Similarly there exists 
an advantage for those individuals who wish to adopt the same 
attitudes and policy concerning risk to join together in an LM-firm.
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Thus the assumption of similar utility functions for individuals within 
a particular LM-firm is rational given the contingent contract defining 
the LM-firm.
We will confine ourselver to uncertainty in the product 
price p . Membership is fixed ex ante of the price being revealed.
The price has a density function f(p) and a mean p and variance
2 . . .  o . As capital and effort are fixed, income per member is just 
P
y i  = (p Q(N) - FC)/N (5.2)
where FC is fixed costs.
Thus the first-order condition for N to maximise (5.1) is
E U ’(y)(p Q'(N) - y) “ 0 (5.3)
and the appropriate second-order condition which we will assume to
hold is
-E U '(y)(pB - c) - 0 (5.5)
where B - Q/N - Q'(N)
c - FC/N
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With diminishing marginal product of labour (we still have Q locally con­
cave and twice differentiable), we have B > 0 . From (5.5) we have
- e|u ' (y) B (p - p) f “ - E U'(y) (c - pB)
covariance (-U'(y).B, p) -(c - pB) E (U'(y)) (5.6)
Now U'(y)^ is the derivative of utility with respect to
price. We will define risk aversion to be when utility is a strictly
2
concave function of price, i.e. when < 0 . We will similarly
32u( 3p
define risk neutrality as when ---= 0 and risk loving as2
3 > 0 . As - U'(y)B is negatively related to U'(y) and
3p
price does not appear in B , the sign of the covariance term in
2
(5.6) is the opposite to the sign of 3— . Thus as E U'(y) > 0 ,
3p
we have from (5.6) :
averse |
-(c-pB) = 0 as members are risk neutral > . Now
loving J
_(C - pB) - - p Q*(N) + y
where y is the income per member at price p . Therefore we can 
state that if N is the optimal membership when price is certain and 
equal to p , we have
averse
N - N as members are risk neutral . In particular
loving
N > N and thus output is greater in the presence of uncertainty when
members are risk averse.
We can state this as
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Proposition 5,1 Membership will be higher, the same, or lower than 
in the certainty case as members are risk averse, neutral, or loving.
uncertainty the larger will be the difference between the membership 
level under certainty and that under uncertainty in the risk aversion 
case. We will define this increase in uncertainty as a mean preser­
ving spread of the price distribution such that a risk averse indivi-
and 0 < 0 , p' has a wider spread than p . We can thus consider 
the effect of a mean-preserving spread of price on the optimal member­
ship by carrying out a comparative static analysis using (5.3) and 
see how optimal membership responds to an increase in y from an 
initial value of 1.
We can proceed from this result to the fact that the more
dual becomes worse off, i.e. we have  ^ < 0 • We will confine
3p
ourselves to a Sandmo-type mean preserving spread of the form
p' = yp + 6(y) (5.7)
where E (p *) = yp + 0(y)
and
Thus for all (y, 0) pairs E(p') - p . But for y > 1
We have
(5.8)
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Proposition 5.1 Membership will be higher, the same, or lower than 
in the certainty case as members are risk averse, neutral, or loving.
We can proceed from this result to the fact that the more 
uncertainty the larger will be the difference between the membership 
level under certainty and that under uncertainty in the risk aversion 
case. We will define this increase in uncertainty as a mean preser­
ving spread of the price distribution such that a risk averse indivi-
2
dual becomes worse off, i.e. we have  ^ < 0 . We will confine
3p
ourselves to a Sandmo-type mean preserving spread of the form
.
P' - YP + 0(Y) (5.7)
where E (p’) = yp + 0(y)
and 9(1) „ d0- 0 . 57 - - p
Thus for all (y. 9) pairs E(p') - p . But for y > 1
and 0 < 0 , p' has a wider spread than p . We can thus consider 
the effect of a mean-preserving spread of price on the optimal member 
ship by carrying out a comparative static analysis using (5.3) and 
see how optimal membership responds to an increase in y from an 
initial value of 1.
We have
5 7 “ - E C p Q'(N) " yl}(p " p)]/D (5.8)
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Thus as D < 0 from (5.4), (5.8) has the sign of
(-U'(y)B + U"(y)[pQ'(N) - y]Q/N}(p - p)j
which can be rewritten as
E (-U'(y)B - U"(y)(Bp - c)Q/N)(p -?)]
Now it is sufficient for (5.9) to be positive that both 
-E [u' (y)B (p - p)] > 0
(5.9)
(5.10)
and
-E c]Q/N)(p - p)1 > 0
(5.11)
(5.10) is the left-hand side of (5.6) and is thus positive given 
2
risk aversion (3 U W - < 0 ). Now (5.11) can be rewritten as 
3p
-E[u"(y)B (p - p)2 - U"(y)B (c/B - p) (p - p)] Q/N (5.12)
The first part of (5.12), -E [u "(y )B  (p - p)2Q/n] , is positive by
concavity of the utility function (U"(y) < 0) . It remains therefore 
to show that
E[u"(y) (c - pB) (p - p)] i  0
94.
i.e. (c - pB)E[u"(y)(p - p)] >, 0
As c - pB > 0 from (5.6), we require to show that
E [u"(y) (p -p')]>,0,
We can only demonstrate this final sufficient condition for
the case when the Arrow-Pratt coefficient of absolute risk aversion 
(see Arrow (1970) and Pratt (1964)) is non-increasing in income.
An interpretation of this would be that, when faced with a portfolio 
choice of a risky asset and a non-risky asset, the individual would 
not elect to buy more of the risky asset, the lower his income.
Let A(p) represent the functional dependency of A on the product 
price and then with non-increasing absolute risk aversion we have :
We will define the coefficient of absolute risk aversion
A as
(A(p) - A(p) ) (p - p) i 0 all p (5.13)
(5.13) holds as if p > p , we have A(p) ( A(p) and if p < p , 
A(p) >. A(p) . Thus
A(p) (p - p) 
-U"(y) (p - p )
( A(p) (p - p) 
f U'(y) A(p) (p - p)
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and U"(y) (p “ p) ~ U'(y) A(p) (p - p)
Thus E [u "(y ) (p - p)] >. -  A(p) E [u ’ (y) (p - p)]
i.e. E[u"(y) (p - p)] >. 0 (5.14)
using (5.10).
As (5.14) completes our sufficient conditions, we can state
Proposition 5.2 If individuals are risk averse and if the 
Arrow-Pratt coefficient of absolute risk aversion is non-increasing 
in income then a mean-preserving spread in the distribution of price 
will increase the optimal membership. Thus output will also increase.
A further possible source of uncertainty in the LM-firm 
is the level of fixed cost (FC) . Even with given capital the 
interest, rental or forced depreciation charges may change in the 
short-run whereas membership decisions may be relevant only to the 
medium term. It is interesting to see if the association between 
"perverse" behaviour to price and fixed costs changes noted in 
Chapter 1 extends to a similar association for increased uncertainty 
in these parameters: will the risk-averse LM-firm employ a higher 
membership if fixed costs are uncertain, and will the membership be 
greater the greater the degree of uncertainty as indicated by a mean­
preserving spread of the distribution of fixed costs ?
Write
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G = -(pQ'(N).N - pQ) > 0 (5.15)
Then (5.3) can be rewritten
- i- E[ll'(y) (G - FC)] = 0
i.e. E[u'(y) (G - FC)] = 0 (5.16)
Thus -e [u ' (y) (FC - FC)] = E(U'(y) (fc - G))
- (FC - G) E(U'(y)) (5.17)
where FC is the expected value of fixed cost. Given risk aversion,
2
risk neutrality, risk loving, we have 3 < 0 , = 0 , > 0 , and
3FC
the covariance term in the left-hand-side of (5.16) can be signed 
as
covariance (-U'(y), FC) = 0  as U"(y) = 0 .
averse
Thus FC •- G • pQ'(N) - y - 0 as members are risk neutral
loving
y is income per member at expected fixed cost. In particular, if 
risk aversion exists then membership would be greater than that in 
the certainty case with given fixed costs of FC . We will state this 
as
Proposition 5.3 If fixed cost charges are uncertain then 
membership will be higher (the same) (lower), than in the certainty 
case, if the members are risk averse, (risk neutral), (risk loving).
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Now consider a mean preserving spread of the distribution 
of fixed costs for a risk averse membership. Again we wish to show 
that
- ^  E [U'(y) (G - FC)] (FC - Fc)j > 0 (5.18)
for the optimal membership to increase with a mean-preserving spread 
of the fixed cost distribution. Rewrite (5.18) as
Ej^{U"(y)y - p Q'(N) U"(y) + u’(y)}(FC - FC)] (5.19)
First take the middle term of (5.19), i.e.
- pQ'(N)E[u"(y) (FC - FC)]
We will show this to be positive if the coefficient of absolute risk 
aversion, which we will write A(FC) , is non-increasing in income, 
that is non-decreasing in fixed costs. Thus
[A(FC) - A(FC)] (FC - FC) i  0 all FC
Then
-U"(y) (FC - F’C) i  U' A(FC) (FC - FC)
and thus
-E U"(y) (FC - FC) i  A(F_C) E U'(y) (FC - FC)
98.
which in turn is non-negative from (5.17) and FC - G < 0 with risk 
aversion, so that
when ft(FC) is the coefficient of relative risk aversion. If ft is
implication is that the share of wealth used to purchase a risky asset 
in a portfolio decision does not increase as wealth increases. Then
U'(y) (1 -ft(FC)) (FC - FC) >. U’(y) (1 -ft(FC)) (FC - FC) all FC
Thus E[u’(y) (1 -ft(FC)) (FC - FC)] % (l-ft^C))E[u‘ (y) (FC - FC)]
which in turn is non-negative from (5.17) and risk aversion, if and 
only if ft(FC) < 1 . We can thus state:
Proposition 5.4 The optimal membership will increase for 
a mean preserving spread in fixed costs if :
> 0 (5.20)
Now take the rest of the terms in (5.19). Write these as
i E [ u ’(y) (1 - ft(FC)) (FC - FC)~J (5.21)
non-decreasing in income (non-increasing in fixed costs) then the
(«(FC) -ft(FC)) (FC - FC) { 0  all FC
and -U’(y)H(FC) (FC - FC) 5 -U’(y)«(FC) (FC - FC) all FC
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(i) The coefficient of absolute risk aversion is positive 
and non-increasing in income;
(ii) The coefficient of relative risk aversion is non­
decreasing in income;
(iii) The coefficient of relative risk aversion is less than 
or equal to one at the income associated with expected 
fixed costs (FC) ;
With at least one of (i), (ii) and (iii) holding strictly.
Although these are only sufficient conditions, and of 
course from Proposition 5.3 we know that membership must increase with 
a spread of the fixed cost density function at some point from y  -  0 , 
it is still interesting to note that the parallel with the perverse 
results under certainty (that membership increases with decreases in 
price and increases in fixed cost)is not exactly continued here. A 
strict parallel would be if we could state the same sufficient condi­
tions for an increased spread in product price being "like" a 
reduction in price (given risk aversion) and implying higher membership 
and for an increased spread in fixed cost being "like" an increase 
in fixed cost (given risk aversion) and implying higher membership.
In fact sufficient conditions for the latter are both more restrictive 
and specific.
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XI. Variable Effort
It is of course conceivable that membership could be considered 
as fixed in the long-run and capital variable in the medium term. This 
however would imply the LM-firm making its capital decision to maximise 
expected utility of income per worker for given membership which would 
in turn lead to an analysis qualitatively similar to that of a competi­
tive entrepreneurial firm. Results for such a firm are thus as reported 
in the Appendix for the competitive firm under uncertainty.
A more interesting extension occurs when although capital 
is fixed, both membership and effort are decided prior to the 
stochastic parameter being revealed. Let us take this case when the 
source of the uncertainty is product price, a more likely scenario 
than the fixed cost uncertainty in these circumstances.
Describe utility as U(y, l)  which is concave in y and 
-4 . Maximising the expected value of utility with respect to effort 
4 and membership N yields first-order conditions of the form :
E{UX pQ'(L) + U2) - 0 (5.22)
E{U1(pQ'(L) - y)) - 0 C5.23)
where U^, U2 are the partial derivatives of U(y, i)  with respect 
to y and 4 . We can show that the total efficiency units of labour 
are greater under uncertainty than under certainty. Write (5.23) 
aa
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E{U1[(Q'(L).i - Q/N)p + FC/N]} « 0 (5.24)
(Q’(L) - Q/LH E{U1[p1 - FC/(Q - Q'(L).I)]} = 0 (5.25)
and E{UX (p - p)) - l- pJEiup (5.26)
As E{Uj (p - p)} < 0 and E(U^) > 0 , we have
FC < pQ - pQ'(L).L
i.e. pQ'(L) < P-Q--~-.F.c_ ' (5.27)
If price was equal to p with certainty, L would solve 
(5.27) with equality. Thus as pQ'(L) cuts (pQ - FC)/L from above 
we have L greater under uncertainty than under certainty. Thus 
we have demonstrated
Proposition 5.5 If both membership and effort are ex ante 
decision variables then the optimal level of total efficiency units 
of labour, and thus optimal output, is higher under uncertainty than 
under certainty, when the source of the uncertainty is the product 
price.
A general proposition concerning the level of effort per 
worker under certainty compared with under uncertainty is not possible. 
We can however adapt the model of Chapter 3 to consider a specific 
example using the tool of risk premiums developed by Arrow (1970) and 
Pratt (1964).
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. 2Assume the variance of price is known a . We will further
assume that capital is fixed in both EP- and LM-firms at the same level 
and ignore capital market considerations. However both l  and N 
are decided before the price is revealed, and it is the joint 
decisions concerning these variables that is the subject of our 
attention.
We will build risk aversion into the model by assuming that 
all individuals wish to maximise the expected value of a strictly 
concave monotonic-increasing transformation T of U , that is each 
individual wishes to maximise
E T(U) , T'(.) > 0 , T"(.) < 0 (5.28)
We will approximate (5.28) with T(E(U) - n) where E(U) 
is the expected value of U , i.e. expected income minus disutility 
of effort, and n is the Arrow-Pratt risk premium given by
ne
1 T"(E (U ))
* T' (E(U) )
_2 2 Q o i  A_ Q2 a2 (5.29)
for the EP-firm's entrepreneur and
n • i A (Q/N)2 o2 (5.30)m in
for the LM-firm's member where Ae , Am are their respective coeffi­
cients of absolute risk aversion evaluated at expected income minus 
disutility of effort. The EP-firm's workers are not faced with any 
risk, so that ■ 0 .
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Provided that n > Nn there is an efficiency gain for e m
the LM-firm. However little should be read into this, as apart from 
the mechanisms for risk-sharing which may be available for EP-firms 
but not for LM-firms, there is also the question of income and 
wealth distributions. The EP-firm may occur when the entrepreneur 
has wealth such that he is much less risk averse than the typical 
LM-firm member.
It is of interest to see, however, how the existence of 
risk changes the decisions of the two types of firm. The objective 
function of the LM-firm is
E(U ) - n - (pQ - FC)/N - g (4) - 4A (Q/N)2 a2 (5.31)m m m m
Optimal l  and N are given by
pQ'(L) - gm ’(4) = BQ'(L) (5.32)
pQ'(L) - (pQ - FC)/L - B(Q'(L) - Q/L) (5.33)
where B - A (Q/N)a2/(1 - 1 A' (E(U)) (Q/N)2 o2) (5.34)m in
and B > 0 if A'(E(U)) S Q  i.e. non-increasing absolute risk m
aversion.
Thus here the optimal supply of efficiency units of labour 
is greater than at Lq in figure 1, Chapter 3, as Q'(L) < Q/L from 
concavity. Also (pQ - FC)/L > pQ'(L) > gm '(4) implies that l  is
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lower under uncertainty and thus N must be higher. The result 
concerning the number of workers mirrors that of Muzondo (1979) , and 
Hey and Suckling (1979) and our previous analysis. The proposition 
that members will work less hard under uncertainty has some intuitive 
appeal given risk aversion as members are opting for the non-risky 
consumption of leisure.
Finally consider the EP-firm. The same approach applied 
to the entrepreneur's objective function of
so that pQ'(L) > g'(l) > (pQ - FC)/L
Inspection of figure 1, Chapter 3, shows us that the equilibrium 
labour input will be less than LQ , end the number of workers will be less 
than in the certainty case as the g'(i) function has shifted to the 
left. However, we cannot say whether the level of effort per worker 
has increased or decreased. The smaller number of workers and smaller 
output per firm is to be expected given the results of Sandmo (1971).
E(Ue) - n - û + pQ - FC -(Û + gU))N- i Ae(E(U))Q2 o2 (5.35)
yields, if Ag (.) is non-increasing in its argument :
pQ'(L) - g'U) (5.36)
Thus pQ'(L) > g' (i) = t and in the long-run equilibrium
where E U - n * u , we have e e
-u - (pQ - FC - jAe Q2 o2)/L (5.37)
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to the entrepreneur's objective function of
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Inspection of figure 1, Chapter 3, shows us that the equilibrium 
labour input will be less than LQ, and the number of workers will be less 
than in the certainty case as the g'U) function has shifted to the 
left. However, we cannot say whether the level of effort per worker 
has increased or decreased. The smaller number of workers and smaller 
output per firm is to be expected given the results of Sandmo (1971).
E(Ue) - n = ü + pQ - FC -(ü + gU))N- J Ae(E(U))Q2 a2 (5.35)
yields, if Ag(.) is non-increasing in its argument :
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Thus pQ'(L) > g' U) “ u + , and in the long-run equilibrium
where E U - n - u , we have e e
- - (pQ - FC - jAe Q2 o2)/L (5.37)
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Appendix to Chapter 5
The competitive firm under uncertainty
Consider a competitive firm with one variable input, x , 
and producing a single product. Let the product price be p and the 
input price be r . The competitive firm maximises the expected value 
of U(n) , where
n * pQ - rx
and Q ” Q(x) with Q' > 0 and Q" < 0 .
1. Under uncertainty concerning either p or r , less , (the
same), (more), is produced as the firm exhibits risk averse, (risk 
neutral), (risk loving) behaviour.
Proof (i) r uncertain with E(r) « r .
E[u'(pQ' - r)] - 0
i.e. E[u'(pQ' - r)J - E U'(r - r)
averse "|
but E U'(r - r) ■ 0 as the firm is risk neutral 1loving J
if the firm is risk averse for instance
E[u' (pQ' - ?)] - (pQ* - r) E(U') > 0 .
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Thus pQ' > r .
(ii) p uncertain with E(p) - p .
Q 'E [u '(p  - r/Q’)] = 0
1. e. Q'e [u '(p - r/Q')] = Q 1 E U'(p - p) = 0 as the firm
averse T
is risk neutral / . Thus if the firm is risk averse 
loving J
p Q' - r > 0
So with both kinds of uncertainty, a smaller amount of the 
single input is used and thus a smaller output is produced that if 
prices were certain at their expected values (r, p) .
2. Consider the firm to be risk averse and let the spread of 
product price be increased in a mean preserving way of the Sandmo
Optimal x will adjust and the sign of the adjustment is 
given by the sign of
Now Q' E U'( p - p) < 0 from (1) above and the second term can
type.
- e|u ' Q'(p - ?) + U" Q'(p - r/Q')Q(p - ?)j
be rewritten :
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Q' Q E [u "(p  - r/Q')(p - p)] - Q ’Q E [u "(p  - r/Q')2]
+ Q' Q E[u "(p  - r/Q’)(r/Q' - p)]
The first part of the right hand side above is negative as 
U" < 0 . The second part can be investigated for the case where the 
coefficient of absolute risk aversion A(p) is decreasing in p .
Then
(A(p) - A(^,)) (p - ^,) < O all p
and -U"(p - |,) < A(|.) U'(P - |.)
U"(p - J.) > -A(|,)U'(p - |.)
E[U"(P - J,)] > -A(|.) E[u'(p - J,)] = 0
as ^  - p < 0 (from (1)) the second part is negative 
also. Thus all the terms are negative and a mean preserving spread 
in the distribution of p decreases the size of the firm.
Finally consider a mean preserving spread in the distribution
of the input price r . The response of optimal x is given by the 
sign of
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Now E[u"(r - r)] is negative if A(r) is increasing in 
r (risk aversion as an increase in r implies lower utility). This 
can be seen from :
(A(r) - A(r))(r - r) > 0 all r
-U"(r - r) > A(r)U'(r - r) 
and EU"(r - r) < -A(r)E[u'(r - r)J <0
With diminishing marginal product this ensures that 
(pQ - pQ\x)E U"(r - r) < 0 
The rest of the expression is
e|[-U"(PQ - rx)-U'](r - r) 
which can be written as
E[U 'CR -  D ( r  -  r )]
—II*’ • • •where ^  = -gr (pQ ” rx) is the coefficient of relative risk aversion. 
Let be non-increasing in income, then
fk ( .r )  - i i ( r ) ) ( r  -  r )  < 0 a l l  r
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Now E [u " ( r  - r)] is negative if A(r) is increasing in 
r (risk aversion as an increase in r implies lower utility). This 
can be seen from :
(A(r) - A(r))(r - r) > 0 all r
-U"(r - r) > A(r)U'(r - r) 
and EU"(r - r) < -A(r)E[u'(r - r)J < 0
With diminishing marginal product this ensures that 
(pQ - pQ\x)E U"(r - r) < 0 
The rest of the expression is
e|[-U"(PQ - rx)-U'] (r - r) 
which can be written as
E[U' CR - 1) (r - i)]
—IT** • • •where = -gr (pQ - rx) is the coefficient of relative risk aversion. 
Let be non-increasing in income, then
fli(r) -‘5l(r))(r - r) < 0 all r
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U'(R(r) - 1) (r - r) < U'<«(?) - l)(r - ?) 
e [u ' (O(r) - 1) (r - r>] < <£(r) - 1) E U'(r - r)
e [u ' <$l(r) - r)(r - ?)] < 0  if «(?) < 1
Thus sufficient conditions for input and output levels to
be less with a mean-preserving spread in the distribution of r are
that:
(i) The coefficient of absolute risk aversion is non­
increasing in income (profit);
(ii) The coefficient of relative risk aversion is non­
decreasing in income (profit);
(iii) The coefficient of relative risk aversion is less 
than or equal to one
and at least one of (i), (ii) and (iii) above must hold strictly.
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The purpose of this chapter is to develop, within a 
decentralized planning framework, a system of incentive payments to 
firms as a means of correcting labour misallocation in an economy of 
labour-managed or cooperative firms. This scheme, we believe, may 
offer certain advantages over existing proposals.
If the labour-managed firm is assumed to adjust its labour 
force and other inputs to maximize income per worker, then at the 
firm's optimum (assuming that inputs are homogeneous and that the 
firm is a price-taker) the value of the marginal product of labour 
will be equal to income per worker; and the level of any non-labour 
variable input will be defined, ceteris paribus, by the equality of 
its price per unit with the value of its marginal product.
Ward (1958; 1967, Chapter 9) demonstrates that the labour 
market tends to be rigid in an economy of such firms. Thus, for 
example, at prevailing levels of income per worker there might be 
excess supply of labour, yet existing cooperatives will not expand 
membership if to do so would reduce income per worker. Moreover, 
consider two cooperatives each at its respective equilibrium at which 
income per worker is maximized, but let income per worker differ 
between them. Domar (1966) and others have argued it is not possible 
for labour to move from the "poor" to the "rich" cooperative because 
any such movement would reduce income per worker in both firms.
Since income per worker in each cooperative is equal to the value 
of the marginal product of labour, it follows that there are differences 
in the latter between the cooperatives. Thus there is a misallocation of 
labour and of other resources among cooperatives in equilibrium at 
different levels of income per worker. Ward (1958) has also shown,
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for a single-product cooperative maximizing income per worker with 
labour the only variable input, that the typical reaction to an 
increase in output price is a contraction of employment and output 
levels. The cooperative economy thus fails in the short run to 
attract labour to its most highly valued uses.
Two points should be made before we consider solutions to 
this misallocation problem. First, as McCain (1973) and Furubotn 
and Pejovich (1973) suggest, contrary to the view taken in the simple 
income per worker maximizing model, the labour force of the coopera­
tive firm may not easily be adjusted in the short run, especially 
when membership reduction is considered. Some approaches to labour 
force adjustment are indicated in the next section. Secondly, we 
would not wish to deny the importance of other problems of the 
cooperative economy not considered here, such as those relating to 
the investment decision discussed by Vanek (1975, Chapter 28) and 
Furubotn (1976). It has also been argued by Vanek (1970, Part III;
1975) and others that the labour-managed form of organization may 
exhibit certain advantages over that of the capitalist firms. These points 
and others have been considered in earlier chapters. They are omitted 
here for simplicity.
I. Some Existing Solutions
Vanek (1970) and Meade (1972) show that with free entry 
of new cooperatives allocative efficiency can be attained. However, 
this may be a lengthy process, and the establishment of appropriate
conditions and institutions for the formation of new cooperatives
l
may be a demanding task. Mechanisms that reduce inefficiency in the 
short-run in which no new entry takes place may therefore be worthy 
of serious consideration.
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Meade (1974) , in a discussion relating to imperfect competi­
tion, suggests that hiring and firing decisions might be taken by an 
outside authority which would instruct the cooperative to recruit 
labour so long as the value of the marginal product of labour in the 
cooperative exceeds its productivity in the rest of the economy. A 
problem with this solution, as Meade recognizes, is that it involves 
a severe dilution of the sovereignty of the worker-managers on which 
the concept of the cooperative firm is based. Others have suggested 
that inefficiency may be reduced to the extent that the cooperative 
can be induced to operate partly like a profit-maximizing firm. Thus 
Dubravcic (1970) proposes that cooperatives be permitted to hire new 
workers at a fixed wage without initially granting them a share in 
net income and full cooperative membership. Of course, this approach 
attempts to solve the problem by significantly altering the nature 
of the firm under consideration. Can the efficiency problem be solved 
while retaining intact the essence of the cooperative firm as an income­
sharing institution with labour-management sovereignty?
Meade's (1972) answer is the Inegalitarian Cooperative, in 
which income per share is maximized but individual workers may hold 
different numbers of shares and therefore will not all receive identical 
incomes. This reflects Meade's requirement that membership adjustment 
can be made only if both existing (remaining) members and those who 
join (leave) the cooperative gain. A new recruit is attracted by an 
offer of shares but membership reduction is more complex and may 
involve partners bribing one of their number to withdraw, or a partner 
who leaves may have to compensate remaining members. Meade goes on 
to argue that the short-run adjustment process in an economy of 
Inegalitarian Cooperatives is Pareto-optimal.
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It is interesting to contrast Meade's model with what we 
propose might be called the Egalitarian Cooperative. In this institu­
tion we conceive of new recruits as being treated on equal terms with 
existing members in income-sharing; and of members discarded through 
labour force adjustment as being fully compensated for any difference 
between what they earn outside the cooperative and what they would 
have earned had they remained within it. In Figure 1, which illustrates 
the determination of the equilibrium labour force, N , for the Egali­
tarian Cooperative, w is the money income that can be earned outside.
R is the maximum value of the total product net of all non-labour 
costs, and so R' is thus the curve depicting the value of the marginal 
product of labour and y the net value of the average product (R/L).
R' and y are drawn assuming that all non-labour variable inputs are 
adjusted to R-maximizing levels at any given labour input level; effort 
per worker is a given constant and it is also assumed that the firm 
has some fixed costs. Prices of output and non-labour inputs are 
exogenously fixed and constant and the underlying production function 
is assumed to be strictly concave.
y reaches 
max at Na
Figure l Membership determination in the Egalitarian Cooperative
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If the original labour force is less than N the firma
will recruit workers until it reaches N the labour force thata
maximizes income per worker. If, on the other hand, the initial labour 
force exceeds the firm will discard workers (thus raising y)
until N. is reached. At this point the marginal worker contributesD
R' (= w) to the total income of the cooperative and receives y .
Thus the "cost" of the marginal worker to his fellows is (y - R'),
which is just equal to the compensation, (y - w) , he would have to
be paid if he were dismissed. By extension of the arguments it is
easily seen that if the original labour force is between Ng and
N. no recruitment or dismissals will take place. The Egalitarian b
Cooperative, as our discussion of the possible equilibria indicates, 
will not in general yield allocative efficiency.
II. Incentives for Labour Mobility: A Proposal
An alternative approach to those discussed in Section I is 
to define an incentive scheme that will produce an efficient alloca­
tion of labour via the self interest of individual cooperatives. We 
will outline here such a scheme which involves a (positive or negative) 
transfer payment from a central incentive fund to each firm i .
Thus income per head in the i1*1 firm is given in (6.1) :
yi “ (Ri + Pi)/Ni (6#1)
Here R^ is again the maximum income net of all non-labour costs 
for labour input the number of members of the cooperative. Thus
Ri “ a*>d we define
116.
P.i (R. - coN.) (N. - N.)/N. 1 1 1 x 7 1 (6 . 2)
where ui and are parameters of , which is dependent on the
decision concerning is the number of members of the coopera­
tive before the introduction of the incentive scheme and w is chosen 
by the incentive fund directorate to equate planned demand and supply 
of labour. If > 0 and labour increases over the base or
original level N. , or if R. - wN. < 0 and labour falls from the 
original level, the incentive fund pays the firm; otherwise, the firm 
pays the incentive fund. Substituting (6.2) into (6.1) we obtain
y i  - (0 +(R. - a)Ni)/Ni (6.3)
The cooperative will choose that labour input which
maximizes (6.3). The necessary and sufficient conditions for a 
unique optimum are
0II31•rl
& (6.A)
R." < 0l (6.5)
We will assume that (6.5) is satisfied for all firms. Of course, 
there may be firms for which optimal N is zero and their entire 
labour force will be recruited by other expanding cooperatives. From 
(6.A) holding for all remaining firms we have that the marginal 
revenue product of labour is the same in all firms. This typifies 
an economy composed of profit-maximizing firms, and, if firms are 
assumed to be competitive (i.e. price-takers), constitutes the optimal
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allocation of labour. Note also that, given (6.5), an increase in 
b) , ceteris paribus, will cause all firms to reduce the level of N^ 
that they choose. Thus ui can be found such that planned supply 
and demand of labour can be equated.
An intuitive explanation for the working of the incentive 
scheme is based on the interpretation of to as the shadow wage rate 
in the economy (from (6.4)). - to is then the profit of the
ith firm at that valuation of labour - the shadow profit. From (6.3), 
income per worker in the i*"*1 cooperative is then equal to the 
shadow wage rate plus the shadow profit per original unit of labour.
The original workers can choose a "no-change" policy, = N^ and 
have income R./N. . If however R. ' > u> , then the original workersl i  i
will do better to recruit additional workers for which they will 
receive payment from the incentive fund if the shadow profit that 
results from operating at the expanded scale is positive (i.e. if 
y^ > U) ). Note that a negative shadow profit (y^ < oj) at the chosen 
level of operation will still imply recruitment as long as R^' > to 
even though this in turn implies a payment to the incentive fund, as 
shadow profit in (6.3) becomes less negative. The incentive fund 
thus pays "profitable" recruiting firms (where y^ > to ) , and receives 
payment from "unprofitable" recruiting firms. The situations with 
regard to firms that adjust their numbers of members downwards are 
analogous but reversed. However we can add the following interpretation. 
From (6.3),
-  idN j  -  ( y ^  “  <o)Ni ( 6 . 6 )
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Substituting (6.6) into (6.2) and then into (6.1) we obtain
y. = (R. + (y. - w)(N. - N.)}/N. (6.7)
We can interpret (6.7) as follows. Income per worker after membership 
adjustment is equal to the firm's operating income per worker R^/N^ 
plus a compensation payment (positive or negative), (y^ - m) , per 
member made redundant spread over the remaining members of the coopera­
tive. If y^ > id then this payment reduces, and if y^ < ui it 
increases, income per remaining member. The incentive fund might, 
in the case where y^ > u , embody a characteristic of the Egalitarian 
Cooperative described earlier. If those made redundant could find 
work at the shadow wage cu , then the payment could be distributed 
to those made redundant and would thus act as a means of equating the 
incomes of those remaining in the cooperative with those made redundant. 
Indeed, where movement of labour from a "rich" to a "poor" cooperative 
is required, workers would not move voluntarily in the absence of such 
relocation payments to compensate them for the difference in income 
levels. Such compensation can of course be financed by the payments 
to the fund made by both cooperatives. The worker who moves to a 
cooperative paying a lower income per worker will share equally with 
other workers in the cooperative's income, but he will also be the 
recipient of a relocation payment from the state. Thus, as in Meade's 
economy of Inegalitarian Cooperatives, income differentials among 
homogeneous workers in the same cooperative may arise. However, in 
contrast to Meade's scheme, the cooperative itself does not discriminate 
between new members and old members, and members can leave the firm 
at will without ever having to compensate those who remain.
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Of course, relocation payments are only pertinent where, 
in the absence of compensation, workers who move would be worse off, 
and they would not be relevant if it were assumed, following Ward 
(1958) and contrary to the behaviour of the Egalitarian Cooperative, 
that membership is freely variable so that workers may be expelled 
against their wishes if that raises the income of those who remain.
The payments effectively make it in the cooperatives' own interests
in terms of maximizing incomes per worker to act like shadow profit- 
maximizing firms; i.e., for given oo , iL to maximize so
that the value of the marginal product of labour is u> in all firms. 
Moreover, as each cooperative is now a shadow profit-maximizer, the 
possibility of perverse reaction to changes in output price, which 
we mentioned above, is removed.
In general can be either positive or negative and
the magnitude of £P^ will be determined by the distribution of all
the N. relative to N. and the forms of the functions R. .1 1  i
The question arises as to whether the total net payments 
made from the incentive fund can be recouped by the increase in the 
yield from reasonable existing tax rates on personal incomes, which 
would increase in aggregate due to the gain in efficiency. Failing 
this, increases in tax parameters would be necessary to finance the 
fund. If there is initial unemployment, of course, this question is 
likely to be largely determined by the extent of saving from making 
payments to the unemployed. Otherwise examples can be constructed 
with very different implications for the financing of the incentive
fund.
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Some light can be shed by looking at three particular cases 
of the working of the scheme in an economy composed of two price-taking 
firms, both facing the same R(N) function (apart from different 
fixed cost in one case) and with R" a negative constant. The first 
two cases we will consider are described below, and illustrated in 
Figure II,where a, 8, and y are areas of rectangles.
Case (i): Both firms have fixed cost of a . Firm A has an
original number of members , and this number maximises
income per worker (equal to y^ = R^ ) in the initial no 
incentive situation. Firm B has a larger original 
number of members N„ and income per worker
D
(yB = ^  + 2(8 + l)/NB ) in the initial no incentive
situation could have been higher if some members could 
have been persuaded to leave.
Case (ii): The firms have and as above but have different
fixed costs, that of firm A being a but that of firm 
B being a + 2(8 + y ) • Ng is thus optimal for firm 
B in the original no incentive situation and yields 
income per menfcer yfi - Rg . Thus in this case both 
firms have maximised income per member in the no incentive 
situation.
The socially optimal labour input in each firm is N in both cases
above and this is achieved by applying the incentive scheme with
is ■ (R! + Rl)/2 . The efficiency gain from the reallocation is y  A B
in both cases, but the payments made from the incentive fund differ.
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Consider first case (i) . Here R. (N) - <oNA
“ 6 + y/2 . Also (N - Na )/Na  - I  and (N - Nfi)/NB 
the payments are from (6.2):
Rb (N) - uN
-y
6 + 2y • Thus
PA = <3 ♦ Y/2) } ( 6 . 8 )
PB
(8 + y / 2 ) 
T 8 + 2y (6.9)
and the sum of (6.8) and (6.9) yields (6.10) :
P + P *A *B
Y2(28 + Y)
B2 + 2y8)
(6 .10)
It is interesting to note that the income of a original member of 
firm A increases by AyA = ^  * while that of an original
member of firm B increases by A yfi = 2(8 V  2y')N i£ the men,ber
remains at B and Ay* - ((8 + y/2)(l + y/B)“8(8 + y)/(8 + 2y))/N 
if the member moves to A . Then Ay* > AyA > Ayfi , which suggests 
that an incentive would be provided for individuals to move from B 
to A , and that the income per member differentials between the 
two firms would be increased.
Now consider case (ii) . Here (6.8) still holds, but now
V N> -
uiN (6 + j Y) because of the extra fixed cost.
Thus
PB + >0
(6 . 11)
and
N a N N LabourA B
Figure il- Welfare gain from labour réallocation.
/ (B + | Y)\
PA + PB = Y ^1 + y/2B ♦ )  (6.12)
Again it can be shown that Ay* > Ay^ > Ayfi .
Finally we will consider case (iii) where we will ignore 
firm B and instead consider N - « U is the amount of unemployed
labour in the economy. The efficiency gain from using the unemployed 
labour in firm A is u>U + y /2  . PA is still as in (6.8) , and 
Ay^ > 0  as in the previous cases.
The first two cases, demonstrate very different implications 
for financing the incentive fund. If the marginal tax rate is t and 
the extra aggregate personal income is P^ + Pg + Y then the fund 
will be exactly self-financing if
1 2 3.
ï (2B + Y) (case (i) ) (6.13)
and
t.. 11 (6.14)
Choosing units such that B = 1 , we find that as y ranges
from 0.1 to 1 , t. would range from 0.15 to 0.5 while t.^
would range from 0.66 to 0.70 . It is thus much more likely that
the incentive fund would be self-financing in case (i) than in case (ii).
have considered here are only examples and do not constitute an 
exhaustive analysis of all possible cases. For instance with reference 
to Figure II fixed costs may be such that both firms wish to be at NDD
in the original situation; then firm A would like to recruit h'B - 
members but is prevented from doing so as there is no unemployment and 
B is not releasing labour.
is simply the increase in income that results from a reallocation of 
labour to equate the value of the marginal product of labour in all 
cooperatives. Two caveats are in order. First, this measure may be 
an overstatement where workers derive utility from sources other than 
income and there are adjustment costs associated with labour mobility. 
Second, it has been assumed throughout that a worker would move to 
another cooperative if offered employment there at a higher income. 
However, it must be recognized that this abstracts from impediments
It should be noted that the three cases of reallocation we
Throughout the discussion our concept of efficiency gain
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to mobility such as difference in housing conditions.
111. Some Further Issues
In this section we review our proposed incentive scheme in 
the light of some of the efficiency solutions discussed in Section I. 
This raises the issues of sovereignty, information requirements and 
long-run equilibrium. We also briefly consider the implications of 
extending our proposal to the multi-period case and to the case of 
the monopolistic cooperative economy, and finally consider incorpora­
ting heterogeneneous labour into our analysis. We continue however 
to abstract from problems arising from uncertainty, and to assume that 
workers derive utility from no other sources than income and that 
there are no adjustment costs associated with labour mobility.
The proposals referred to in Section I involved either 
dilution of the sovereignty of the worker-managers or a distortion of 
the cooperative firm from its pure form. Thus hiring and firing might 
be controlled by an employment authority (Meade, 1974), or the coopera­
tive might be allowed to hire labour without in the short run granting 
full membership and entrepreneurial rights (Dubravcic, 1970); or it 
might be permitted to discriminate between new members and old members 
(Meade, 1972). The incentive scheme defined by (6.2) involves neither 
any inherent change in the cooperative as an institution nor any 
dilution of its sovereignty.
Of course the incentive scheme proposed here is not unique 
in this respect. For instance, lump sum taxes or subsidies, specific 
in quantity to each firm, could be found to reallocate labour
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optimally be changing the fixed costs of individual firms. Such a 
policy is adapted to the monopoly context by Vanek et al (1977). The 
problem with this approach, however, is that it requires that planners 
have information concerning the R(N) functions of all firms. It is 
appropriate, at this stage, to consider the information requirements 
of our proposed incentive scheme.
Our scheme, like most decentralized planning instruments, 
would have considerable informational advantages over a policy of firm- 
specific lump sum taxes. It might be operated as follows. The fund 
directorate observes N. , states a value of to and asks all firms 
to state their planned membership adjustments. If planned demand for 
members exceeds planned supply then u is increased until to equates 
demand and supply plans. The firms then adjust their membership and 
begin operation at that new membership level. At the end of the 
planning period they report the value of R^ they have achieved to 
the incentive fund directorate, which then makes or receives the pay­
ment defined in (6.2).At no point in this process does the fund direc­
torate require any knowledge of the functions R^(N^) (apart possibly 
in order to estimate the approximate cost of financing the fund for 
budgetary purposes). It is assumed, of course, that all firms are 
price-takers as far as w is concerned. If a pure tâtonnement process 
is not possible, then of course the scheme may suffer from imperfections 
owing to attempts to operate the scheme at non-equilibrium values of u .
We may now consider the extension of our proposal to the 
multi-period case and to the case of monopolistic economy. We will 
also outline a possible long-run adjustment mechanism.
1 2 6.
As far as the multi-period case is concerned the incentive 
scheme generalizes immediately with the proviso that the are not
updated from period to period. The size of the incentive fund pay­
ments will thus vary over time as shadow profits move to zero as a 
result of new entry in the long run. Other proposals cannot be so 
easily generalized. Meade's (1972) Inegalitarian Cooperative is faced 
each period with a different supply price of labour in terms of number 
of shares. Now members' shares cannot be removed from them after they 
have joined the cooperative. Thus, if the supply price of labour is 
decreasing, the Inegalitarian Cooperative may postpone recruitment in 
order to take advantage of cheaper future labour markets. If, on the 
other hand, the supply price of labour is rising, the firm may over­
recruit initially in order to prevent paying a higher supply price of 
labour later. Both cases involve actions that may infringe the efficiency 
conditions, although the second situation will not occur if members can 
resign and reapply.
In the long run, new cooperatives would be formed and others 
disbanded. Furthermore existing cooperatives may be reconstituted to 
undertake different activities at different intensities. The long run 
equilibrium that we envisage would be the result of the state forming 
or reconstituting cooperatives. It would do so by both choosing the 
area of the cooperative activity and defining such as to maximize
R.(N.)/N. . The formation of such new cooperatives would increase 
productivity in the economy such that u would have an upward trend.
The payments made from or to the incentive fund by cooperatives where 
y > u would diminish, and as the new cooperatives would offer 
y^(N.) S R^(N^)/N^ >. w cooperatives with y < is would gradually be 
disbanded. Thus a long run equilibrium with R^N.j/i^) “ u> - R^(N.)
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for all i is obtained and is characterized by (i) Pareto efficiency 
and (ii) ■ 0 for all i .
Note that u> would equate the supply and demand for labour 
both in terms of short-run adjustments via the incentive scheme and 
the underlying long-run adjustments via the formation of reconstitution 
of cooperatives. There appears little reason to suppose that progress 
towards long-run equilibrium would be inhibited by the short-run adjust­
ment mechanism of the incentive fund.
If the cooperative is not a price-taker but faces a downward- 
sloping demand curve, the incentive function P is insufficient to 
maximize social welfare, as indeed are all the policy instruments 
considered so far. A further policy instrument is required to ensure 
that the firm produces the socially optimal output level. Vanek et al 
(1977) suggest coupling an administered price with lump sum taxation.
This, as with all solutions to the monopoly problem, involves know­
ledge of the demand and cost functions facing each firm in the economy.
A system of administered prices could, of course, be coupled with 
our incentive fund proposal. An alternative would be to use a varia­
tion of (6.2) such as (6J.5) and then to approximate the consumer 
surplus term by readily observable magnitudes:
P* - (Rt - wN.)(N. - N.)/N. + (S. - S.)N ./N. (6.15)
In equation (6.15) is the consumer surplus associated with input
decisions of labour and other inputs x. , and S. is that
associated with the original input levels Ni and x^ . In this case 
is better considered as the difference between revenue and cost
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other than labour costs and R. = R. (N. , x.) . Given (6.15), incomel i l l  ’
per head is y* where
y* = oi + (R. - wN. + S. - S.)/N.i i ii i l
and x.i , N. , which maximizes y* , maximizes■'l profit plus consumer
surplus, i.e., R. + S. - uN. .l i  i Approximating S. - S. byi l 1
J(p ” p)(q + q) where p , q are the original price and quantity 
demanded and p , q those relating to input levels (x^ , N^) , P* 
can be expressed in terms of easily observable and measurable magnitudes. 
The closeness of this approximation depends, of course, on how well 
the demand function can be approximated by a linear function.
The scheme can be extended to the case of heterogeneous 
labour,if we make the assumption that the occupational wage structure 
is fixed by the state to equate demand and supply for all classes of 
labour, and that all firms have to make the same relative income payments - 
that is, in the case of just two classes of labour, although members of 
each class of labour will generally have different incomes in different 
firms, the ratio of incomes of the two classes of labour will be 
constant for all firms. We define k classes or grades of labour and 
let a.(j - 1, 2, . . . k) represent the ratio of the income of a 
member of the jth class of labour to that of a member of the first 
class. Thus a^  « 1 . All firms have to make the same relative income 
payments, that is accept given values for the a^  . Enterprise autonomy 
is thus somewhat reduced. We can then use the a^  to aggregate the 
labour input of the i6*1 firm and define :
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N.
k
» E a. N.l j“l J i
k
N. = E a. N.' J il j-1
(6.17)
(6.18)
where , N^ -1 are respectively the numbers of grade j workers
previously employed and to be determined in the I6*1 firm .
Substitution of (6.17) and (6.18) into (6.2) and then the 
result into (6.1) yields :
k k
y. = u + (R. - (o E a. N.J) Z a. N.J (6.19)
1 1 j-1 J 1 j-1 J 1
Necessary and sufficient conditions for a unique maximum of (6.19) with 
respect to are :
9R.
— — . - u) a. “ 0 j " 1 , 2 ....... k (6.20)
3N.J Ji
and that the Hessian of R is negative definite.
The directorate of the incentive fund have to determine <■>
and a. (j - 2, 3....... k) from information concerning firms'
planned supplies of and demand for different grades of labour in order 
to equilibrate the k labour markets. Given this, wa^ is the 
shadow value of a unit of the grade of labour.
Finally, consider the case where effort is a variable l  
and labour input can be changed for given N . The scheme can easily 
be adapted to the present context provided a common 1 is fixed by
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collusion of co-operative members.
Each co-operative is paid from (or has to pay to) a central 
incentive fund an amount B relating to the values of R , l  and 
N . The incentive payment, B , is defined as follows, where R = R(L):
B - (R - wL)(— ) (6.21)
N
where u> and N are parameters; u> being interpreted as the shadow 
price of a man-hour and being common to the function (6.21) for all 
firms, N denoting the initial membership of the firm which will 
therefore vary from firm to firm. The payment B is treated as a 
revenue (or cost) of the firm to be shared out in relation to work—time 
supplied, thus
y (R ♦ B) £ . . (R - ooL) oaf. + ------N
(6 .21)
Maximisation of utility U(i, y) with respect to l  and N yields 
respectively (6.22) and (6.23)
ir ‘ “ + (rl ' u) fy N
( 6 . 22)
0 » (R^ -  u ) t (6.23)
which may be combined to produce the medium-term efficiency condition
IT " *L " “ y
(all co-operatives) (6.24)
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Of course if there was an entrepreneurial sector u would simply be 
the competitive hourly wage rate, otherwise w is set by the incentive 
fund directorate.
In the long run cooperative mobility across industries and 
the formation of new cooperatives equates income per man hour in all 
cooperatives and B in (6.21) converges to zero as R/N converges to 
m . Thus this incentive scheme produces medium-term efficiency as 
described in Chapter 2, and new entry and mobility of all factors 
ensures that Pareto efficiency exists in the long run. However needs 
payments if made would again present added problems.
IV. Conclusion
This chapter has been mostly concerned with presenting an 
incentive scheme to remove the inefficiency owing to labour market 
imperfections in the cooperative economy which has long been recognized 
in the literature. The significance of the incentive scheme can be 
seen in two ways. First, it can be considered as a decentralized 
planning analogue to the other proposed solutions to the problem, 
and thus as a contribution to the theoretical analysis of the ineffi­
ciency question. Second, it can be viewed as a policy prescription. 
However, if this latter viewpoint is taken a number of qualifications 
have to be made owing to the implicit and explicit assumptions of the 
model we have been using.
In this context, the critical assumptions include the simple 
income per member maximand (other maximands are discussed by Vanek,
1975, pp. 30-31, and Furubotn, 1976) and the absence of adjustment 
costs. Variations on either of these assumptions will almost certainly 
imply that revisions of the incentive scheme are required. In parti­
cular, if monetary valuation of significant differential non-pecuniary 
benefits and conditions of work is not possible, difficulties may be 
created for the operation of the scheme. Finally, short-run distribu­
tion of income consideration have been neglected as it is assumed that 
the welfare function is such that efficiency is preferred whatever the 
consequences for the distribution of income in the short run.
In conclusion, we must stress that the incentive scheme we 
have proposed here is one in which the income per member maximizing 
behaviour of the cooperative becomes identical to profit-maximizing 
behaviour at a given shadow wage rate ui . In so far as the individual 
cooperatives are price-takers, this constitutes in essence a similarity 
between the objectives of the cooperatives and the efficiency objective 
of the state. The scheme thus allows the state to achieve its aims 
without recourse to direct controls over the behaviour of the indivi­
dual cooperative, and thus without requiring a large amount of firm- 
specific information.
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An important feature of the 1965 reforms in Soviet industry
was the establishment of a new system of enterprise incentive funds.
Given that the reform measures, in the words of a translation of Premier 
Kosygin's (1970) famous speech, were intended "to expand the economic 
independence of individual enterprises" the material incentive fund (a 
source of bonuses) might be expected to influence enterprise behaviour. 
Two possible effects have been distinguished. Ellman (1971, 1977) has 
discussed the extent to which the incentive system induces the adoption 
of taut plans by the enterprise. A taut plan, as Ellman (1977, p.34) 
indicates, may nevertheless be inefficient in input use, scale of output, 
technology or product mix. Domar (197«), Bonin (1976) and Martin (1976) 
have analysed the possible influence of the system on input and output 
choices of the enterprise assuming maximisation of incentive funds or 
bonuses. The concern of the present chapter is also with this latter 
influence and we abstract from the issue of taut versus slack plans.
It need hardly be said that, although this is a convenient simplification, 
both effects may operate together and may interact.
In the typical formulation with which the present paper is concerned the 
incentive fund is determined by enterprise performance as reflected in 
sales growth and profitability thus,
Several variants of the incentive scheme have been studied
_B
wN
+ c (PQ-PQ) 
PQ
(7.1)
where B is the incentive fund or total enterprise bonuses, the
wage bill (wage rate nultiplied by numbers of workers employed), n
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profits, K capital employed and PQ revenue, PQ being the initial 
level of revenue. Positive coefficients a and c are set by central 
planners and regulate the relative importance of the two performance 
indices, sales growth and profitability, in bonus determination.
As w and PQ will be assumed fixed we may define Z and Z'
Z = a i + bPQ , b = — (7.2)
PQ
Z' = (Z - c)N (7.3)
so that maximising (7.2) implies identical decisions to maximising B/N 
and maximising (7.3) implies identical decisions to maximising B .
There has been some discussion on whether bonuses per worker or total 
bonuses is the more appropriate objective for the enterprise, (see for 
example Horwitz (1970), Fukada (1977), and Law (1974). Bonuses per worker 
of course already has a parallel in the theory of the socialist enter­
prise in that Ward (1958) assumes maximisation of income per worker in 
his seminal model of the labour-managed firm. Bonin (1976) views a 
formulation like (7.2) as a relevant maximand for the Soviet manager and 
the present analysis will concentrate on (7.2) rather than (7.3). How­
ever, an alternative view is taken in Martin's (1976) recent paper where 
a managerial maximand similar to Z' is employed.
According to Ellman (1971, p.133) the intention of (7.1) was to 
induce the enterprise to increase consumer satisfaction (proxied by sales) 
and efficiency (proxied by profitability). A similar interpretation is 
offered by Adam (1973) who states that the idea was to stimulate an 
expansion of output while inducing enterprises to seek increases in produc­
tivity. In the present paper we postulate one or both of the following 
as possible objectives of the incentive scheme.
1. To achieve technical efficiency in that:
(i) input mixes in all enterprises are such that the 
marginal rate of technical substitution between 
the two factors of production, labour and capital, 
are equal in all enterprises.
(ii) The scale of output in each enterprise is such that 
transferring inputs from one enterprise to another 
would reduce welfare.
2. To increase output without increasing inputs of factors of
production by increasing effort or reducing "slack" or 
x-inefficiency in an enterprise.
We will argue that the bonus scheme (7.1) is unlikely to be 
successful in achieving either of these objectives, and that the reasons 
for this are at least part of the explanation for the early amendment 
of the scheme.
I. Technical Efficiency
Bonin (1976) has demonstrated that 1 (i) is not metby the scheme, 
for if Z is maximised then
where w is the wage rate, r the capital rental rate and (n/K)i is the
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profit rate on capital of the i ^  enterprise and the left-hand side 
of (7.4) is the marginal rate of technical substitution of labour for 
capital in the i ^  enterprise with production function = Q^(K^, N^) . 
As (n/K)^ may be expected to differ between enterprises technical 
efficiency in terms of input mix is not achieved. (Marginal rates of 
technical substitution between labour and capital would not differ among 
enterprises in Domar's (1974) formulation, where the manager's maximand 
contains sales and profits, but not the profit rate. Bonin (1977) 
employs the same maximand in his recent analysis of quantity targets)
Note also that the parameters a and b of (7.2) do not appear directly 
in (7.4) and would be irrelevant to input decisions if the enterprise 
simply maximised Z subject to producing a particular level of output 
predetermined by planners. If, on the other hand, output is variable 
the coefficients a and b might be expected to influence JI/K via 
the enterprise's output decision.
Of course although (7.4) would be valid if output levels 
were exogenously determined by quantity controls, it would not necessa­
rily be valid if one or more inputs were in fixed supply.
If output levels are not exogenously determined and there 
are no constraints on inputs then a further unfortunate property of the 
bonus scheme is that given fixed output and input prices and the assump­
tion that, for some capital/labour ratio, input levels exist which 
enable any output level to be produced, then the level of bonuses is un­
bounded from above provided b > 0 . Equation (7.2) may be rewritten as
a - a - a(f ♦ r) ♦ bPQ (7.2)
Holding £  fixed, the limit of Z as K, N ->■ - can be examined.
The limit of a —  is greater or equal to zero, and wN/K + r is a
constant. By the assumption above bPQ becomes arbitrarily large
and thus there exists no interior global maximum for Z. Also Z' =
K(Z-c)N is unbounded as K, N « while —  is fixed as both (Z-c)N
and N are unbounded. If the capital-labour ratio is also variable as 
the scale is increased then the managers can do at least as well as 
when it is fixed, and so a fortiori Z and Z' are unbounded.
The real significance of this argument is not that infinite 
bonuses could result - constraints on input availability or some other 
system reponse would occur long before this - but rather that some 
quantity controls on inputs or output would have to be in existence in 
parallel to the bonus scheme. The likelihood that the bonus scheme would 
have little part to play in achieving technical efficiency is increased.
Of course an interior local maximum may exist but this would only be 
optimal in an input- or output- constrained situation and then only when 
the interior solution is better than all corner solutions where constraints 
are binding. Note that only when an interior local maximum exists and is 
optimal or when output is exogenously constrained does (7.A) hold.
The assumptions made to prove unboundedness of Z and Z' are 
of course only sufficient but not necessary to make the above points. How­
ever, if a local maximum does exist and is optimal, the question remains 
as to whether (7.A) and the related output decision can be reconciled with 
technical efficiency as we have defined it. Also if output is fixed 
exogenously then (7.A) is certainly an optimal condition for input mix, 
but again can it be reconciled with technical efficiency (i.e. l(i))? In 
order to examine this further we will consider the former case as the more 
general, and remark that w and r need not be the social costs of the
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factor inputs. Now (7.4) can equate the marginal rate of technical 
substitution in each enterprise if it is possible to use an enterprise 
specific policy parameter, such as the price paid to the ith producer 
(P^) , in order to equate optimal profit per unit of capital across en­
terprises (given a^, b^, the parameters of (7.2) for the iC^  enter­
prise). Furthermore, the higher the parameter b^ is relative to a^ , 
the higher the optimal level of output in the i1*1 enterprise. The 
absolute values of a. and b. determine income distribution acrossl l
enterprises.
Thus a set of triplets (a^, b^, P^) can be found which 
induces technical efficiency. The method is described in detail in the 
Appendix . Of course, this implies that the Central Planning Board 
(CPB) must intervene between the producer's price and the price paid 
by consumers which would reflect their valuation, but such intervention 
already exists in principle, although not for this purpose, in the form 
of turnover taxes. The problem with accepting this argument is the large 
amount of information required by the CPB in order to find the socially 
optimal producer prices, taxes and bonus fund parameters : a similar 
scale of problem to that of the application of lump-sum taxes. Neverthe­
less, there is a possibility that some of the technical inefficiency 
embodied in (7.4) may be mitigated by CPB pricing and investment policy 
to reduce variance in profit rates on capital. In fact, in the context 
of the 1973 reorganisation, Bonin (1976, p.494) suggests that planners 
might allocate investment across associations according to profitability.
II. Increasing Effort
In investigating the second postulated objective of the bonus 
scheme we will make the simplifying assumption that and N£ are
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fixed for all enterprises. By means of a simple model we will argue 
that the best form of bonus scheme (7.2) for the CPB to use is one 
where is zero; that is one where only profit (which we assume to be
both positive and less than revenue) is rewarded by the bonus scheme.
We will assume that managers of the itb enterprise act so
as to maximise a quasi-concave function V^(Z. , JL) being the utility of
the "typical" worker. £. is the average effort per worker and 
3V. 3V . 1
-rs— > 0 , t-j—  < 0 . With K. and N. fixed output is a function 
3 l 3 l dQ. xd2Q. 1
Q.(t.) with -t-t—- > 0 and ---— < 0 . Optimal effort levelsi l d£. 2l d£.i
(i ■ 1, 2, . . .  n) satisfy1
3V. P. dQ. 3V.
3Z7 (ai IT + bi Pi> dtT + 3*7X I  1 1
i - 1, 2...... n (7.5)
Consider P^ fixed and so JL* is a function of just the 
two parameters of the bonus scheme a^ and b^ . The CPB are assumed 
to maximise a quasi-concave welfare function U(Q^(1^), •••»
0^ (1.^ ) subject to distribution of income constraints (in utility terms 
as a typical worker may be required to worker harder in one enterprise 
as compared to another) of the form
V.(Z., t.) i ■ 1, 2, . . ., n (7.6)
and also to the response i. - £.*(a., b.) from the comparative1 1 1 1
statics of (7.5). The CPB's problem is thus to maximize the following 
Lagrangean with respect to a^ 0 and b. i 0 (i * 1, 2, . . ., n)
M - U(Q1(£1*),Q2a2*>....Qn(tn*)) " Xi ^ i <Zi»ti*> " M
(7.7)
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First order conditions, using (7.2) and (7.5) can be written:
dQi
*
3*.1 av. n.X __ L _ L
d 1. 1 3a.1 i az. k .1 1
dQi
*
3 1.1 av.
\  __ L p 0
dt.1 3b.1 1 azi igi
that A. > 0 1 provided at
0 and either « 0 or ■ 0l
i = 1,2,... ,n (7.8)
P.Qj £ 0 and either - 0 or » 0
i « 1,2,.. .,n (7.9)
* *
at. at.
3a. > 0.
Now from comparative statics of (7.5) we obtain :
*3*.
1 - -LJ f s  ! i
av. 
+ _ L
dQ. P. 
1  1
ZÎT K.3a.
1 Hi '[ Si K. az.X
*
3 1.
1 - i H
S.P.Q.  1 1. 1
av. 
♦ azT
dQi
d T Pi
db.
1
Hi 1l 1 * * 1 1
C B
a2v .  ___ 1 (  !i + b.PSi ¡¡7 1 j  d i
i - 1,2....n (7.10)
l Œ 1.2,..., n (7.11)
and H.
f a2v. /  e . V  fdQi Y  3vi /  pi \  d2Qi
+ 2 a‘v. /  p. \ dQ: 3 V.v 1 biPi) ^  + ¡ 1 7
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H is positive from the second order conditions for maximising V^, 
which we assume to hold. Substituting (7.10) and (7.11) into (7.8) 
and (7.9) and multiplying (7.8) by yields :
... /dQ.\2 3V. P.
r. n. + —  I—i )  __L _L ioi i W  3Z. H. and either = 0  or a^ = 0 (7.8a)
where T.l
3U
3U m 2 3V.l P.1
3Qi Vd4i / 3Z . 1 H.l
s .1
•H
>CX3
df,.l H.l
A • 1 9Z. 1
and either * 0 or b. ■ 0 (7.9a)
Given our assumptions, any solution to the conditions (7.8a) and 
(7.9a) must have T^. < 0. Thus if PjQ^ > IT£> 0 and (7.8a) holds as a strict 
inequality then a fortiori (7.9a) must hold as a strict inequality, implying 
ai “ b^ - 0. On the other hand if (7.8a) holds as an equality (7.9a) must 
hold as a strict inequality implying a^ >0, b.. ■ 0. Both a^ and b^ 
being zero could only constitute a solution in the unlikely event that 
V^(0, *£*(0, 0)) 'V.. Thus to increase effort the incentive scheme should 
typically be a function of the profit rate alone. Bonuses based on the 
profit rate (subject to a minimum output constraint) were a central feature 
of Liberman's reform proposals of the early sixties.
III. Conclusion
We have argued that as well as the problem of input mix, a further 
problem involved in using the bonus scheme (7.2) is that of the unboundednesa 
of the bonus payments at large scale. This appears to suggest that the
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bonus scheme is an inefficient control of the enterprise managers' decisions 
if used alone. Quantity controls are thus likely to be needed, and the 
existence of such controls raises questions concerning the significance of 
the input mix problem (equation (7.4)) particularly as the extent of the 
inefficiency involved in this may be mitigated by the setting of prices 
paid to producers which are distinct from consumers' prices.
The bonus scheme does not appear to be a satisfactory tool for 
increasing labour productivity by rewarding effort. In terms of a simple 
model with fixed labour and capital, it is found to be dominated by a 
bonus scheme which relates to profits alone. Of course it is still 
possible that a justification of a positive b^ in (7.2) is as an 
incentive for the enterprise to accept larger allocations of controlled 
factor inputs from the CPB.
However there appears considerable reason for the early amendment 
of the bonus scheme in practice and the extent to which there has since 
been reversals to the reforms of the mid-sixties (see Ellman (1977)).
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Appendix to Chapter 7 The planners choice of bonus parameters.
To investigate a possible pricing strategy for planners it 
will be assumed that the relevant welfare function can be written
U = U«^, Q2 . • -, On) (A7.1)
where is the quantity of the one good produced by the i ^  enter­
prise. Enterprise j may of course be producing the same» or a different 
good. Now consider the well-known exercise of maximising (A7.1) subject 
to production functions and labour and capital availability N and 
K . The Lagrangean may be written
n c \ n n
UO) + Z x J q . - Q. (N. ,K. ) -yM(N - Z N. ) (K - Z K.) (A7.2) i=l H  i i i i J N W 1 K i»! i
whence the following first-order conditions can be derived.
3U
3Qi
- X.1 0 l s 1 ) 2 ) • • • y n • (A7.3)
X.l 0 l s 11 2) • • •, n. (À7.4)
3Qi
Xi 3ÎT ~ UK - ° 1 ’ l ’  2 ..... “* (A7.5)
Suppose decisions taken by enterprises are such that Z is 
maximised. Two questions then arise. First, can enterprise behaviour 
be induced to satisfy conditions (A7.3), (A7.4) and (A7.5)? Secondly, 
if such a correspondence is possible, can the bonus scheme be used to 
provide an arbitrary income distribution such that the output produced
can be allocated among individuals to satisfy planners distributional 
preferences? (Our second question interprets Z maximisation as 
maximising income per worker). Maximisation of Z by the enterprise
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by choice of K and N implies the following first-order conditions
identical with those in (A7.4) and (A7.5) for some if and only
if the following hold
differ from that paid by consumers. Note that conditions (A7.8) and
(A7.9) can be satisfied by setting w and Pj (i ■ 1, 2 ........ n) for
any ♦ > 0 defining the money unit to utility unit relationship. Thus 
a socially optimal input mix for any output level and bonus scheme 
parameters can be attained. Price Pi will, of course be enterprise-
w i - 1, 2 ., n (A7.6)
3Qi
3K.l
i l 1. 2 (A7.7)
The solutions for in (A7.6) and (A7.7) will be
w ‘N (A7.8)
b.
(A7.9)
(A7.10)
Price P.^ in (A7.9) and (A7.10) is now to be interpreted as the producer 
price received by the i**1 enterprise and, as we will see, this will
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specific unless all enterprises in the particular industry have the 
same technology. Condition (A7.9) may be redundant as the enterprise 
may be constrained by planners to produce a given output such that 
(A7.3) is satisfied. If there is no such constraint the following 
tax strategy can be adopted by planners. Set + t^  equal to $A^ 
where t^ is an enterprise-specific rate of sales tax or turnover 
tax such that the price paid by consumers (P^ + t^) for any particular 
commodity has the same proportional relationship to A^ . Thus (A7.9) 
together with (A7.8) and (A7.10) determine welfare-maximising choices 
of input mix and output by the enterprise. Substituting P^ from 
(A7.10) and using (A7.8) an optimal tax rate t? is easily derived,
til 0 A.l P.l
£  (Q.A. -Q. w i l “kk Mn N) (A7.ll)
Given (A7.3), (A7.4) and (A7.5) it is easily confirmed that t* > 0 
providing there are diminishing returns to scale. The state's total
will thus be
n f n
£ Q.t* - 4W 1
i-1 1 1 H-l♦ { J x (Qi V  " ■ v }
(A7.12)
It is assumed that government revenue is composed of enterprise profits 
and capital rental payments as well as taxation, and that part of these 
receipts is disbursed in the form of payments to enterprise incentive 
funds. Finally, from (A7.9) the following expression can be obtained 
for optimal parameters in the incentive scheme
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b. *
< I 7 >1
V i  - - unn
yKK + W
(A7.13)
Note that (A7.13) only requires that particular enterprise- 
specific b/a ratios be set for efficiency. As long as these optimal 
ratios are maintained planners have some scope to pursue other objectives 
through choice of absolute values of a and b . The total size of 
incentive funds and inter-enterprise variation in incentive payments 
per worker can obviously be affected by choice of absolute values of
a and b .
«MK
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Following Domar (1966) a number of authors have presented 
theoretical analyses which portray the Soviet collective farm as a 
producer cooperative. They have drawn, on general theory of the producer 
cooperative as advanced by Ward (1958), Sen (1966) and Vanek (1970) but 
have developed models which reflect particular characteristics of the 
Soviet collective farm such as the existence of members' private plots. 
The effects of crop quotas and price changes have been analysed by Oi 
and Clayton (1968); Bradley (1971, 1973) and Cameron (1973a, b) have 
discussed incentives and labour supply - a topic which has also been 
explored by Bonin (1977) in an examination of the impact of uncertainty 
within a producer cooperative model of the collective farm.
State policies have been studied by these writers within the 
framework of the producer cooperative model of the collective farm by 
determining the effects of price, rent and tax changes and work and crop 
quotas on factor allocation and crop outputs.
The objective of the present chapteris to examine the effects
»
of restrictions on the size of private plots. This question does not 
seem to have been considered in the theoretical literature on collective 
farm models yet such restrictions have been applied in practice. Thus 
in the late fifties, under Khrushchev, there was pressure on collective 
farms to reduce the size of private plots which was reflected in 1959 
in a 7 per cent reduction in private plot area. Brief accounts are 
given by Conquest (1968, 65-6) and Karcz (1970, 238-9) and it seems 
that one intention of such a policy was to induce an increase in the 
labour input devoted to collective crops.
Although private plots only constitute some 3 per cent of the
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sown area and their production has fallen in relative importance^ Nove 
(1977, Chs. 1,5) reports that they are responsible for over 25 per cent 
of gross agricultural output, with collective farms accounting for 39 
per cent and state farms around 30 per cent of gross output in 1973. 
Moreover the private plot continues to provide a significant proportion 
of average income of collective farm households - 27 per cent in 1972 
and more in earlier years according to Wâdekin (1975). It should be 
noted that some state-employed persons and pensioners also hold private 
plots.
A producer cooperative model of the collective farm is outlined 
in the first section of this chapter. The second section is concerned 
with an examination of the effects of restrictions in the size of private 
plots. Our analysis reveals that important distinctions may be drawn 
between short-run and long-run responses to changes in the area of 
private plots. We assume that in the short run membership of the collec­
tive farm is fixed but members may vary hours worked and the allocation 
of their labour time between work on the private plot and on collective 
land, whereas in the long run the level of membership is also variable.
Of course membership reduction and recruitment might not be accomplished 
with equal ease and much will depend on the nature of alternative employ­
ment opportunities. Factor intensity as reflected in labour-land input 
ratios is shown to play a key role in the explanation of the nature of 
the response of the farm to the change in private plot size. In the 
third section we consider some implications of a system under which 
the area of private plots is determined by the member's contribution to 
communal work. Some concluding comments are presented in the final 
section of the chapter.
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I. A Collective Farm Model
As the model we will use combines features encompassed by the 
Oi-Clayton (1968) and Bonin (1977) (certainty) models its structure may 
be outlined fairly briefly.
There are N identical collective farm members (or households)
and they jointly choose the number of hours, t , each member has to
work on the collective cropfs). We thus assume that l is determined
by collusion of all members rather than, say, by individual myopic decision'
taking with any one household behaving as if changes in its value of
f, leave every other household's l  decision unaffected. In Cameron's x x
model (1973, 18) under .certainty and identical tastes it is argued
that "each household is aware that its every move is accompanied by
similar moves of all the . . . other households" so that the decision
taken in this case will be the same as under collusion. Bonin (1977,
81-2) discusses a number of hypotheses which yield this outcome. Of
course in any labour allocation scheme a check may have to be made on
each member by the rest to ensure that labour obligations are fulfilled
but we will abstract here from such supervisory costs. As well as working
on the collective land each member has a plot of k hectares of land
for private cultivation and chooses the number of hours, l  , that he
works on the private plot. The member's concave, twice differentiable
utility function, U(y, 1) , is maximised by choice of l  and
i  is the sum of i  and l , y is the member's total net income and x z
3U/3y > 0 , 3U/3*. < 0 and 3 U/3i3y S 0 reflecting the assumption that 
the marginal utility of leisure (-3U/31) does not decrease with 
income. The member's net income is given by:
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y - [X(IN, txN) -FC]/N + z U z, k) (8.1)
Two interpretations of the model are possible. In the first 
X(0 is the total revenue net of all variable non-labour costs from 
the collective land, t is the collective land per member, FC repre­
sents fixed costs of the farm such as rent and z(*) is total revenue of 
the member net of all variable non-labour costs from his private plot.
The collective land net revenue and the fixed costs arc shared equally 
among members. The z(0 function is an envelope function, representing 
maximum net revenue with respect to selection of crops, fertilizer and 
other inputs at given input and output prices. The X(*) function'is 
also an envelope function implying optimal input selection but there 
are restrictions on the selection of collective crops which we note 
below. We also make the critical assumption that X(*) and z(*) are 
homogeneous of degree one and that marginal net revenue products are 
decreasing.
The alternative interpretation follows the technological speci- 
fiction of Oi and Clayton (1968). The farm produces one collective crop 
and one private crop using only two inputs, land and labour. Output 
prices are fixed and the value of these outputs are X(*) and z(*) (per 
member). The corresponding critical assumption is that both crops have 
production functions exhibiting constant returns to scale and diminishing 
marginal products for both factors. We will occasionally draw on this 
interpretation in later discussion but it docs seem worth emphasising 
that the earlier somewhat more general interpretation is possible.
Collective land per member, denoted by t , is given by
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t - T/N - k (8.2)x
where T is total farm size in hectares. Now by the homogeneity 
assumption and using (8.2) we may rewrite (8.1) as :
y - x(tx, T/N - k) + z(*z, k) - FC/N (8.1a)
where x(0 = X(«)/N.
In the short run utility is maximised, subject to (8.1a), with 
respect to and . In the long run membership, N , is also
variable. Membership can be increased by recruitment and reduced by 
choosing not to replace those who leave or die. We will assume that, 
in the long run, membership adjusts to the level which, jointly with 4^ 
and 4 , maximises(8.la)and thus utility. (Of course it must be
recognised that in some circumstances alternative employment opportunities 
may be such that full adjustment of membership to a level which maximises 
income per member is not feasible.)
First-order conditions for maximising utility with respect to
l  . 4 and N , assuming an interior solution, are :x ’ z
3U + 3U = 0 (8.3)
3y 31X 34
3U 3z 3U
3y 34z 34
■ 0 (8.4)
FC/T - 3x/3tV - 0 (8.5)
Note that (8.3) and (8.4) toeether imply
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3x _ 3z d V / d i
n x  ~ 3 l z ” 3U/3y ( 8 . 6 )
that is, each member allocates his time so that the marginal (net) revenue 
product of labour on both types of land is equal to his marginal rate of 
substitution between income and work. This condition is familiar from 
Bonin's (1977) analysis in which membership is assumed fixed whereas (8.5) 
which states that membership is adjusted until the marginal (net) revenue 
product of collective land is equal to fixed costs per hectare and the 
equality of the marginal (net) revenue product of labour in the two 
types of land is to be found in Oi and Clayton (1968).
An interpretation of (8.5) is assisted by multiplying through by 
T/N. Then it is seen that optimal membership equates the marginal member's 
contribution to fixed costs of the farm (FC/N)with the marginal (net) 
revenue product of collective land (3x/3t^) multiplied by the overall 
number of hectares per member (k hectares of private land plus a 
member's share equivalent to (T - Nk)/N hectares of collective land).
Thus (3x/3tx)T/N is the marginal loss to the current members of 
admitting an additional member, as their individual private crop areas 
are unchanged, but land allocated to collective crops is reduced.
In the next section the effects of restrictions in the size 
of private plots, k , are discussed. Our exposition of the model is 
completed by stating two important assumptions relating to these plots. 
First, we assume that members would prefer larger to smaller private 
plots, that is
at optimal *x and l .
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The second assumption is that private plots are more intensively culti­
vated than the collective land,
V k * V S c  (8-8>
As x and z are different functions, (8.8) does not follow from (8.7) and 
homogeneity. It is a separate assumption which reflects the argument 
that private crops offer a more profitable outlet (because of state 
controls on the collective crops which may be produced and their prices) 
and, as a result, members choose a higher labour input per hectare on 
the private plot. The vector of collective crops, production of which 
is permitted (ordered) by planners, is unlikely to be income-maximising 
from the viewpoint of the collective farm member. Indeed, if farms 
could freely select both the vector of communal and that of private 
crops, land-labour ratios would be equal in both sectors in the absence 
of price differences. Such freedom of crop choice cannot be assumed.
On institutional grounds(8.8)appears to be a reasonable assumption in 
the Soviet context.
We must point out here that changing the prices of collective 
or private crops or changing constraints on what crops may be produced 
in each sector may remove the excess demand for private plot land which 
is reflected in our treatment of k as a permitted maximum. We are 
thus assuming that prices and permitted crop assortment are of such an 
order that excess demand for private plot land exists in the sense that 
3U/3k > 0 . Of course a particular k may be optimal from a social 
point of view (or from the point of view of planners'preferences) 
even though 3U/3k 0 because of differences in pricing and crop
assortment between private and collective sectors. For instance the 
state-determined prices of some collective crops may be relatively low
for political, income-distribution, or other reasons whereas the output 
of private plots is sold on a 'free market'.
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II. Response to Private Plot Size
We will examine the effects in the long run and in the short 
run of a change in k , the size of each members' private plot.
(a) Long-Run Response
this model because of the assumption of homogeneity of degree one of the
net revenue functions. The latter implies that marginal net revenue prc
ducts are homogeneous of degree zero. Thus as FC and T are fixed
l  I t  is constant (from (8.5) )and Jl /k and (-3U/3A) / (3U/3y) are X X  Z
constant (from (8.6)). This means that land-labour ratios in both types 
of plot are invariant with respect to the value of k and for suitable 
positive constants a^ , a^ and a^ we may write,
The effect of a small change in k may be determined by total 
differentiation of (8.11) which yields (using (8.3), (8.4) and (8.5)):
The long-run response is particularly simple to analyse in
(8.9)
(8 .10)
3U/3H
3U'/3y_ “ a3
( 8 . 11 )
1 57.
UL3k
G 3U 
H 3y (8 .12)
. u 3 Uwhere H = — =■
3y
32U 31T 3U 32U
3y34 3y 34 3i2
and 3U 3^U 3U 3^U 34 3y2 “ 3y 343y
Thus, from (8.7), 34/3k < 0 . Total differentiation of (8.9) yields
whence sufficient conditions for 3N/3k > 0 are (8.7) and (8.8).
reinforces the move towards greater cooperative plot size and, as the 
land-labour ratio is constant total labour hours on the cooperative 
land increase. In the simple two-crop interpretation of the model the 
output of the collective crop increases and that of the privately- 
produced crop falls. Finally if 4 is fixed at say 4 , as in the 
Oi-Clayton (1968) model and income-per member alone is maximised the
34 /3k = 4 /k > 0z z (8.13)
and so we have :
3Jt /3k = 34/3k - 34 /3k < 0x z (8.14)
The analysis is completed by differentiation of (8.10) which
yields
3N/3k ■* [(4 /k - 4 /1 ) - 34/3k] N2t /T4w Z X X  A X (8.15)
As membership contracts in response to a fall in k this
where
2
and
H
G
32U /3l<\2 .  ^ 32U 3Ù-3U 32U
" 2 111 3y ' J “ 3y34 3y 3 i 3 l 2
3U 32u 3U 32U > o
3y2 3y 3A3y °
< 0
Thus, from (8.7) , 3£/3k < 0 . Total differentiation of (8.9) yields
3i  /3k ■* i. /k > 0z z (8.13)
and so we have :
3)1 /3k = 3i/3k - 31 /3k < 0x z (8.14)
The analysis is completed by differentiation of (8.10) which
yields
3N/3k - [U /k - 1 /t ) - 3A/3k] N2t /Tt (8.15)Z X X  A X
whence sufficient conditions for 3N/3k > 0 are (8.7) and (b.8).
As membership contracts in response to a fall in k this 
reinforces the move towards greater cooperative plot size and, as the 
land-labour ratio is constant total labour hours on the cooperative 
land increase. In the simple two-crop interpretation of the model the 
output of the collective crop increases and that of the privately- 
produced crop falls. Finally if l  is fixed at say Ï  , as in the 
Oi-Clayton (1968) model and income-per member alone is maximised the
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signs of 34 /3k , 31 /3k and 3N/3k are as above and the conclusionsX z
are unaltered.
A number of influences underlie these results. First it is 
clear that if at some initial ! , ! private plot size is reduced 
the marginal (net) revenue product of labour on private plots will fall 
relative to that on collective land. Thus at a given 1 a reallocation 
of labour from private plots to collective land will occur. Secondly 
at a given labour input 1 the transfer of land from private to collec­
tive use implies a sufficiently large transfer of labour such that the 
collective labour to land ratio will rise. This, in turn implies a 
rise in the marginal (net) revenue product of collective land. Gains 
can now be made by contracting membership since the net value of the 
output that can be produced on additional collective land (obtained from 
the private plot of a member who leaves) and remaining members' enlarged 
share of the net output from collective land exceed the additional fixed 
costs which remaining members would have to bear as a result of a 
member's departure. Finally of course 1 will change because the fall 
in k induces a fall in income and a response in individual labour supply. 
It might be surmised that both a rise or a fall in individual hours are 
possible - and we show below that this is indeed the case in the short 
run. However in the long run the marginal rate of substitution between 
income and leisure remains constant and this plays a key rôle in deter­
mining that individual labour supply increases when k falls.
(b) Short-Run Response
In the short run the number of members, N , is fixed so that
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(8.5)does not hold both before and after a change in k . Thus, in this 
case, the land-labour ratios on the two types of land are not invariant 
with respect to a change in k and the simplifications (8.9), (8.10) and 
(8.11) are no longer relevant.
Comparative statics of (8.3) and (8.4) yield:
1 17 _ 3x '!g + f 3u\  2 32x 32x
* 1[[ 3k 3tx>' u 2 Wz
d Z 3tX X d z 2z
. H 1' 3 2x 32z \
W a y  \i d Z 31 ^ X X d i  3t z z /
(8.16)
where A 3U 32x H 3U 32z + H
3£.2u X (3U/3y)2 3y 3H2 z (3U/3y)2
11
(3U/3y)
> 0.
As G > 0, H < 0 and as the cross derivatives of the revenue functions 
are positive (because the revenue functions are homogeneous of degree 
one and marginal revenue products are diminishing) , a sufficient condition 
for(8.16)to be negative is our assumption stated in(8,7)above. Thus a 
reduction in k increases both land and labour inputs on the cooperative 
plot. However, both ' i i . J ' iV . and 3l/3k are ambiguous in sign. If 
k is reduced then income effects may imply that the extra cooperative 
plot labour is found from leisure time rather than private plot working 
hours.
If the production process also involves a capital input (e.g. 
tractors), the level and allocation of which may be optimally determined 
by members, the long-run analysis is easily extended. Capital will be
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allocated such that its marginal net revenue product in both sectors is 
equated with its rental per unit. If the first-order conditions yield 
a unique solution for levels of the three inputs then homogeneity of 
degree one of the net revenue functions in land, labour and capital implies 
that the ratios of labour to land and capital to land in each sector are 
unchanged when, k , the size of a private plot changes. Thus the 
results of this section carry over with the ratio of capital in the 
collective to capital in the private sector changing in proportion to 
the corresponding ratio of labour inputs. The long-run effect of a cut 
in private plot area will be an overall reduction in the level of the 
capital, input reflecting not only the fact that private plots would'
(because of their greater profitability) be cultivated in a more capital- 
intensive fashion but also the long-run reduction in membership.
However, a caveat is in order here. If the state or management imposes 
limitations on the use of capital or if there are significant indivisibilities 
such that capital is not variable in the long run in the same sense and 
within the same time period as membership our analysis would be seriously 
affected. In particular if there is a third input,capital,which is 
fixed at exogenously determined levels x(*) and z(*) are no longer 
homogeneous of degree one in labour hours and land and the analysis will 
not hold.
III. Private Plots as Incentives
The 1969 Model Collective Farm Charter, reproduced in R. Stuart 
(1972, pp 222-223), states that labour participation of a house­
hold in the communal sector is taken into consideration in establishing 
the size of its private plot. Thus far we have viewed the size of
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the private plot as exogenously determined. In this section we will 
allow the area of each private plot to be endogenously determined by 
labour participation on the communal plot and we will consider the 
effects of increasing private plot area entitlement per labour hour of 
communal work. Thus, to be specific, let
B + gi o x (8.17)
and assume that, optimising under this scheme, (i.e. for given and g)
workers choose i  * hours communal work implying B = k - g l  * whereX O O X
k is the value of k at i  - SL * . We will examine the response o X X
of a long-run equilibrium > ^z* * N*) to a small
increase in g , dg , which changes Bq and g such that k - kQ at
l  = l  * thus :X X
ko + 8(*x - V > (8.18)
First-order conditions for an interior utility maximum with 
respect to 4 , and N yield
3U
3y
3x /§£ ÜÜ \ 1 + Ü  = 0
■H x V* 3tJ J  H
(8.19)
1Ü15. + ÜL = o3y 3 t z 31
(8 . 20)
3x/3tx - FC/T ( 8 . 21 )
ondition (8.21)Lmplies 3x/3tx and 3x/3*x are constant with respect 
and from (8.19) and (8.20) we may writeto g
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x X
k - k + g U  - L *)O X X (8.18)
(8.19)
3U 3z + 8U 
3y 3 i z 31
(8 . 20)
3x/3tx - FC/T ( 8 . 21)
Condition (8.21)implies 3x/3tx and 3x/3*x are constant with respect 
to g and from (8.19) and (8.20) we may write
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3 x / 3 + (3z/3k - 3x/3tx)g = 3z/31z C8.22)
Note that the net value of the marginal revenue product of labour is no 
longer equal on private and collective plots. Now, from (8.22) a 
small increase in g implies
The right-hand side of (8.23) is negative by (8.7) and d(3z/3k) and
degree zero in their arguments so that we may write 3z/3k = t(k/^z)
and Sz/3^ -\Kk/£z). Obviously $'(■) < 0 and ÿ'(-) > 0 from the 
assumption of diminishing marginal (net) revenue products. Because 
they are of opposite signs and since the left hand side of(8.23)is 
negative the only configuration of signs that is possible is
gd(3z/3k) - d(3z/3*z) = -(3z/3k - 3x/3tx)dg (8.23)
d(3z/3t ) must have opposite signs as they are both homogeneous of z
3 (3z/3k) . „ 3 (3z/3i.z) > 0 (8.24)
so that we must have 3(tz/k)/3g < 0 .
Now from (8.20)
3(3
-H 3)1 (8.25)
(3U/3y)3 3,5
163.
for a small displacement from and, since H < 0, it follows that
34/3g > 0 . The sign of 34x/3g may now be determined. Condition 
(8.24)implies that the private sector labour to land ratio, 4z/k .falls 
when g rises. From 3(4z/k)/3g < 0 we derive
k 34/3g - (k + Jlzg) 3*x/3g - lz(*x - ¿x*) < 0 (8.26)
and since 3i/3g > 0 from(8.25), 34 /3g > 0. Also from 3(4 /k)/3g < 0x z
we may write
k 31./3g - 4 e 34 /3g -  4 (4 -  4 *) < 0 • (8.27)
£j Z  X  Z  A  A
so that in general 3i_z/3g is ambiguous in sign at positive g due to 
income effects but is certainly negative at g = 0.
Implications for membership are derived as follows. From (8.21) 
l  /(T/N - k) is constant with respect to g whence
(t + l  g)31 /3g + (4 T/N2) 3N/3g + l  C l -  l *) = 0 (8.28)X X X  X X X X
and so 3N/3g < 0 since, from (8.26).Si^/Sg > 0 .
In general the direction of change in the total labour supply 
on the collective plot, and thus from(8.21)that of the total area of the 
collective plot, is indeterminate. However it is easily shown that
• 3(N4x)/3g - [(k - *xg)N2/T] 3)lx/3g (8.29)
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which is certainly positive at g = 0 but is, in general, ambiguous
in sign. Three cases may be distinguished. First if some land is given 
for private use independently of , then k > and (total
communal labour) and Ntx (total collective land) will both increase 
with g . Secondly if k = then total collective land and total
communal labour will both be unchanged, the effect of the rise in 
being exactly offset by the fall in N . Lastly if some positive amount 
of communal labour has to be provided before there is any entitlement 
to private plots the increase in g reduces both communal labour and 
collective land.
IV Concluding Comments
We have shown that in a simple model of the collective farm 
reducing the size of private plots results in increases in land and 
labour inputs for collective crops both in the short run when membership 
is fixed and in the long run when it is variable. Presumably this has 
been one of the intentions of such a policy in practice. In the long 
run the amounts of both inputs devoted to private crops would decline; 
but in the short run the effects of plot area reduction on private plot 
labour are indeterminate, so it is possible that extra collective labour 
input is provided by reduction in leisure rather than private plot working 
hours. We have also explored some implications of a system under which 
private plot size depends on the member's contribution to communal work.
In addition to ignoring the complications of a capital input
which we discussed earlier our theoretical analysis must be qualified
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by recognising that income changes may have an effect on the efficiency 
or the quality of the labour force. Thus, in the face of severe restric­
tions on private plots, which significantly reduce income from given 
effort, the younger and more mobile workers may leave the farm or at 
low income levels labour efficiency might be affected. (The productivity- 
income-nutrition link has been extensively discussed by Bliss and Stern 
(1978)). Also income effects of a reduction in private plot size may 
reduce the supply of new members so that desired membership increases 
may be infeasible.
Although uncertainty of parameters other than k do not seem 
likely to affect the broad conclusions from the comparative statics 
analysis uncertainty concerning future permitted levels of k may well 
do so. If k were fixed until after the harvest then only the long-run 
membership adjustment would be affected whereas in the, perhaps less 
likely, case in which members believe there is a chance that some of their 
private plot area may be cut before harvest then the supply and alloca­
tion of individual labour would also be affected. Of course in a dynamic 
context expected cuts in private plots would influence activities like 
fertiliser application on the private plot by affecting expected future 
returns.
Finally, although we cannot review alternative theories here, 
it should be noted that Stuart (1972 Chs. 6, 9) has questioned the 
suitability of the "producer cooperative" model for the Soviet collective 
farm and it seems likely that the debate on alternative models of the 
Soviet collective farm will continue.This chapter, however, has been 
concerned with providing an analysis of the implication of private plot 
restrictions within a producer cooperative model.
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1• A recent paper by Weitzman (1974) considered the choice
between two planning strategies for maximising the expected value of 
benefit over cost. At the planning stage, benefits (B) and costs 
(C) were functions of output q and random variables 0 and n , 
i.e.
B - B(q, n)
and
C = C(q, 6)
n and 0 were assumed independent for much of the analysis
- an assumption which will be retained here. The production decision
concerned finding that production level to maximise profit given the
planning strategy and given 0. That is the planning decision is
taken before 0 is known; the production decision - in so far as the
plan allows freedom of decision - takes place when 0 is known.
thThe derivatives of the functions with respect to the i argument 
is denoted by subscript i . Following Weitzman, the sign 2 indicates 
"an accurate local approximation". Equation (9.1) is from Weitzman 
(1974), equations 2 and 16. The two strategies of the planners were:
(P) Set price equal to expected marginal benefit where
expected marginal benefit equals expected marginal cost, 
i.e. find p such that the output level, chosen by 
the producer, h(p, 0) solves
-  ( h ( p , 0 ) ,  0) 2 E O ^ h i p ,  0 ) ,  rO] •P (9.1)
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(Q) Set output equal to that level where expected marginal 
benefit equals expected marginal cost, i.e. find q 
such that
E[B1 (q, n)] = E[CL (q, 0)] (9.2)
Planning strategies P and Q will generally provoke diffe­
rent production decisions due to P allowing a response in terms of 
output level to 0 , whereas Q constrains output level to q .
Following Weitzman (1974) and locally approximating B(q, n) 
and C(q, 0) by:
C(q, 0) = C(q, 0) + (C’ + o(0)) (q - q)
+ C"(q - q)2/2 (9.3)
B(q, n) ° B(q, n) + (b ' + 8(n)) (q - q)
+ B"(q - q)2/2 (9.4)
where E(o(0)) - E(8(n)) - 0 and B’, C', B", C" are fixed coeffi­
cients, the comparative advantage of strategy P over strategy Q is 
found to be A(P - Q) 2 o2(B" ♦ C")/(2C"2) (9.5)
and where B" 2 Bu (q, n) and C" 2 Cu (q, 0) , with B" assumed 
negative and C" assumed positive. Obviously the sign A(P - Q) depends 
on whether |b"| * |C'| . If |B"| > |c"| then A(P - Q) is negative}
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if |B"| < |C"| then A(P - Q) is positive, is defined
below (p. 173 ) ,
This result is of obvious theoretical and practical importance. 
However both strategies P and Q are inferior to a strategy based 
upon what Weitzman calls "ideal" prices, and which he defines by:
"Now an ideal instrument of central control would be a 
contingency message whose instructions depend on which 
state of the world is revealed by 0 and n ." 
(Weitzman (1974, p. 481))
Such messages can ensure that B - C is maximised for any 6 and r) .
He then dismisses the possibility of such a strategy being 
used by arguing:
"It should be readily apparent that it is infeasible for the 
centre to transmit an entire schedule of ideal prices or 
quantities. A contingency message is a complicated, specia­
lised contract which is expensive to draw up and hard to 
understand. The random variables are difficult to quantify. 
A problem of differentiated information or even of moral 
hazard may be involved since the exact value of 0 will 
frequently be known only by the producer." (Weitzman (1974, 
p. 481))
I will argue here that the case against ideal prices is over­
stated by Weitzman. For this purpose, in Section II a contingent pay­
ment function which is linear in costs and benefits per unit output is 
shown to have "ideal" properties. Two variations are considered. One 
where both 0 and n are observed prior to the production decision 
and the other when just 0 is observed. This second variation may 
appear more appropriate in many situations. In Section III, the
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comparative advantages of such ideal price strategies over P and Q 
are calculated using the techniques of Weitzman's paper and A(P - Q) 
related to them. Finally the implications of the analysis in terms 
of the relevance of ideal prices are discussed in a concluding section.
In particular the information requirements of the various strategies 
are compared.
II. Consider the contingent price p* where
p* = (a +bB(q, n) + (1 - b) C(q, 0))/q (9.6)
where 0 < b $ 1. This price is contingent upon q, n and 0 , but 
is only dependent upon n and 0 via the functions B(q, n) and 
C(q, 0) . Let us call strategy IP the adoption of a contingent price 
p* as in (9.6) where the production level decision is determined by 
profit maximisation by the producer given p*, n and 0 . Strategy 
IP' will differ only to the extent that the producer maximises 
expected profit, given p* and 0 .
With strategy IP , the producer maximises profit (n)
where
n - p*q - C(q, 0)
- a + b (B (q, n) - C(q, 0)) (9.7)
i.e. he will choose q* such that B^(q*, n) ” C^(q*, 0) , thus 
maximising the excess of benefit over cost in all situations, i.e.
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given any n and 0 . With strategy IP' , the producer maximises 
expected profit where
E(n)  = a + b(E [B(q, n)] - C(q, 0)) (9.8)
i.e. he will choose q' such that E[B^(q', n)] = C^(q', 0) , thus
maximising the excess of expected benefit over cost, given 0 .
The output levels q , q* and q' can be related by realising 
that they all maximise expected profit: q before 0 or n are known, 
q' before n is known but after 0 is known and q* after both 0 
and n are known.
For strategy IP' , p* could be reformulated as
p' - (a + b E[B(q, n)] + (1 - b) C(q, 0))/q (9.9)
It is easily seen that with risk neutrality on the part of 
both the producer and the planners, an identical result (q') emerges.
HI. The expected net benefits of planning with ideal prices are
calculated below. Such calculations are of interest for two reasons. 
First, as we will argue in the next Section, planning strategies IP 
or IP' may have advantages rather than disadvantages, in terms of 
informational requirements, over strategies P or Q . Secondly, even 
if they do not, they offer a yardstick with which to judge the compara­
tive advantage A(P - Q) and to measure the incentive for using a 
contingent price strategy. Even if IP' is completely infeasible, it
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is of interest to assess the magnitude of A(P - Q) in terms of the 
theoretical welfare loss A(IP' - Q) .
Differentiate equations (9.3) and (9.4) with respect to q 
and obtain :
C1(q, 6) 2 c' + a(0) + C"(q - q) (9.10)
B^q, n) 2 B’ + B(n) + B"(q -  q) (9.11)
With strategy IP the LHS of equations (9.10) and (9.11) 
are equal: Thus we can solve for q* - q as :
q* - q 2 (b ’ + B(n) - C' - a(6))/(C" - B") (9.12)
But also from (9.10) and (9.11) we know that
(q, 0)] 2 C ‘
E[B1 (q, n)] 2 B*
and thus by (9.2) 
C' 2 b ' (9.13)
Substituting (9.13) into (9.12) and then substituting the 
resulting expression for q* - q into (9.3) and (9.4), we obtain after
taking expectations:
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E[c(q*, 0)] 2 E [c(q, 6)] - 2y a 2 + 2y2 C"(o2 + i|<2) (9.14)
E[B(q*. n)] 2 E[B(q, n)] + 2y i|>2 + 2y2 B"(o2 + i|<2) (9.15)
where E[(a(0))2] “ a2 , E[(B(n))2] * and y » 1/(2(C" - B"))
Note that E[(a(0)) ] (E[(B(n)) ]) is an approximation for the variance 
of marginal cost (benefit) when q - q . y is positive as C" > 0 
and B" < 0 .
Now A (IP - Q) - E [b (q*, n) - C(q*, 0) - B(q, n) + C(q, 0)] (9.16)
A(IP - Q) 2 y (’I'2 + o2) > 0 (9.17)
With strategy IP’ we have, from (9.10) and (9.11):
C ^ q ’, 0) 2 B’ + B"(q' - q) 2 [e B^q', n)]
and C^q', 0) 2 C' + a(0) + C"(q' - q)
q' - q 2 2y a(0) (9.18)
Substituting in (9.3) and (9.4) and forming an appropriate 
expression for A(IP' - Q) , we obtain
A(IP' - Q) 2 y a2 > 0 (9.19)
By using the fact that A(i - j) - A(i - k) ♦ A(k - j) , 
all the elements in the Table are found from (9.5), (9.17) and (9.19).
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The following remarks can be made from consideration of
the Table.
1. If |C"| = |B” | then A(P - Q) is very small, whereas 
other elements in the Table are not in general small.
2. The smaller the absolute values of C" and B" , the 
greater is the advantage of using a strategy of type IP 
or IP' over using Q or P .
3. No variations associated with n appear in any elements 
other than in the top row. This implies that such variations 
affect P, Q and IP' strategies equally adversely.
4. The proportion of the advantage of using IP' rather than 
Q gained by using P rather than Q (assuming
|B"| < |C"|) is z^ where :
Zl - 1 - b,,2/c "2
The proportion of the advantage of using IP' rather than 
P gained by using Q rather than P (assuming |B"| > |C"|) is
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z2 where :
z2 = 1 - C,,2/B"2
If C" is near zero, then is near one, A(Q - P) is
very large and dominates A(IP' - Q) unless B" is likewise very small. 
The advantage of using IP' may still be considerable. However if 
|B"| is near zero, then z^ is near one and A(IP' - P) is near 
zero, and there is little advantage from using strategy IP' .
IV. We have shown that an "ideal" price can be found as a
simple schedule of 0 and n , (equation (9.6)) and have calculated 
the extent of the comparative advantages of such schedules over 
planning strategies P and Q . It is now necessary to consider the 
relative information requirements and the extent of other problems 
associated with the implementation of the various strategies.
Weitzman's result incorporating a criterion for preferring 
P to Q (A(P - Q)) relies simply on the relative magnitudes of 
C" and B" . However the implementation of either P or Q requires 
much more. A(P - Q) is a comparison of the 'optimal' price strategy 
p and the 'optimal' output strategy q . To find either p or q 
requires full knowledge by the planners of the functions B(q, n) 
and C(q, 0) ex ante, together with the distribution of n and 0 .
In addition p requires knowledge by the producer of the function 
C(q, 0) ex post. There is ample opportunity for differential informa­
tion or even moral hazard to prevent p or q from actually being
chosen.
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In order to implement the IP or IP' strategies, rather 
different information is required. Only ex post information on B(q, n) 
and C(q, 0) is required with strategy IP . The producer requires 
knowledge of the functions given 0 and n (in order to find q* ), 
and the planner requires knowledge of the actual values of the benefits 
and costs in order to find p* . In respect of measuring costs, honest 
cost accounting combined with an inspection of profits made should 
suffice. The measurement of benefits would in general be more difficult 
requiring some unbiased referee. However, it should be noted that the 
objectives of both planners and producers is the same - to maximise the 
excess of benefits over costs. If both have to make some declaration 
as to performance, their interests may largely coincide. An example 
of the principle of similarity. See Ross (1973).
Strategy IP' requires in addition that the producer can 
estimate expected benefits for each output level if the price is p* 
or that the planner can if the price is p' .
An additional advantage of IP or IP' strategies is that 
choice of the parameters a and b in (9.6) determines the allocation 
of risk between the central planning authority and the producer. Many 
different allocations of risk can be achieved while retaining the 
"ideal" property. However the P and Q strategies each uniquely 
define an allocation of risk. The distributional aspects of the planner- 
producer problem do not lend themselves well to strategies of type P 
and Q . It is by no means certain that such strategies will imply a 
'desirable' allocation of both expected profit and variance of profit to
the producer.
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The analysis here and Weitzman's model are both probably too 
normative to allow a totally convincing argument for the implementation 
of ideal price strategies as a practical and efficient planning policy. 
Nevertheless, a valid conclusion would appear to be that there is no 
justification for dismissing ideal price strategies while considering 
particular non-ideal strategies such as P and Q .
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The use of tatonnement processes to arrive at optimal plans has 
long been a subject of analysis, and recently the comparison of planning by 
setting prices with that of setting quantities has attracted particular 
interest (see Heal (1969)). On the other hand, criticism has been levelled 
at the tatonnement process itself as requiring much too much time and 
transmission of information to be a practical proposition. Weitzman (1974) 
considers the comparison of price and quantity planning procedures in a 
world without tatonnement and when planners act with incomplete information.
In his simplest model he assumes that planners maximise the expected excess 
of uncertain benefits over uncertain costs of a firm's activity by cpntrolling 
output, either directly by using a quota instruction or indirectly by setting 
a price and allowing the firm's profit maximising behaviour to determine output. 
The advantage of the price setting policy is that the firm chooses output with 
full knowledge of the cost function, while the disadvantage is that the firm 
ignores the effects on benefits which its decision is likely to have. Broadly 
speaking, his result is that if the marginal benefit curve is flatter (steeper) 
than the marginal cost curve then price planning is on average superior (inferior) 
to quantity planning., see Chapter 9.
The Weitzman model has been extended by, among others, Yohe (1978), 
Ireland (1977)(see Chapter 9), Laffont (1977), Karp and Yohe (1979) and Malcolmson 
(1978). As far as I am aware, however, the analysis has always been in the form of 
assessing benefits and costs from the nroduction of one or more firms in the econo 
my, whereas one of the maior forces for studying optimal planning was to ensure 
both full employment and feasibility in resource allocation. There is no 
way of imposing this in the benefits minus costs formulations and maintaining
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a cost function which is independent of other firms' decisions: with fixed 
factor endowments, one firm's cost function is a result of all firm's fac­
tor demand decisions. Indeed, one of the key problems of using prices as 
planning instruments in a second-best world with incomplete information is 
the lack of assurance of the feasibility of the joint output decisions of 
the firms. It is the purpose of this chapter to suggest just one possible 
way out of this dilemma, which develops naturally from Weitzman's model 
and which yields planning strategies susceptible to the same kind of 
comparative analysis.
Price and quantity controls in this chapter will refer to prices 
or quantities of one (or more)resources or factors of production. The 
quantity control is simply an optimal allocation of the available supply by 
direct instruction. A price control will be factor prices offered to a 
subset of firms. These firms will then determine their demands and the 
planning authority will allocate the remainder of the factor supplies to 
the other firms. Two questions thus arise. First, what is the optimal price 
to offer, and second which firms should be in the "preferred" subset of 
firms which are permitted to make factor demand decisions?
A further interpretation is possible in the context of labour- 
managed firms in conjunction with the incentive payment for labour mobi­
lity, described in Chapter 6. Here the resource price would be the shadow 
price 1» .
We will find in Section II that our conclusions, but not our 
analysis, differ markedly from that of Weitzman (1974) in that a price 
planning procedure of this kind for the allocation of a single resource 
between two firms can be found which dominates quantity controls unless 
the uncertainties in firm production processes are sufficiently positively 
correlated. We extend the analysis to any number of resources in
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Section III with rather weaker results. Section IV contains an analysis 
of optimal factor cost schedules and draws comparisons with the work of 
Ireland (1977) and Karp and Yohe (1979). Section V contains some final 
remarks concerning the generalisation of the model to more than two 
firms.
II, Allocating a single resource between two firms
We will assume that the planning authority wish to maximise 
the expected value of a social welfare function.
V = b ^  + b2Q2 (10.1)
where b^ and b2 are positive and are expected values of random 
variables which are independent of all arguments of and Q2 , which
are designated :
= Q ^ ,  0) (10.2)
Q2 " Q2<L2' n) (10.3)
The resource is available in a total supply of L efficiency 
units, so that for feasibility and full employment we require:
Ll + L2 (10.4)
where L^, L2 are the resource allocations to two firms with production 
functions (10.2) and (10.3) respectively. The units of measurement of out­
puts are chosen so that the product prices are both unity. Thus and 
Q2 are the respective firms' revenue functions. The coefficients b^ and 
b2 may diverge from unity due to income distribution or other considera­
tions
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0 and n are collections of random variables and we will 
assume that (10.2) and (10.3) can be approximated by
Ql - A(0) + (Q1' + a ( 0 K 4  - £t) ♦ - V 2 (10.5)
q2 ■ B(n) + (Q2' + 8(n)(L2 - l2) + iQ2"(L2 - L2)2 (10.6)
where Qx', Q2' are positive constants and Ql", Q2" are negative
constants. Also
E ci(0) = E 6(n) - 0 , and E(a(0))2 = a2 , E(B(n))2 « Y2 
and E(a(0).B(n)) = w
In (10.5) and (10.6) , L2 are the direct quantity alloca­
tions of the resources that maximise the expected values of (10.1) sub­
ject to (10.4), i.e. they satisfy
8Q1 3Q2t r> ^3Ï7 " b2 E 3L2 0
which implies from (10.5) and (10.6):
(10.7)
bi V  - W
Note also that
( 1 0 . 8 )
Q1(L1, 0) - A(0)
Q2(L2,n) - B(n)
(10.9)
so that (10.1) is equal to
bxA(0) + b2B(n) (10.10)
with the quantity allocation, which we will call strategy (L) .
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The use of quadratic approximations such as (10.5) and (10.6) have been 
criticised by Malcolmson (1978) .However, the technical reasons for such use 
are powerful as it is important in what follows to have marginal products 
which are separable functions of decision variables and random variables.
Now we will define two alternative price planning strategies. We 
will assume that each firm, if offered the resource at a relative resource 
to product price, w, could choose a profit maximising level of use of the 
resource given full ex post knowledge of 0 or n as appropriate. Thus 
the firm has more knowledge about its own production function than the 
planners, although it has no knowledge concerning the other firm's production 
function. If prices were set for both firms, then resource use decisions 
would not in general satisfy (10.A) . Suppose rather that we have:
Strategy (w^): the relative resource to produce price w^ is set for
■ ■■■■■ - -  'V
firm 1, which solves L^, given 0, from
( 10. 11)
'V.
so that = L^(w^, 0), reports this back to the planning authority and
then proceeds to hire the resource and produce the output. Then the 
planners allocate L - L1 units of the resource to firm 2, and require firm 2 
to employ them. We will limit our analysis by assuming 0 i L| i t .  The 
allocation of resources and thus expected social welfare will depend on 
the numerical value of w1 . This is chosen by the planners to maximise 
the expected value of (10.1), given the ex ante stochastic demand
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function Lj^ . Thus it satisfies
irb 3Qi - „ ^ 1 VL
.
3L, 2 >l-2 J 3w^ 0 ( 10. 12)
From (10.5) and (10.11) we have
L^Wj^O) “ (w1 - Q^* - a(0) + Q^" (10^ 13)
and so
(10.14)
which is negative and non-stochastic, 
see that (10.7) holds, and using (10.5) 
yields
Substituting (10.14) into (10.12) we 
, (10.6), (10.8) and (10.13) in (10.7)
0 (10.15)
and using (10.15) and (10.13) we obtain
W1
(10.16)
Then from (10.13) and (10.16)
(^wj, 0) -Lj - - a(0)/Q1'' (10.17)
and from (10-4)
l2 - l2 ■ « ( W / Q i " (10.18)
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In an exactly similar way we can state
Strategy (w^): the relative resource to product price is set for firm 2,
■ - ■ 'V.
which solves for k_(w2, n) to maximise its profits given w2 and n.
'V %
We assume 0 s L, S 1 . The remaining L - L_ units of tne resource are 
allocated to firm 1. By a symmetric argument to that for strategy (w^) , we 
have
L2 “ L2 “ " B(n)/Q2" (10.19)
Lx - ¿i - B(n)/Q2’’ (10.20)
The comparative advantage, A(w^-L) of using strategy (w^) over 
strategy (L) is given by the expected value of (10.1) using strategy (w^) , 
minus (10.10). Substituting (10.17) and (10.18) into (10.5) and (10.6) and 
thus into (10.1) and using (10.10), we have
A(W|-L) = i o2(b2Q2" - b1Q1,,)/Q1" 2 + b^/Qj" (10.21)
and when ai “ 0 and 0 and n are independent,
A(Wj-L) < 0 as b2|Q2 | > b||Qj |
so that strategy (wx) is better on average if firm l's marginal benefit product 
curve is steeper than firm 2's, i.e. if firm l's marginal benefit product of the 
resource is more sensitive to resource allocation. If w > 0  (< 0) then
this decreases (increases) the relative advantage of strategy (L), as when
»v.
marginal product is high in firm 1 (high a(0) 'leading to high L^, the
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marginal product is also, on average, high in firm 2 (high (5(n)), and the 
resource is likely to be badly misallocated.
We may also derive
A(w 2-L) ■= J Y2(b1Q1"  - b2Q2")/Q2” 2 + bjWQ2'1 (10.22)
so that if u f 0 , at least one of (10.21) and (10.22) must t>e non-negative.
( Also if id i 0 at least one of (10.21) and (10.22) must be non-positive)' 
Finally, using (10.21) and (10.22) yields
M w j-Vj ) = (b2Q2’' - b1Q1")H/(Q1" 2 Q2" 2) (10.23)
where H * { E
The sign of (10.23) is again determined by the relative slopes of the marginal 
product curves, weighted by the benefit coefficients.
The conclusions in this simple model are significantly different 
from those of Weitzman (1974), but have similarity with arguments in Laffont 
(1977) who considered the Weitzman quantity strategy as similar to a consumption 
prices strategy. We find that if to = 0  there is always a price strategy 
(wj or w2) which is to be preferred to strategy (L). Furthermore, the 
planners do better to allocate a resource price and the associated decentralised 
decision as to resource use to the firm with the steeper marginal benefit 
product curve, and then clear the market by allocating the rest of the resource 
to the other firm. Only if there is strong positive correlation between 
marginal products of the two firms are these results weakened.
£
(a(0)Q2'' + 6(n)Q1")
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Ill, Any number of resources
We can extend the analysis to the case of m resources by treating 
most of the notation as referring to vectors and specifying approximations to 
the production functions as
Qx = A(0) + (Q1‘ + a(0)(L1-L1) + (10.5a)
Q2 = b ( n) + (Q2’ + B(n))(L2-L2) + J(L2-L2)TM2(L2-£2) (10.6a)
where Q1', a(0), Q2', B(n) are row vectors, Lj, 1^, L2, L2 are
column vectors and , M2 are m x m non-stochastic matrices of second- 
order derivatives of the production functions, and are thus symmetric and 
negative definite. The superscript T indicates transpose. Strategy (w^ ) 
now relates to choosing a (column) vector of optimal resource prices, w^,
■V i\,
yielding firm l's demand vector 1^ = Lj ÎWj 0) . Proceeding as in Section
II we obtain from E a(0) = E 6(n) = 0
W 1
(10.16a)
L1 - Mj-1 n(0)T
(10.17a)
A(w l-L) = - J E |^(0)M1"1(b1M1 - b2M2)M1“1 a(0)T]
+ b2 E |^ë(n)M1-1 a(G)T] (10.21a)
Similarly, for strategy (w2), we have
^ « - I T
L2 “ L2 “ " M2 B(n)
(10.19a)
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and
A(w 2~L) = - B(n)M2_1(b2M2- b 1M1)M22“2 11' 2
(10.22a)
Even if 8(n) and a(0) are independent and the last terms in both (10.21a) and 
(10.?2a) are zero, it is no longer true that their signs will be opposite 
if (b2M2 - bjM^) f 0. A sufficient condition would be that (b2M2 - b^M^) 
were negative or positive definite.
and again a sufficient condition for strategy w^  ^ to be preferred to 
strategy w2 is that bjMj - b2M2 is negative definite, and here the 
criterion is independent of any correlation between a(0) and B(n).
Obviously if m “ 1, M^, M2 are scalars and definiteness of some kind
is assured.
Here, then, a rather weaker result is obtained than in the single 
resource case. This was to be expected as the welfare advantages of using 
strategy (wj) over strategy (L) may be a mixture of positives and negatives 
for different resources and thus the total comparison may depend upon
Subtracting (10.22a)from (10.21a) yields
(10.23a)
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weights derived from the levels of uncertainty of marginal products. Note 
however, that if and M2 are diagonal matrices (10.21a)-*-(10.23a) are much
simplified and the comparative advantage is additively separable over all 
resources. This, of course, would allow for a mixed w^/w2 strategy, each 
resource being treated independently as in Section II.
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IV. Cost functions
An alternative strategy to those considered so far is to set a 
cost function rather than factor prices to one of the firms, again allocating 
the residual factor supplies to the other firm. The questions arise as to 
the form of the function and the criteria for choosing the "preferred" firm 
to make the allocation decisions. Karp and Yohe (1979), extending the analy­
sis of Ireland (1977) (see Chapter 2) consider the optimal linear marginal 
revenue schedule. We will consider the optimal linear marginal factor 
cost schedules, set for firm 1 and defined by
w l* = + - L^) (10.24)
where w^ is the optimal price vector from strategy (Wj) and L the optimal
quantity vector from strategy 
total cost function is
(L) and Xj is an m x m matrix. Note that the
w 1*TL1 « C(Lj) + w^(Lj- Ll) + J (T.j - hj)T X | (L, - Lj) (10.25)
where C(L1) is total cost at L1 “ V
factor
Profit maximisation 
products, by choosing
by firm 1 implies setting (10.24) equal 
L ^ such that
to marginal
W1 ♦ V Li - £t> = Q1,T + a(0)T + Mj(L* - Lt)
(10.26)
i .e. L* - ¿i = (Xj - Mj)“1 n(0)T (10.27)
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The vector of demands for resources is dependent in general
of all elements of a(0). Of course if were diagonal then the demand
functions are independent provided is also diagonal.
Maximising (10.1) given (10.25) with respect to the (i, j)tn element 
of yields
|b1(Q1' + a(0 )) - b2(Q2' + Bin))
+ a(0)(X1-M1)"1(b1M1 + b2M2)| p[X1-M1)"1Ja(0)Tj - 0 (10.28)
Now consider the choice of
V  = - b2V bl (10.29)
then (10.28) reduces to
b2B(n) dx>
diXj-Mj)-1
a ( 0 ) TJ = 0 (10.30)
and (10.30) holds if 6(n) and o(0) are independent. Then Xj* satisfies 
the first-order conditions for an optimal linear contingent price vector. We 
have, substituting (10.2y) back into (10.27)
I * — L1 b2M2> a(0)
(10.31)
and the comparative advantage of using strategy (w^) as defined by (10.24)
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over strategy (L) is
A(Wj* - L) = - j bj2 E jaiOMbjMj + b ^ ) “1 a(0)*| - 0 (10.32)
and (10.32) is non-negative as ( b ^  + b ^ )  is negative definite. This 
strategy is in effect the resource allocation analogue of the IP' strategy in 
Ireland (1977)(see Chapter 9) extended to m resources. The analysis is very general 
except for the key assumption of independence of the a(0) and 0(n).
One other situation where progress can be made in the m resource case 
is where a(0) and 8(n) are constrained such that 8(n) “ G a(0) where
G is a non-stochastic square matrix. Then stochastic variations in one 
firm's marginal products can be completely explained by those of the other 
firm. Then
Xx = Mj - ( b ^  + b2M2)(b1I - b2G)_1 (10.33)
satisfies the first-order conditions (10.28), and in the special case where 
G = - I, such that a gain for one firm is a loss for the other,
Xx = (Mx - M2)b2/(b1 + b2) .
Finally, if there is just one resource we can find the optimal 
value for the scalar Xj^ for the case where
E(a(0) 6 (n)) “  w f  0
With - Ql"*
*
M2 ■ Q2*1* we have provided b^o - b2<*> > 0:
, W * ' *  W  ^ (10.34)
b2(o " b^o
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: .») <h;“ -bi"2>
L1 “ L1 ' 2 (b1Q1"  + b2Q2") (10.35)
, * _i (b-u-bj^o2)2
and A(wx - L) = b.Q," ♦ bJ<rrr
¿0 I i  ^q
(10.36)
The criterion for selection of the "preferred" firm which is to
decide the resource allocation is shown by A(w^ - wj) where strategy 
is that of setting an analogous cost function for firm 2. We have
*
(w2)
* * ( b A 2 - b2V)<fl'V - w 2) 
2 o V ( b 1Q1"  + b2Q2")
in the case of one resource and
A(w^ - w2) = - J E jj[b^ a(0) - b26(n)(b^M^ + b2M2)
(10.37)
(bjcKO) + b26(n)) | (10.38)
in the case of m resources when a(0) and B(n) are independent. 
Obviously (10.37) and (10.38) are identical in the case where to - 0 
and m ■ 1 .
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V. Conclusions
The analysis in this chapter has been conducted for a two-firm economy. 
We have assumed that the decisions made by the preferred firm are feasible, in 
that the firm's demands are not more than total supplies. This latter 
assumption is not particularly worrying in a two-firm economy - the preferred 
firm could be supplied with the minimum of its demands and the available 
supplies - but it is a complication in extending the model to n firms.
One possible way forward would be to rank the firms in terms of the criteria 
for judging the "preferred" firm and then ask each in turn (in the "pecking" 
order given by the rankings) for their demand responses to strategies of 
setting factor prices or cost functions until the supply is exhausted or 
until the last firm is reached. A further refinement would be the recom­
putation of w or w* in response to demand levels from highly ranked firms 
already received.
An alternative to the above kind of generalisation is to reinterpret 
the two-firm model in the following way. Let be the maximum revenue
from given inputs in one sector of the economy, and Q2 in the other. The 
coefficients bj >b2 a8ai" allow deviations in social value and revenue.
The functions Q2 are envelope functions reflecting the decisions of
many individual production units all equating marginal revenue products to 
marginal factor cost. When the latter is a given number (wi say) no further 
internal factor market is required and planning strategies con be chosen in 
accordance with the results of Sections II and III. 01 course, when a cost 
function rather than a factor price is used as the planning strategy, a further 
internal factor market for arriving at a sector-specific market-clearing 
marginal cost of factors is required.
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The analysis in this chapter has demonstrated an important difference 
in the criteria for selection of the preferred firm or sector between setting 
factor prices and setting factor cost functions. In the former case, and 
taking m = 1 and ui = 0 for simplicity, it is the relative slope of the 
revenue functions of the two firms or sectors. In the cost function case, 
however, the criterion is the relative uncertainty in the marginal revenue 
products. An explanation of this key difference appears straightforward. 
With the cost function strategies, the deciding firm takes full account, via 
the cost function, of the slope of the other firm's marginal revenue product 
schedule. Thus all that is left is to allocate the decision to the firm 
or sector with most uncertainty. With strategies (w^) and (w , however, 
no account at all of the other firm's marginal revenue product's sensitivity 
is taken by the deciding firm, and this relative sensitivity takes precedence 
over the levels of uncertainty.
In either case, the conclusion is the justification of a "pecking 
order" in granting firm's demands for resources in a situation of planning 
with incomplete or uncertain information.
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